



Transportation Security Administration

Report to Congress on Transportation Security March 31, 2003

Table of Contents

- I. Introduction**
- II. Transportation Security**
- III. Intelligence Domain Awareness**
- IV. Aviation Security**
- V. Maritime and Land Security**
- VI. Multimodal Security**
- VII. Research, Engineering, and Development**
- VIII. Cooperative Efforts**

- Conclusion**

- Appendix**

I. Introduction

The Aviation Security Improvement Act (P.L. 101-604) was signed into law on November 16, 1990, by President George H.W. Bush. Section 101 of the Act established the position of Director of Intelligence and Security, and in turn, an office was created within the Office of the Secretary of Transportation (OST) to perform the transportation security strategic planning, policy formulation, countermeasure coordination, interagency liaison and intelligence duties assigned by the Act. The Act also modified what later became through recodification Title 49 United States Code (49 U.S.C. 44938), requiring that this report be submitted annually by the Secretary of Transportation.

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (P.L. 107-71 or ATSA), signed on November 19, 2001, by President George W. Bush, significantly changed the way transportation security was managed and performed within the United States by creating the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) within the Department of Transportation (DOT) and vesting in the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security the responsibility for security for all modes of transportation.

The Under Secretary was specifically directed, among other things, to: receive, assess, and distribute intelligence information related to transportation security; assess threats to transportation; develop policies, strategies, and plans for dealing with threats to transportation security; make other plans related to transportation security, including coordinating countermeasures with appropriate United States departments, agencies, and instrumentalities; and serve as the primary transportation security liaison to the intelligence and law enforcement communities. These were all functions formerly assigned to the OST Director of Intelligence and Security by the 1990 Act. The Under Secretary was also directed to perform numerous specific operational functions, research and development, inspection, and enforcement of regulations, all related to transportation security.

In addition to giving TSA broad responsibility for security in all modes of transportation, ATSA outlined very specific responsibilities of the Under Secretary in the area of aviation security, and transferred to the Under Secretary security authorities formerly vested in the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the FAA Assistant Administrator for Civil Aviation Security. Among TSA's aviation security functions is responsibility for preboard passenger and property screening for U.S. and foreign air carriers at U.S. airports and airport perimeter security and access controls.

Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (November 25, 2002), TSA became a part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Act transferred to DHS all of the functions of TSA, including the functions of the Secretary of Transportation and of the Under Secretary relating to TSA. Technically, those functions were transferred to the Secretary of Homeland Security, but they have been delegated by him to the Under Secretary, now known as the Administrator of TSA.

TSA works to maximize the security of the public traveling in all modes of transportation, and strives to maintain the integrity of the U.S. transportation system and infrastructure against terrorist and other criminal acts through regulations, guidelines, inspections, cooperative agreements, and government investments. TSA coordinates intermodal and interagency intelligence matters and transportation security-related actions. Security actions, commensurate with their respective authorities, are carried out by TSA and by the DOT operating agencies, *i.e.*, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), the Federal Transit Administration (FTA), the Maritime Administration (MARAD), and the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA).

Additional responsibilities for maritime security have been vested in the Department of Homeland Security (as the Department in which the U.S. Coast Guard is currently operating) under the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), signed into law on November 25, 2002, the same date as the Homeland Security Act. Although TSA has responsibility for transportation security in all modes, including maritime security, and will continue to work cooperatively with the U.S. Coast Guard, section 110(a) of MTSA includes specific requirements that the Secretary of Transportation and Secretary of Homeland Security report on various aspects of maritime transportation security activities and the effect of those activities on port security against acts of terrorism. Accordingly, this report will not specifically address efforts in the area of maritime security in any detail. The law also requires that this report discuss “Assessment of Financial and Staffing Requirements” and provide “Legislative and Regulatory Recommendations” to Congress. We have not included such items because they are now included in budgetary and other required submissions from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

II. Transportation Security

The Federal Government fully recognizes transportation security as an important element in national security strategy and U.S. counterterrorism policy.¹ DHS and DOT are both committed to improving transportation security systemwide. Technology and human capability must keep pace with the increasing sophistication of explosive devices, other weapons and the techniques terrorists or criminals may use to threaten all forms of commercial travel. At the same time, processing passengers and baggage through screening checkpoints and the application of other security measures must improve to accommodate the rapid growth in passenger and cargo traffic. We must continuously improve the quality of security through better equipment for screening passengers, bags and cargo, used by carefully selected, well trained and certified Federal government and other security screening personnel.

¹ The White House, “A National Security Strategy for a New Century,” May 1997, p.10; reaffirmed in publications with the same title dated October 1998 and December 1999; reaffirmed again in the White House Office of Homeland Security, “National Strategy for Homeland Security” dated July 2002, p.4, 21-23, 29-30, 57-59, and 69.

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) recognizes the importance of security for forms of transport other than aviation. It states in SEC. 101(a) that the Under Secretary “shall be responsible for security in all modes of transportation...” and shall “oversee the implementation, and ensure the adequacy, of security measures at airports and other transportation facilities.” SEC. 101(a) assigns national emergency responsibilities to the Under Secretary to “coordinate domestic transportation, including aviation, rail, and other surface transportation, and maritime transportation (including port security).” In addition, SEC. 106(a) of the Act specifically recognizes the importance of the multimodal interface by authorizing the Under Secretary to order the deployment of “such personnel at any secure area of the airport as necessary” to meet aviation and national security concerns, including automobile parking facilities within and adjacent to airport secure areas, and “access and transition areas at airports served by other means of ground and water transportation.” SEC. 109(a) discusses enhanced security measures and suggests that the USTS may: “Require effective 911 emergency call capability for telephones serving passenger aircraft and passenger trains.”

The United States transportation system is vast, allowing the free movement of millions of passengers each day. It includes more than 367 maritime ports, more than 1,000 commuter rail stations, and 600 central bus stations. Each year, more than 130 million passengers commute by ferry, and more than six million take overnight cruise line voyages. Amtrak carries more than 23 million passengers on its own trains and more than 61 million passengers on local commuter rails, while the Long Island Railroad carried more than 85 million passengers. A recent report by the American Bus Association estimated that more than 860 million passengers ride on more than 44,000 over-the-road motor coaches and inner city buses each year.

Governments, airlines, cruise ships, bus, rail and transit, seaports, terminals, stations and airports must work together cooperatively to achieve our common goal: safe and secure transportation worldwide. Transportation hubs, transshipment points and multimodal locations must receive increased attention. We must strengthen partnerships among federal, State and local government officials, airline executives and station managers, airport and terminal operators, inland waterway and seaport directors, and bus, train and transit operators to assess security systems, reduce vulnerabilities and adopt the best practices in use today. Ensuring effective and efficient screening and other security measures for increasing numbers of passengers, bags and cargo on more trips on all modes while protecting civil liberties remains the greatest challenge for transportation security managers and the TSA.

Critical infrastructure must be protected. Transportation infrastructure security responsibilities are among those addressed by the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, which was established in July 1996,² and published its final report in October 1997.³ Pipeline security is as vital to our economic and national

² Executive Order 13010 of July 15, 1996, Critical Infrastructure Protection, 61 Fed. Reg. 37347 (1996).

³ The Report of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, “Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructures,” Washington, DC, October 13, 1997.

security as aviation or maritime security. Rail and highway bridges are also vital for the free and seamless movement of passengers and goods. In addition, each DOT administration also has a responsibility to protect its own assets, thereby contributing to the maintenance of the safety and security of the commercial transportation system.

It is vitally important that in ensuring security in all modes of transportation, we do so in an economical and efficient way that does not adversely affect commerce. We are diligently working to secure the supply chain, not impede it. We must ensure the safe, secure, and efficient movement of passengers and goods, and we believe we can accomplish all three in an integrated manner. We must be careful not to drive crime and terrorism from one mode of transportation to another one that is perceived to be more vulnerable.

The response of various federal agencies to the threat of terrorist attacks on the transportation system has been limited, due to gaps in authority, resource limitations, and conflicting priorities. In 1986, the U.S. Coast Guard was granted limited authority to address security threats to port terminals and on passenger vessels after a U.S. citizen was killed during the seizure of the foreign vessel *Achille Lauro* in 1985. However, nothing in the Coast Guard's existing authorities, regulations, or current guidance provides any particular minimum or mandatory security requirements. Rather, they simply state a general requirement that plans ensure the security of the passengers and of the vessel or terminal, with no enumerated screening standards. Each operator of a passenger vessel or terminal can choose from a variety screening methods (including trained animals, electronic devices or a combination of methods). Moreover, such operators are free to set their own standards for screening equipment and for hiring and training screeners, and they can decide on their own what weapons to prohibit.

Even less security protection is either required or currently exists in the rail, subway and bus transportation modes. Prior to the September 11 attacks, little statutory authority existed to require measures to ensure the security of rail, subway or bus passengers. In addition, agencies with jurisdiction over these operations have not issued any mandatory security standards. Rather, such agencies' missions have largely centered on maintaining operations and improving service. For instance, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) requires rail operators to implement plans to ensure passenger safety, but imposes no minimum requirements or standards for screening of passengers, baggage, crew, or stores' provisions. Similarly, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA)'s State Safety Oversight Rule, which applies to heavy rail systems not regulated by FRA, simply requires state oversight agencies to integrate "specific provisions for addressing passenger and employee security" into an established safety oversight program, and imposes no minimum security requirements. And although FTA has been working with light rail, subway, and bus transit systems to experiment with increased security practices, such practices are voluntary and subject to no mandatory or uniform standards.

III. Intelligence Domain Awareness: Assessment of Trends and Developments in Terrorist Activities, Methods, and Other Threats to Transportation

Threat is more than just a chronology of historical criminal and terrorist events. It is an assessment of potential based upon a combination of perceived intent and tangible capability. There are those in the world who demonstrate directed hostility and possess the knowledge, resources and skills to act upon that hostility. "Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty."⁴

The United States and its citizens at home and abroad remain targets for terrorist groups seeking to challenge our policies, influence international affairs and attack our concept of civilization. Terrorists seek to destroy public confidence in the safety and security of travel and damage our economic security. Two of the most cherished, traditional American "freedoms" are freedom of the seas and free trade. These relate to our perceived "right" to move and travel freely. The continued growth of commercial transportation, tourism and the world economy depends upon effective transportation security measures efficiently applied. However, the threat to transportation is not restricted solely to those motivated by political or social concerns.

Many aviation security measures are designed to prevent acts of terrorism. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that criminal acts against civil aviation are not committed exclusively by terrorists. Many crimes against civil aviation have been committed by mentally deranged persons, or fugitives and would-be refugees who resorted to hijacking only as a means of transportation with no clear intention of harming the aircraft or its occupants. Others, such as those related to insurance fraud in the 1950's and 60's, were more deadly.⁵ A ceiling on the amount of airline trip insurance passengers can purchase was imposed, and baggage screening was improved. Domestic airline sabotage declined until there were no fatal incidents in the 1970's.⁶ It is important to note that commercial airlines must counter crimes unrelated to terrorism, such as theft and fraud.⁷ Air carriers' security interests are inherently broader than the prevention of terrorism, and their own security programs deal with more than is required by Transportation Security Regulations in title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, parts 1500 through 1699.

Terrorism is difficult to forecast. The terrorist threat is a composite reflecting the capabilities and intentions of numerous small, often changing groups of individuals. The actions of a single individual can make an enormous difference in the overall threat level.

⁴ Attributed to Thomas Jefferson and John Philpot Curran (1750-1817).

⁵ President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, "Report to the President," Washington, DC, May 15, 1990. p.160.

⁶ Rochester, Stuart I., "Takeoff at Mid-century: Federal Civil Aviation Policy in the Eisenhower Years 1953-1961," U.S. Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, Washington DC, 1976, pp. 262-3, & 275.

⁷ President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, "Report to the President," Washington, DC, May 15, 1990. p. 46.

In addition, the threat at any given time varies in reaction to a broad spectrum of influencing factors and events, many of which are unanticipated. Nevertheless, the terrorist threat level in the United States, as well as internationally, is expected to remain serious. This judgment is based on consideration of a number of factors:

First, there are numerous unresolved conflicts worldwide, many of which show no sign of early resolution. The present tendency has been that more conflicts have emerged than have been resolved, and, unless there is an unexpected, dramatic change in this trend in the coming years, an increasing number will remain unresolved. While many conflicts do not involve the United States directly, the status of the United States as the sole "superpower" means that parties to a conflict, as well as outside observers and sympathizers, are prone to decry either U.S. involvement or lack thereof.

Second, since the United States is variously perceived as a supporter of unpopular regimes, an enemy of Islam, and an exponent of imperialism (whether political, economic, or cultural), any number of terrorist groups view U.S. interests as fundamentally inimical to their own. They see attacks against U.S. interests as justifiable, often meritorious and even obligatory.

Third, the expanding geographical range of terrorist activity is increasingly evident. Members of foreign terrorist groups, representatives from state sponsors of terrorism, and radical fundamentalist elements from many nations are present in the United States. There is evidence that a few foreign terrorist groups have well-established capabilities and infrastructures to support terrorism. There may also be other groups which are not yet known to the intelligence and law enforcement communities. The international radical fundamentalists' presence in the United States is growing, and the potential threat from them is increasing. Foreign radical fundamentalists operate in small groups and act without guidance or support from state sponsors, making it difficult to identify them, and even more difficult to anticipate and counter their activities. The United States may not be their primary target, but hatred of the West is a common theme. America is seen as a corrupting influence, destructive of society as the radical fundamentalists believe it should be.

Fourth, the manifest vulnerabilities of the U.S. infrastructure are likely to prove irresistible to terrorists wishing to inflict damage on the U.S. economy as they did on September 11, 2001. Foreign terrorists may choose civil aviation as a target again despite the many, more easily accessible targets that are equally (or possibly even more) symbolic of the aspects of America to which they are lethally hostile. Some terrorists in the United States have shown an ability to build small improvised explosive devices that are capable of destroying commercial airliners. These terrorists are capable of devising other means of attacking lightly defended or undefended components of the civil aviation system, perhaps using massive vehicle bombs, a successful terrorist tactic worldwide.

Fifth, while there has been a downward trend in the number of terrorist attacks until recently, the lethality is increasing. The attack on the World Trade Center in 1993, the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, the intentional destruction of U.S. facilities in the

Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996, and the bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa all demonstrated increasing willingness on the part of various terrorist groups to carry out attacks intended to cause indiscriminate mass casualties. These were all dwarfed by the coordinated attacks on September 11th.

Sixth, the phenomenon of ad hoc or non-traditional terrorist groups has introduced a factor that has greatly complicated the task of preventing foreign terrorist attacks worldwide. Denying entry of individuals who are not members of any *known* terrorist group, recognizing or identifying them as terrorists, or anticipating the timing, method or targets of attacks are extraordinarily difficult challenges for law enforcement and intelligence agencies. In addition, state sponsors of terrorism are distancing themselves from the activities of these groups, like Al-Qa'ida, allowing "free agents" such as Usama Bin Ladin or captured and sentenced Ramzi Yousef to operate.

Seventh, the Intelligence Community is becoming increasingly concerned with terrorists' acquisition or manufacture of chemical and biological weapons, as exemplified by the Aum Shinrikyo's 1995 sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway system. Although significant, these forms of attack are not accorded the same priority as attacks using explosives.

Finally, the successes of law enforcement and the judicial system in the arrests and convictions of the terrorists responsible for the World Trade Center bombing, a plan to bomb various sites in New York, and the plot to bomb a dozen U.S. air carrier flights in the Asia-Pacific region, have added a variable to the equation. On the one hand, the recent record could act as a deterrent to some foreign terrorists, particularly those with business ventures or fundraising activities in the United States, who do not want to provoke greater scrutiny. On the other hand, ad hoc or non-traditional terrorists are unlikely to be affected by such considerations and may well view the incarceration of one of their own as a provocation to be answered with retaliation. While law enforcement successes in the United States could deter some terrorists from carrying out attacks on U.S. soil, other terrorists may be incited to seek revenge either here or abroad.⁸

With respect specifically to the threat to civil aviation in the United States and internationally, it must be seen in the context of the broader threat. There is no evidence to suggest that the threat to civil aviation in the next ten years will increase disproportionately to the general threat. However, civil aviation's traditional appeal to terrorists as a high profile and prestigious target, coupled with continuing media attention concerning its vulnerabilities, lead unavoidably to the conclusion that the threat to civil aviation over the next ten years will certainly not diminish and could increase.

⁸ The nearly simultaneous blasts at U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on August 7, 1998, killed 224 people, including 12 Americans, and injured more than 5,400. Usama Bin Laden is suspected of masterminding and financing the bombings. He was placed on the FBI's 10 Most Wanted List prior to September 11.

IV. Aviation Security

The concept of combating terrorism through improved aviation security as an element of national security policy is not new. In the 1986 report of his task force on terrorism, then Vice President George H. Bush asserted that the United States views terrorism as a threat to the national security.⁹ On August 4, 1989, the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism was created by then President George H. Bush, after the December 21, 1988, bombing of Pan Am 103. Its objective was to conduct a comprehensive study and appraisal of practices and policy options to prevent terrorist acts against civil aviation with particular reference to the destruction of Pan Am 103. Many hearings were held, the Commission's report was issued on May 15, 1990, and its recommendations formed the basis of the provisions of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-604).

The U.S. aviation system has been on alert since the spring of 1995. On October 1, 1995, the Secretary of Transportation asked the FAA to direct airports and air carriers within the United States to begin implementation of more stringent measures than those that were announced by the Secretary two months earlier on August 9, 1995. Increased aviation security measures contained in previously agreed contingency plans in effect since then have been reflected in heightened security for other modes of transportation and their facilities within the United States. Security measures overseas have been increased and adjusted a number of times over that same period. The plot to bomb a dozen U.S. air carrier flights in Asia and the Pacific in 1995, coupled with the memory of the bombing of Pan Am 103 in 1988 and the French airline UTA Flight 772 in 1989, remind us that aviation security is an international problem requiring global solutions. Even in the face of the attacks on September 11th and increased threats within the United States, the threat remains great overseas.

President William J. Clinton established the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security on July 25, 1996, and directed that preflight security inspections be conducted on all overseas international flights: "every plane, every cabin, every cargo hold, every time."¹⁰ A preliminary report by the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) Baseline Working Group was completed and provided to the Commission on August 30 to contribute to an initial White House Commission report by September 9, 1996. The final report of the Baseline Working Group was published on December 12, 1996.¹¹ The White House Commission published its final report the next year.¹²

⁹ Bush, George, "Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism," Washington, DC, February 1986,

¹⁰ White House Office of the Press Secretary, "Statement by the President at Hangar 12, JFK International Airport," July 25, 1996.

¹¹ BWG, "Domestic Security Baseline Final Report," Washington, DC, December 12, 1996, pp. 78-79. This report contains sensitive information and is not available to the public.

¹² White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, "Final Report to President Clinton," Washington, DC, February 12, 1997.

The primary focus for DOT and other agencies in the late 1990's was to implement the White House Commission recommendations and the provisions of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 and the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997, which funded many of the Commission's initial recommendations dealing with aviation security. The *Two-Year Agenda for DOT's National Security Goal* stated that the goal was to "advance the nation's vital security interests in support of national objectives such as the National Security Strategy, National Drug Control Strategy, and economic growth by ensuring that the transportation system is secure and available for defense mobility and that our borders are safe from illegal intrusion."¹³ First among the outcomes to be achieved was to "reduce the vulnerability and consequences of intentional harm to the transportation system and its users."¹⁴

As required by ATSA, on February 17, 2002, TSA took over the responsibility for civil aviation security functions from FAA and approximately 1400 FAA aviation security personnel became the core workforce of the TSA. That same day TSA assumed the airlines' passenger screening company contracts and all equipment used to perform passenger screening at the Nation's airports. This was the first step toward the required hiring, training and positioning of Federal security screeners at all U.S. airport screening checkpoints, achieved on November 18, 2002, as required by law.

Effective and efficient civil aviation security will still be based on the system of shared responsibilities in place for the last thirty years. The new law provides government with more direct responsibility and increased authority, but does not absolve other partners from all responsibility for safety and security. Even as the federal government takes over many security functions, the shared responsibility will remain. All partners must do their fair share to make the system secure.

Status of Recommendations of the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism

On August 4, 1989, the President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism was created by Executive Order 12686. Its objective was to conduct a comprehensive study and appraisal of practices and policy options to prevent terrorist acts against civil aviation with particular reference to the destruction of Pan Am 103. Many hearings were held. The Commission's report was issued on May 15, 1990, and was reviewed in detail by the Departments of State and Transportation, other government agencies and the industry.

The Commission made 64 recommendations of which 31 were implemented or addressed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), another 11 by the Office of the Secretary of Transportation, 15 by the State Department and the remainder jointly with other agencies. Commission recommendations formed the basis of many of the provisions of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990 (P.L.101-604) signed six months after

¹³ Department of Transportation Website, <http://www.dot.gov/onedot/flagsec.htm>, August 26, 1999.

¹⁴ Id.

the Commission report. In that Act, a total of 43 actions were within the purview of the Department of Transportation. The Office of the Secretary (OST) had five and the FAA was assigned 38 actions to fully implement the 1990 Act. All FAA and OST actions have been completed.

Since the recommendations have been fully integrated into transportation security planning and reinforced by subsequent laws such as ATSA and the Homeland Security Act of 2002, TSA will not report on this item in a separate section.

Deployment of Explosives Detection Systems (EDS)

Explosives detection systems (EDS) significantly improve the effectiveness and efficiency of checked baggage screening and improvised explosive device detection. The purchase and deployment of EDS, advanced technologies for automated screening of checked bags, explosives trace detection devices (ETD), and other equipment has been funded by the Federal Government for nearly ten years to implement several laws, U.S. counterterrorism policy and national security strategy.

The Federal Government funded security improvements in the last decade by subsidizing the capital expenses of the air carriers, including initial training, first year warranty and maintenance, and installation costs. Checked baggage screening was the responsibility of the airline industry at that time. In accordance with the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1999 (P.L. 105-277), all major air carriers agreed in writing to assume operations costs for installed EDS and agreed to pay maintenance costs following the expiration of vendor warranties and the initial maintenance periods in U.S. Government purchase contracts. Congress was notified that those agreements were signed.

The deployment of explosives detection systems (EDS) in 2002 built upon the progress made since the first EDS was certified. In December 1996, the Federal Aviation Administration purchased 54 certified EDS with some of \$144 million for equipment provided in the Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997. From 1996 until December 31, 2000, over 100 certified EDS were installed at 38 U.S. airports in over two dozen cities for use by 21 airlines. In addition, over 580 explosives trace detection devices were deployed to 111 U.S. airports for use by 41 air carriers at screening checkpoints and in baggage handling areas.

By November 19, 2001, when the Aviation and Transportation Security Act was signed, there were over 140 EDS to screen checked baggage and over 780 explosives trace detection devices deployed nationwide. After the Act, over 200 EDS and over 1200 ETD were installed in U.S. airports through January 2002.

By January 18, 2002, TSA and FAA worked together to ensure that a system was in operation to screen all checked baggage at all U.S. airports, using a variety of methods. The system used at an airport changed as equipment was deployed to meet the end of year deadline to screen all checked bags using explosives detection systems (EDS). Until

EDS are fully deployed, alternatives will be used such as explosives trace detection (ETD) devices, TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams, and physical inspection of checked bags. As the Act allows, air carriers were required to use the security procedure known as “bag match” at locations where EDS were not yet deployed.

TSA entered into a contract with Boeing/Siemens to act as the integrator and coordinator with all U.S. airports and their stakeholders in developing and implementing an approved plan that would ensure the appropriate technology was deployed to meet the Congressional mandate of 100% EDS checked baggage screening by December 31, 2002. The process began with Boeing/Siemens working with the airport stakeholders and TSA’s Federal Security Directors (FSDs) in developing an acceptable plan. The next step required that detailed design documents be finalized and that all parties concurred on the designs. A deployment and installation schedule was developed once the design plans were approved and Boeing/Siemens obtained the necessary permits.

For those airports where alternative measures are in place, TSA is continuing to deploy technology to gradually eliminate the need for the use of such measures. TSA continually monitors the deployment effort to ensure timelines are met by both the manufacturers and those tasked with the installation.

While TSA and its industry partners have met the December 31 deadline, some installations are causing operational disruption in airport lobbies. At those airports, TSA continues to work with the airport authority to refine checked baggage screening configurations to minimize such disruption, as well as to minimize TSA’s staffing at each screening location.

TSA continues to work with vendors that have fielded certified EDS used for screening checked baggage to improve baggage throughput, increase detection capability and decrease false alarm rates. TSA is also working with new vendors that are developing screening technology, sharing “lessons learned” as well as assisting them in meeting the certification criteria before TSA can purchase and deploy their product.

By the end of calendar year 2002, approximately 730 explosives detection systems (EDS) and 4443 explosives trace detection (ETD) devices were installed in U.S. airports with more on the way. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296), Section 425, added Section 44901(d)(3) to title 49, United States Code, requiring monthly reports on the status of the deployment of EDS. Several classified reports have been submitted to Congress in accordance with that requirement. TSA is confident it will meet the new requirement for 100% EDS checked baggage screening at the remaining airports by December 31, 2003.

TSA Explosives Detection Canine Teams

The TSA National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program is the second largest explosives canine program within the Federal government and is the largest within the Department of Homeland Security. The National Program meets a core element of the

DHS mission by providing Federal resources and equipment to “first responders.” Under cooperative agreements with State and local agencies, TSA provides partial reimbursements of each team's annual operating expenses; provides explosives detection dogs; and, provides handler training, canine training aids, and storage magazines.

The Explosives Detection Canine Team Program exists to deter and detect the introduction of explosive devices into the transportation system. Bomb threats cause disruption of air, land and sea commerce and pose an unacceptable danger to the traveling public. They should be resolved quickly. Explosives detection canine teams are a proven resource that can reliably detect explosives and are a key component in a balanced counter-sabotage program. The use of highly trained explosives detection canine teams is also a proven deterrent to terrorism. Teams provide timely and mobile response to support transportation facilities, transit and rail stations, airports, passenger terminals, seaports and surface carriers.

The visibility and use of TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams has increased tremendously throughout the entire United States. The program has grown from 87 teams at 26 airports in 1996 to 281 teams at 64 airports by 2003. A major goal of the program is to have TSA certified teams present at each of the 82 largest airports within the United States. Another is to apply these valuable resources in an intermodal environment. A pilot program with the Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority has shown promising results for intermodal deployment of TSA-certified canine teams and will be used as a model for future applications.

TSA conducts annual certifications of each of the canine teams participating in the program, as well as Short Notice Assessments (SNA). These SNA's are conducted in partnership with the Airport Law Enforcement Agency Network.

As part of TSA's increased oversight responsibilities, Field Canine Coordinators (FCC) are currently assigned to each airport and provide liaison with Federal Security Directors and participating agencies. Through joint cooperation, an annual Comprehensive Assessment/Survey is conducted by the TSA field canine coordinators and the participating agency to evaluate the effectiveness of the program. TSA also promotes cooperation among international, Federal, State, and local explosives detection canine team programs by providing technical assistance through training seminars and international conferences.

TSA Explosives Unit

The mission of this unit is to provide an expert, rapidly deployable, national level resource on explosives for all transportation modes both within the United States and overseas. It provides twenty-four hour, expert advice on the management of transportation security incidents involving actual or suspected explosive devices to Federal Security Directors, as well as pilots in command and Federal Air Marshals about least risk bomb location (LRBL) procedures and other in-flight countermeasures. It also conducts post-blast investigations of transportation related bombings of aircraft, airports

and other targets, and conducts Explosives Security Surveys to evaluate airport, seaport, or other transportation hub vulnerabilities to terrorist or other criminal attacks which utilize explosives.

Unit personnel train Federal Air Marshals, other TSA personnel, airport, air carrier, transportation security and law enforcement personnel in explosives recognition, explosives effects, and emergency procedures involving explosives, explosive devices and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The unit provides assistance and advice to the National Transportation Safety Board, the Federal Aviation Administration, and other U.S. and foreign agencies on transportation explosives investigations. Testing and evaluation of the effects of explosive devices, explosions, and weapons on civil aviation aircraft and other transportation equipment is another important function. It also supports TSA personnel conducting threat analysis, formulating policy and plans, or conducting operations where there is a need for technical knowledge involving the use of explosives and other related threats to civil aviation or other modes of transportation.

Effectiveness of Screening

The Transportation Security Administration has intercepted more than 4.8 million prohibited items at passenger security checkpoints in its first year, contributing to the security of the traveling public and the nation's 429 commercial airports.

Through February 2003, intercepted items included 1,101 firearms, nearly 1.4 million knives, nearly 2.4 million other sharp objects including scissors, 39,842 box cutters, 125,273 incendiary or flammable objects, and 15,666 clubs.

When an item is intercepted, a passenger has the option of returning it to his or her vehicle, giving it to someone who is not getting on the flight, putting it in the mail before again going through the checkpoint, storing it in a checked bag if a permitted item is involved, or voluntarily abandoning the item at the security checkpoint.

U.S. Airport Security

Many activities to maintain and improve effective security at the Nation's airports during 2002 continued as Federal screeners were hired, trained and deployed and Federal Security Directors assumed their duties.

TSA continued the comprehensive oversight and enforcement of aviation security requirements at more than 400 U.S. airports, including seasonal facilities. Moreover, the agency continued to conduct on-site inspections and assessments at U.S. airports while maintaining close liaison with airport stakeholders to promote compliance with TSA rules and national standards for airport and airline security. Through this process, TSA is able to propose options to increase or decrease the security requirements based on threat and risk.

Reimbursements to local and State governments and authorities continued to pay for the cost of their law enforcement officers (LEOs) assigned to perform duties at U.S. airports. Virtually all airports with executed agreements have received purchase orders from TSA allowing them to submit invoices for support provided through January 31, 2003. The program obligated \$78,512,364 in FY 2003. Of that obligated amount, \$19,911,522 has been expensed and \$5,777,534 is being processed through the Finance Center in Oklahoma City. We are awaiting receipt of the invoices for the remaining \$52,823,307.

International Aviation Security

Aviation security is a worldwide concern. The Transportation Security Administration's security efforts are focused primarily on U.S. airports, U.S. air carriers wherever they fly, and foreign air carriers that service the United States. TSA and other governments work together to raise the level of security provided to protect all air carriers and airports. International air transportation requires global cooperation to ensure effective aviation security worldwide.

International Civil Aviation Organization

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is a specialized agency of the United Nations that was established by the Chicago Convention in December 1944. ICAO sets international aviation security Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) for its 185 Member States. TSA works closely with ICAO to strengthen these standards and to ensure compliance with them throughout the international aviation system. Recognizing the importance of aviation security in ICAO and the needs of its expanded aviation security office, the United States continues to be the largest contributor to the Aviation Security General Trust Fund and provides two TSA security specialists to ICAO headquarters in Montreal, Canada. ICAO uses these specialists to conduct security surveys and training for countries in need throughout the world.

European Civil Aviation Conference

The European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC) is an intergovernmental consultative organization that was established in 1955 by the Council of Europe with the active support of ICAO. ECAC's objectives are to encourage the safe and orderly development of civil aviation to, from, and within Europe. The Conference is comprised of 36 Member States.

In the field of security, ECAC's objective is to ensure the maximum level of security possible within ECAC and with its partners serving its airports. ECAC Member States apply ICAO Annex 17 Standards and Recommended Practices. In addition, supplementary measures appropriate to the conditions in Europe are promulgated by ECAC through its frequently revised security manual, Document 30. While the aviation security measures contained in the manual are not mandatory, the expectation within ECAC is that all Member States will comply.

The United States (TSA), Canada, and Israel have been granted permanent observer status on the ECAC Security Working Group. TSA is an active participant in the activities of the Security Working Group and two of its subgroups, the Operational Task Force and the Technical Task Force.

Transportation Security Administration Representatives

Transportation Security Administration Representatives (TSAR's), formerly, Civil Aviation Security Liaison Officers (CASLO), in all but four instances, are located overseas. There currently are 20 TSAR's who report directly to the TSA International Liaison Office. They are the primary TSA contacts with U.S. embassies and host governments on transportation security matters. Primary responsibilities include helping U.S. and foreign air carriers implement security requirements, the exchange of threat information, and onsite TSA coordination during transportation security incidents.

Foreign Air Carrier Security

Transportation Security Regulations in title 49 CFR part 1546 requires foreign air carriers operating to the United States to submit security programs to the TSA for acceptance for their operations to, from, and within the United States. At the end of 2002, there were 145 foreign air carriers operating to and from the United States that were required to have security programs acceptable to the TSA Administrator. The foreign air carriers may adopt the model security program (MSP) prepared by the TSA, submit their own security programs for review, or refer the TSA to foreign governments that perform security procedures at last points of departure to the United States.

The TSA continuously assesses threats against all foreign air carriers and will not hesitate to discuss and, if necessary, impose additional security measures to meet any threat.

Foreign Airport Assessments

Chapter 449 of title 49 of the United States Code required the Secretary of Transportation to assess the effectiveness of the security measures maintained at foreign airports: 1) served by U.S. airlines; 2) from which foreign airlines provide service to the United States; 3) that pose a high risk of introducing danger to international travel; 4) and at other airports considered appropriate by the Secretary of Transportation. This responsibility was transferred by ATSA to the Administrator of TSA.

Approximately 230 foreign airports qualified for assessment under the law; this number fluctuates as changes in air carrier service occur. The number of FAA assessments conducted at each foreign airport is determined by criteria such as current resources and threat conditions.

TSA focuses resources on those airports that may have difficulty sustaining effective security measures. These focused efforts include interagency actions to alert aviation officials to potential vulnerabilities. This enables the respective host governments to take

action to resolve security concerns before serious deficiencies develop. When the determination has been made that a foreign airport does not administer and maintain effective security measures, TSA may initiate action such as public notification or, in certain circumstances, suspension of service.

As a result of the assessments we conducted, TSA has strengthened the international civil aviation security system by offering security enhancement recommendations to airport and government officials from multiple countries. Most of the recommendations fell into the categories of access control, airport administration, passenger screening, airport emergency planning, national administration, baggage and cargo security controls. Onsite training and technical assistance were offered on numerous occasions to include special projects such as Safe Skies for Africa. In this vital project we provide technical support and training to help the nine designated African countries strengthen their airport security posture.

Since the events of September 11, 2001, we have concentrated efforts to ensure that aviation security providers at international airports continue to provide increased security measures for flights to the United States. Aviation security inspectors were deployed to all critical airports following the September 11 terrorist attacks, and remained vigilant through 2002. As a result of focused efforts on airports that required enhancements, it has not been necessary to issue any "Secretarial" action or notification for any international airport during this reporting period.

V. Maritime and Land Security

In maritime and land security, TSA capitalizes on existing DOT operating agency infrastructure and stakeholder relations to the maximum extent possible. We want to leverage these assets and build on them to ensure effective approaches to surface transportation security challenges with minimal duplication of effort.

TSA employs a systems approach, recognizing the inherent intermodal, international, and interdependent nature of transportation. We must avoid driving terrorism from one mode to another of perceived lesser security if possible. We must not make one mode's security measures overly stringent or too economically challenging compared to others. We must not concentrate solely upon one aspect of transportation security (e.g., cargo, passengers, infrastructure) and leave the others vulnerable.

Effective risk management based on threat and vulnerability assessments is essential for setting security standards and implementing countermeasures. High value, highly vulnerable transportation assets are our highest priority. TSA risk management depends upon partnership with industry to help identify and mitigate vulnerabilities. The consistent application of a single model that identifies security system vulnerabilities against specified threat scenarios is our vehicle for managing risk. Aggressive data mining and analysis will be used to accurately describe the threat, probability of attack, and consequence to transportation for focused, layered security.

Under this approach, there are three primary elements of good risk management: a threat assessment, a vulnerability assessment and a criticality assessment. TSA maritime and land personnel are actively engaged in developing vulnerability templates across the various transportation modes in support of the risk-based regulatory approach. We plan to analyze vulnerability to potential threats against a facility's existing security baseline, and generate numerical scores representing relative risk. The goal of future security standards will be to link vulnerability model generated relative risk scores to the homeland security advisory system (e.g., the color coded threat system). This will be accomplished by requiring facilities to achieve reduced relative risk scores, through the prudent implementation of security countermeasures, as homeland security threat levels increase.

TSA seeks to set national transportation system security standards in conjunction with modal administrators and stakeholders. The standards will be mandatory and apply to everyone above certain thresholds. In setting these standards there is recognition that transportation is a global enterprise and to the greatest extent possible, adoption of these or similar standards by international bodies is preferred. Though TSA will set the standards, they will be administered and implemented by existing agencies and organizations.

Prior to the September 11 attacks, little statutory authority existed to require measures to ensure the security of rail, subway or bus passengers. In addition, agencies with jurisdiction over these operations have not issued any mandatory security standards. Rather, such agencies' missions have largely centered on maintaining operations and improving service. For instance, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) requires rail operators to implement plans to ensure passenger safety, but imposes no minimum requirements or standards for screening of passengers, baggage, crew, or stores' provisions. Similarly, the Federal Transit Administration (FTA)'s State Safety Oversight Rule, which applies to heavy rail systems not regulated by FRA, simply requires state oversight agencies to integrate "specific provisions for addressing passenger and employee security" into an established safety oversight program, and imposes no minimum security requirements. And although FTA has been working with light rail, subway, and bus transit systems to experiment with increased security practices, such practices are voluntary and subject to no mandatory or uniform standards.

The existing regulatory framework leaves the maritime and land-based transportation systems unacceptably vulnerable to terrorist attack. Seaborne passenger vessel and seaport terminal operators work under inconsistent levels and methods of screening, and they are largely free to make their own rules regarding the hiring and training of security personnel, both at normal and at elevated threat conditions. The rail, subway and bus transportation systems are subject to no mandatory security requirements, resulting in little or no screening of passengers, baggage, crew, or stores' provisions. A terrorist attack on any of these industries, which serve passengers far greater in number and in socioeconomic diversity than airports, could severely damage the confidence of the American public in its commercial and public passenger systems. Uniform screening

standards, enforced by binding regulations, are needed to better protect ships, trains, subways and buses from terrorist attacks.

TSA will develop a series of regulations that will set screening standards for specific subsets of each transportation mode. For instance, separate regulations will govern the screening of passengers boarding small ferries, baggage on passenger rail trains, and crews or stores transported on cruise lines. The standards will establish procedures for the screening of passengers, baggage, crew, and stores, and set minimum employment and training qualifications for security personnel, and require regular training and re-certification of security personnel and equipment.

Each transportation mode has unique characteristics that will make various security measures more or less feasible or appropriate. For instance, unlike airports and airplanes, bus, subway and train systems often feature remote entry points which lack infrastructure to assist in directing and controlling access to the rest of the rail or bus system. Moreover, different threats affect particular subsets of each transportation mode. For example, the potential personal and economic harm from a terrorist attack affecting 5,000 passengers on board a vacation cruise ship would be far different than 15 passengers aboard a small touring ferry. Similarly, the efficiency demands of commuter transit systems during peak hours, such as rush hour on the Staten Island Ferry or in the Washington, D.C. metro system, will require faster screening than for non-commuter travelers, such as tourists awaiting transport on a vacation cruise or tour bus. Screening procedures will be carefully designed to effectively screen and have a minimum impact on passenger, baggage, and crew mobility.

Screening standards also will reflect systematic evaluation of their ability to effectively detect threats and prevent attacks, albeit in a manner which is as cost effective as it is prudent. The standards will incorporate consideration of the operating environment, such as station or terminal designs, peak and non-peak traffic, departure and arrival points, rest rooms, and waiting areas. Development and implementation of screening standards will utilize prototyping in the development phase of the standard setting process to identify appropriate technologies and processes that will be effective and efficient in preventing and protecting against threats. Screening procedures also will take advantage of intermodal facilities where they exist to avoid double-screening. For instance, many airports are co-located with seaports where large numbers of passengers are either unloading off ships and boarding planes, or vice versa. In such cases, passenger and property screening by one mode might obviate the need for re-screening prior to entry into the next mode if appropriate controls and safeguards are set in place.

Maritime and Inland Waterway Security

The three agencies within the Federal Government with responsibilities for port and maritime security are the Coast Guard, the Maritime Administration, and TSA. The Coast Guard is the lead operational agency with maritime security responsibilities because of its operational presence in all major ports and because of its broad military and statutory authorities. The Coast Guard, TSA and MARAD work together in

evaluating port security grant applications and selecting the amounts chosen recipients receive.

The Coast Guard is our Nation's lead maritime security agency and functions as the first line of security on our maritime borders. It has broad military and statutory authorities that are critical to securing our 95,000 miles of coastline, 3.4 million square miles of Exclusive Economic Zone and 361 seaports. Nearly 40 percent of the Coast Guard's current operating budget is directly related to the core missions of the proposed Department and the remainder of its missions contribute indirectly to the overall security and economic viability of the Nation.

The Coast Guard brings critical capabilities to the new department. The Coast Guard possesses extensive regulatory and law enforcement authorities governing ships, boats, personnel, and associated activities in our ports, waterways, and offshore maritime regions. It is a military service with around-the-clock command, communication, and response capability. The Coast Guard maintains a network of coastal and seagoing vessels, aircraft, and expert personnel to prevent and respond to safety and security incidents. It has a geographic presence throughout the country, coasts, rivers, and lakes, both in large ports and small harbors. As a member of the National Intelligence Community, the Coast Guard offers intelligence fusion and dissemination capabilities.

Perhaps the most important maritime related initiative that TSA began during its first year of existence is the "Operation Safe Commerce" (OSC) program. OSC is a cooperative effort between the Federal government and the non-Federal sector that includes some of the top "load centers" in the United States. In the New York metropolitan area it includes the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. On the West Coast it includes the ports of Los Angeles, Long Beach, Seattle, and Tacoma. OSC involves the close cooperation between several Federal agencies. The Department of Transportation (including the Office of the Secretary and the Maritime Administration) and the Department of Homeland Security (including TSA, the Coast Guard and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection) currently chair the program, with key members being the Department of Justice, the Department of State, and the Department of Commerce.

Its purpose is to explore commercially viable options that support cargo management systems that keep pace with expanding trade, while protecting commercial shipments from threats of terrorist attack, illegal immigration, and contraband. Using grants to the designated load centers, OSC will analyze existing supply chains and current security practices, and provide a test-bed for potential solutions and improvements in container security. OSC will aid in the development of procedures, practices, and technologies that help secure and monitor cargo from point of origin to point of destination.

Congress appropriated \$28 million as part of the Fiscal Year 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act to provide seed money for grants that TSA will award and administer based on proposals that the load centers will submit. The grants will not be limited to the port authorities alone. Rather, persons and entities that represent components of the

supply chain may seek funding through the ports. These pilot projects will provide a proof of concept that will ultimately improve the security of the international and domestic supply chain.

Another important step that TSA took in its first year was the awarding of port security grants. In July 2002, TSA, in conjunction with the Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration, awarded grants to 77 ports throughout the Nation totaling \$92 million. In the New York metropolitan area as an example, TSA awarded \$8.9 million to the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.

The 77 grants fell into two categories, both involving critical aspects of maritime security. The first category, funded at \$9.3 million, involved an assessment of current security needs that will enable ports and terminals to evaluate vulnerabilities and identify mitigation strategies for their facilities. Approximately \$77 million of the grant pool went to the second category to provide funding for facility enhancements. This second category also included a subcategory for "proof of concepts" in technology that will advance port security. "Proof of concept" projects explore the use of new technologies such as electronic seals, vessel tracking, and electronic notification of vessel arrivals. Five million dollars supported grants in this area.

These grants were a down payment on a larger effort to enhance the security of the maritime transportation system. All of these grants answered specific needs, but the total of 850 grant applications requesting approximately \$700 million in funding indicates that more needs to be done and more resources are needed..

As part of the FY 02 Supplemental Appropriations, Congress provided an additional \$125 million in funding for port security grants and stipulated that TSA use \$20 million of these funds to support port incident response exercises and training related to port security. These funds will also provide continued support for security assessments and enhancements. TSA worked closely with the Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration in reviewing the grant applications and making the determinations of grant awards for the initial round of funding and will continue to do so in disbursing the additional \$125 million.

TSA is participating in a multiagency effort involving radiological dispersal devices (RDD). This is an important program involving several agencies in the Department of Homeland Security. TSA is co-leading this effort with the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection under the Border and Transportation Security Directorate.

In 2002, the TSA Explosives Unit assisted the Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation with a blast analysis of the tunnels beneath the locks of the U.S. portion of the seaway and facilitated funding of that engineering analysis through the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). The unit facilitated a blast analysis and offered advice about a possible retrofit of the Golden Gate Bridge in San Francisco, California. The Explosives Unit has also developed an explosives security training package in concert with the International Council of Cruise Lines (ICCL) and has taught several

courses to cruise line security personnel covering topics like explosives, terrorist IEDs and bomb threat management procedures. A similar effort was coordinated with AMTRAK for rail security. The Explosives Unit also conducts a quarterly seminar on explosives security for the Global Maritime and Transportation School's National Maritime Security Program at the U.S. Merchant Marine Academy, Kings Point, NY., and was featured in a maritime industry security awareness video training tape.

Land Security

TSA is working with the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) to assist the rail industry in conducting security assessments of our freight rail system. The security of hazardous materials including radioactive materials and defense related shipments are two areas that have received special emphasis. FRA is also assisting Amtrak in enhancing the security and safety of New York City tunnels under the East and Hudson Rivers. FRA is currently developing with Amtrak a grant agreement specifying the projects that will utilize the \$100 million in emergency supplemental funds provided to Amtrak for improving the security of these tunnels. Funds are anticipated to be obligated shortly.

TSA is also involved with the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) on assessing the security of high-risk transit assets including vulnerabilities in subway tunnels and stations where large numbers of people converge and where an attack would cause the greatest disruption to transportation services. FTA is working with local systems to develop best practices to improve communication systems and develop emergency response plans.

A key concern of TSA is the security of cargo on trucks. TSA is conducting industry-wide cargo threat assessments and considering options to help prevent terrorists from hijacking trucks or cargo that would also provide the trucking industry with the ancillary benefit of reducing cargo theft. This effort ties in closely with the plans to prevent the unlawful importation of radiological weapons or other weapons of mass destruction into the United States.

The Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) and TSA have worked together to heighten security and surveillance of critical highway infrastructure including vital connectors to our ports, railroads, and military bases. FHWA is working with State Departments of Transportation and local transportation officials to conduct vulnerability assessments and to establish protection strategies. Furthermore, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration is working to ensure that trucks crossing the borders into the United States have been properly inspected and meet security and safety requirements.

To keep pipelines secure to the maximum extent possible, the communication process has been streamlined with our Federal, State and industry partners to ensure that security information and threat warnings are available on a real-time basis. TSA and the DOT Research and Special Programs Administration continue to focus on implementing a

coordinated, appropriate set of protocols based on threat assessments for inspectors to use to verify that operators are putting security practices into place at critical facilities.

VI. Multimodal Security

It is critical to understand the intermodal nature of transportation. For example, goods that are manufactured in a factory in Belgium or China and then shipped to a point of embarkation in Europe or Asia do not complete their journey when the container is off-loaded in Port Newark or Long Beach. From those arrival points it would be shipped by rail or truck to distribution centers around the country, and eventually again transported to factories in the United States for further assembly or placed onto store shelves. The same transport process is true for goods, raw materials, and agricultural products exported from the United States. Furthermore, a wealth of goods is either entirely transported by rail or truck within our own borders or cross-border to Canada and Mexico. On a daily basis, rail and truck commerce also includes high volume, high content shipments of hazardous materials.

The multimodal aspect of transportation applies to passengers as well as to goods. Passengers move from highways to mass transit to aircraft and back. Commercial passenger aircraft also carry cargo. Airplane passengers become cruise ship passengers and then make the reverse trip on the way home. After arrival, commuter ferry passengers may take intra-city buses to get to their offices. The over-the-road bus industry carries over 750 million passengers a year on regularly scheduled and charter bus service traversing critical bridges and tunnels as part of their everyday journeys.

A project to streamline baggage screening for Royal Caribbean cruise ship passengers catching flights on American Airlines is being studied at the Port of Miami as a way to reduce travel hassles for air/sea travelers. After Royal Caribbean passengers clear immigration and customs inspections, TSA screens their baggage while they check in with American Airlines and get boarding passes. Until reaching their final destination, passengers do not have to touch their bags again. After screening, their bags are taken by truck from the Port to Miami International Airport, unloaded and transferred to appropriate American Airlines flights. Project partners include the Miami-Dade Police Department, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Coast Guard, and other Department of Homeland Security agencies.

At Miami International during peak season, up to 15,000 passengers disembark from cruise ships at the Port of Miami in a two-hour period. Their arrival just adds to the normal rush when they get to the airport. Other airlines and cruise lines have approached TSA about forming similar partnerships. The process eventually could be reversed. Bags could be checked to Miami International from another airport, transported by truck to the port terminal, turned over to the cruise line to be screened and then delivered to their owners as they board the ship. In addition, partnerships could eventually involve hotels, Amtrak and bus lines. Effective security, efficiently applied must be maintained at all times for the project to be a success.

VII. Research, Engineering, and Development on Transportation Security

Detection of high explosives and prevention or mitigation of their use to attack commercial passenger aircraft has been a prime focus, historically of the Federal Aviation Administration, and now the Transportation Security Administration (TSA). The current terrorist threat extends beyond air transportation to all other modes of transportation and to fixed facilities. The Department of Homeland Security will build on TSA's R&D in this area to develop and deploy even more effective explosives detectors that can address the broader threats. Development of reliable stand-off detection capability for large quantities of explosives, especially in vehicles, is particularly needed.

Enhanced detection of weapons of mass destruction carried over our transportation infrastructure or into our ports and terminals is an additional focus. Combining information from cargo manifests, routing documents, and other databases, while taking advantage of the Nation's vast capabilities in information technology, will improve our ability to identify suspect cargo and promote more effective and efficient inspection processes. Finally, the ability to discern individual hostile intent allows more focused screening; a key tool to enhance transportation security.

Recommendations for research, development, test and evaluation activities include:

- Improve explosives detection equipment and procedures to allow reliable detection of explosives carried by persons boarding aircraft;
- Improve explosives detection equipment and procedures to allow reliable detection of explosives in air cargo;
- Improve efficiency and reduce false alarm rates of explosives detection systems currently used for screening checked baggage;
- Adapt explosives detection technologies for use in other modes of transportation, such as trains and cruise ships;
- Develop stand-off detection technologies that can detect large quantities of explosives in cars and trucks at a distance;
- Develop stand-off detection technologies that can detect, if possible, the quantities of explosives carried by suicide bombers on their persons with the intent to detonate explosives in crowded areas such as transportation terminals;
- Enhance detection of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons of mass destruction;
- Develop and test technologies that will utilize existing and proposed data bases and data mining, information visualization, and knowledge management techniques;
- Research and develop techniques to detect physical manifestations of threatening behavior from individuals presenting themselves at ports, terminals and other transportation facilities;
- Develop and test the next generation of non-intrusive inspection systems;

- Develop initiatives to support the Container Security Initiative (i.e. smart containers), ground and maritime sensors, global tagging and tracking systems, and surveillance systems; and,
- Enhance protection of airports, ports and waterways by improved situational awareness and surveillance systems.

The TSA Explosives Unit has initiated three counterterrorism (CT) research and development projects through the interagency CT community's Technical Support Working Group (TSWG). These projects include a post-blast database for use by bomb investigators in the field to compare explosive device components recovered at a bomb scene with known database of those components. This project is fully funded and underway. The second project will create a homemade explosives simulant training kit, designed to give security screeners, law enforcement personnel and investigators a visual example of what homemade explosives should look like when discovered either during screening or in law enforcement operations. This project is fully funded and will be fielded in June 2003. The final project will examine the likely bomb building components that can be expected in the future based upon current and emerging technologies that have not yet been seen in improvised explosive devices (IEDs). This project will be funded in FY-2004. Together, these TSA sponsored projects will give Federal, State, and local first responders and security personnel important new tools for the war on terrorism.

The TSA Explosives Unit is also participating in the development of several other TSWG projects which include a CBRN training kit using inert simulants, and an international project involving the study of the scalability of home-made thermobaric explosives which have been discussed in terrorist training manuals recently recovered in Afghanistan. The unit has also been instrumental in initiating a TSA pilot program for the incorporation of new explosives detection algorithms into current explosives trace detection (ETD) devices to alarm on previously undetectable explosives that are in the Al Qa'ida and other terrorist groups' inventories.

VIII. Cooperative Efforts

Other Departments, Agencies, and Instrumentalities of the United States Government

Involving our stakeholders in everything that impacts them is TSA's pledge. We have established charter working groups to revisit old issues and address new ones. Each group must gather input from the issue's most appropriate stakeholders. In performing its functions while coordinating within DHS, TSA will capitalize on existing programs in all modes of transportation, and we will make extensive use of existing infrastructure and relationships with stakeholders. A large part of our business plan involves continual coordination with the many stakeholder groups representing various modes of the transportation sector.

In the maritime arena alone, TSA representatives have met with and discussed the security concerns of a large number of groups, such as the American Ship Building Association; the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU); the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command; the Nation Association of Waterfront Employers; the Port of Tacoma; the U.S. Chamber of Shipping; the APL Limited Shipping Line; the American Association of Port Authorities; the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers; and the National Defense Industry Association to name a few examples.

With respect to our specific commitment to transportation security, TSA will work within the umbrella of organizations within DHS to set national standards and criteria for transportation security. TSA will continue to work closely with the Department of Transportation to coordinate our joint responsibilities for improving transportation security. Both Secretary Ridge and Secretary Mineta are confident that these ties will remain strong.

The Office of the Secretary of Transportation, TSA, the other modes within the Department of Transportation, and other Federal agencies have been working on two important initiatives in the critical area of maritime security. First, a multi-agency Container Working Group (CWG) was established after 9/11. The Office of the Secretary of Transportation, TSA, Coast Guard, and the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (BCBP) are the major participants in the CWG. (Other members of the CWG include: Maritime Administration; Federal Highway Administration; Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration; Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation; Federal Aviation Administration; Federal Railroad Administration; Bureau of Transportation Statistics; Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service; the Department of Commerce through its Technology Administration and National Institute of Standards and Technology; various offices of the Department of Defense; the Food and Drug Administration and the Federal Maritime Commission.

There are also a large number of private sector participants including in part the American Trucking Associations, the Association of American Railroads, the World Shipping Council, the Pacific Maritime Association, the National Association of Waterfront Employees, the Marine Transportation System National Advisory Council, and the International Mass Retailers Association. Its charter is to address key components of the process through which a container/truck is packed, secured, loaded and transported to the United States, ensuring the integrity of the shipment at all points in the international transportation chain.

The Container Working Group established four subgroups to examine issues relating to: Information Technology (IT) -- Cargo information and acquisition; Security Technologies (ST) -- Physical security, tracking of containers, WMD detection, and eventually "blast containment technologies"; Business Practices (BP) -- To examine best practices to improve security that are commercially viable; and, International Affairs (IA) -- To work with the international community on container security.

The anticipated result of this effort is to improve the overall security of containers/trucks by: establishing security standards and criteria for identifying high-risk containers/trucks; implementing a prescreening process to target containers/trucks before they are shipped to the United States; developing and deploying technology to prescreen identified high-risk containers/trucks; developing procedures and deploying technology to secure containers/trucks as they are transported to the United States; and, improving cargo security during domestic transportation, particularly high consequence cargoes.

Related to the CWG is a Container Security Initiative (CSI). TSA will participate in this effort by increasing the data that agencies such as the BCBP can review in order to accomplish a more thorough analysis of threats posed by containers shipped in commerce.

TSA's Rail Cargo Security Branch has identified a "Chlorine Initiative" as a priority project to address bulk hazardous materials shipments. This effort has been closely coordinated with other key participants. TSA has worked closely with organizations both within and outside the Federal government, and continues to work with the DOT Intermodal Office, and DOT's Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA). Outside of the government some of the participant groups include the American Chemistry Council, the Chlorine Institute, and the American Association of Railroads.

The goal of this initiative is to perform a system-wide security review of the shipment of chlorine. This review will track the transport of chlorine throughout the supply chain. This again focuses on the intermodal aspects of our transportation system. The analysis and the conclusions we develop will enable TSA to identify best practices, and to propose standards and performance based regulations. The Chlorine Initiative will serve as the prototype for the development of security standards for the transport of other bulk hazardous materials. TSA is also part of a Department of Homeland Security chaired working group with the Department of Energy, the Department of Justice, the BCBP, and other agencies, to discuss regulating the transportation of radiological materials. Similarly, TSA is involved in preliminary discussions with the Food and Drug Administration to explore initiatives in the safe transportation of shipments of food and agricultural products.

Cooperation with Foreign Transportation and Security Authorities

In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, we know we cannot have border security without effective transportation security. America can and must accommodate both reliable security and economic growth. Within the last four months this Administration has signed "smart border" accords with both Canada and Mexico precisely to develop joint action plans to ensure the secure and efficient flow of people and goods across not only our borders, but across trade corridors that stretch from northern Canada to southern Mexico and beyond. Transportation security and effective border management are different sides of the same coin.

The St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation has been working closely with its Canadian counterpart and the Coast Guard to heighten security on the St. Lawrence River and ensure the protection of ocean access to our Great Lakes ports.

The Maritime Administration is working jointly with BCBP, exporters and importers, carriers and governments to establish business and security practices that will push the Nation's virtual borders outward to the point of loading of containers.

The Coast Guard has engaged the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in the development of international maritime security procedures that we hope will be adopted by the IMO later this year.

TSA is working with international organizations such as the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to develop an international consensus to combat terrorism. The White House announced in a press release on June 26, 2002, an agreement among the Summit participants regarding transportation security. President Bush secured G-8 agreement on a major new U.S. proposed Transport Security Initiative designed to enhance our security while growing our economies. G-8 countries account for over 50 percent of the world's trade, approximately two-thirds of the world's passenger aircraft fleet, and 13 of the world's 25 busiest international airports.

The United States proposed in March that the G-8 cooperate in addressing these challenges by advancing key transport security initiatives within G-8 countries, and in multilateral bodies such as ICAO, IMO, and the World Customs Organization. The initiative will lead to more effective screening of people and cargo before transit; increased security for ships, airplanes, and trucks while in transit; and enhanced security at airports and seaports. By deploying modern technology, the initiative will push the security perimeter beyond physical borders, strengthen security, and expedite the movement of legitimate cargo and travelers.

Conclusion

The finest way to honor the memory of those who perished on September 11th is for those of us in TSA and DHS to continue to work together to improve the overall system of transportation security so those events are never repeated.

As the national transportation system security manager, TSA will be the lead agency in the DHS to determine transportation system security requirements, resources and countermeasures. We are already working with other DHS agencies and DOT operating administrations to develop security standards, incorporate industry best practices, discover effective new technologies and innovations, and create a more uniform level of effective and efficient security measures across all modes.

Appendix: Summary of Activities and Accomplishments for 2002

January

- On January 7, TSA started recruiting to hire Federal Security Directors for U.S. airports after contracting with Korn/Ferry International to assist with the search for qualified candidates.
- On January 9, FAA issued a list of eleven recommended security measures for flight schools and fixed base operations. The recommended measures are applicable to all general aviation (GA) aircraft, but focus primarily on those under 12,500 pounds maximum certificated takeoff weight. Although not required, these security measures represent GA “best practices” widely recognized and accepted within the community.
- On January 18, TSA ensured that a system was in operation to screen all checked baggage at all U.S. airports, using a variety of methods. The system used at an airport will change as equipment is deployed to meet the end of year deadline to screen all checked bags using explosives detection systems (EDS). Until EDS are fully deployed, alternatives will be used such as explosives trace detection (ETD) devices, TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams, and physical inspection of checked bags. As the Act allows, we are also requiring air carriers to use the security procedure known as “bag match” at locations where EDS are not yet deployed. Over 200 EDS and over 1200 ETD are installed in U.S. airports.
- On the same day, FAA issued new, detailed guidance for training crew members in dealing with potential threats, especially hijackings. The guidance, developed in consultation with airlines, pilots and flight attendants, represents a shift in strategy from passive to active resistance by crewmembers.
- The Transportation Security Oversight Board was formally constituted and met on January 28.

February

- On February 1, TSA announced a series of six week studies at 15 U.S. airports conducted by TSA staff supported by business process consultants that traced the movement of passengers and cargo through security systems to determine what changes could provide both more effective security and better service to travelers.
- The DOT budget unveiled on February 4 included \$4.8 billion in funding for TSA’s first full year.

- From February 8-24 during the 2002 Olympic Winter Games, TSA deployed both EDS and ETD to the Salt Lake City International Airport to screen carryon and checked baggage, effectively serving as a “real world” pilot study of innovative ways to use these security technologies.
- On February 17, TSA took over aviation security screening responsibilities that have been the airlines’ for over 30 years. The Under Secretary of Transportation for Security also assumed responsibility for civil aviation security functions from FAA and approximately 1400 FAA aviation security personnel became the core workforce of the TSA.
- The FAA Aviation Security Research Service (AAR-500) in its entirety was also transferred from FAA to TSA along with the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security. A Chief Technology Officer was designated.
- At the same time FAA, on behalf of TSA, initiated new contracts with the airline’s screening companies and no cost loan agreements covering the appropriate equipment used to provide passenger screening at U.S. airports. Through June 2002, TSA negotiated 73 contracts with screening companies and 80 reimbursement agreements with airlines that perform their own screening. TSA also signed no cost loan agreements for the current screening equipment and reimbursement agreements with over 100 airlines, airport authorities and other entities like airport consortia to provide maintenance services for the equipment.
- An interim final rule was published effective February 18, 2002, establishing the Aviation Security Infrastructure Fee to help defray TSA's costs of providing U.S. civil aviation security services.
- On February 19, contract regarding intellectual property (IP) rights was signed with InVision Technologies, Inc.
- On February 22, Special Federal Aviation Regulation (SFAR) 91 dated October 30, 2001, was incorporated into TSA’s regulations under 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 1550.7. SFAR 91 covered all-cargo flights exceeding 95,000 pounds gross takeoff weight. These measures were intended as anti-hijacking precautions, and not for the security of the cargo being transported on the all-cargo flights. Many all-cargo air carriers, however, voluntarily adopted FAA-approved security programs for the cargo they transfer to passenger flights.
- Also on February 22, TSA published a final rule known as the “Twelve-Five Rule” that requires aircraft operators who are not already operating under a security program and are using aircraft weighing 12,500 pounds or more to implement a security program that includes: (1) fingerprint-based criminal history records checks on their flight crews, and (2) restricted access to the flight deck. The regulation and the security programs apply to all-cargo and passenger aircraft, some seating less than 20 passengers. Scheduled and charter (public and

private) passenger operations that are not already covered by a security program must also adhere to this program. As published, the effective date of the Twelve-Five Rule was June 24, 2002.

- Again, on February 22, FAA and TSA jointly published a Final Rule effective February 17, 2002, transferring civil aviation security rules from FAA (14 CFR) to TSA (49 CFR) and amended those rules to comport with ATSA and enhance security as required by the Act.
- On February 28, TSA ordered 100 explosives detection systems (EDS) from InVision Technologies, Inc., consisting of CTX 2500 and CTX 5500DS models, and placed an order with InVision to acquire parts kits sufficient to build an additional 300 explosives detection systems. Together the equipment and the parts kits are valued at approximately \$169.8 million.
- DOT formed a working group to develop strategy and policies to detect, deter, prevent, protect against, and mitigate chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons material (CBRN) attacks on the United States through the national transportation system. The group is working to identify and prioritize threats, develop scenarios, determine gaps in procedures, develop response strategies and procedures, and identify research and development requirements for detection for each threat. The membership includes TSA headquarters and technical center, OST and FAA representatives with other modes expected to join soon. The Department of Energy and the Federal Emergency Management Agency have sent observers to meetings and several intelligence community briefings have been received. TSA has been involved in many interagency meetings and groups relating to CBRN.

March

- On March 4, DOT and TSA announced that NCS Pearson Inc. will assist in the recruitment and hiring of Federal security personnel to perform airport screening duties and other functions at U.S. commercial airports by providing an automated, Internet-based system for the recruitment and placement of personnel. Under the terms of the \$103.4 million competitively procured contract, the company will also provide on-going human resources services for these personnel.
- The first seven Federal Security Directors were sworn in on March 13 by Secretary of Transportation Norman Mineta.
- On March 18, the Secretary and TSA announced grants totaling \$175 million in supplemental funds for 317 eligible airports, drawing from the Department of Defense's 2002 Appropriations Act, for costs associated with additional law enforcement personnel, airport surveillance and the revalidation of all airport-issued and approved identification. In reviewing the 317 applications, FAA found

that the smaller airports suffered the greatest impacts, while the medium and large airports had a greater capacity to absorb the additional security costs.

- Also on March 18, pilot program testing of 100% checked baggage screening for explosives began at Norfolk airport with explosives trace detection (ETD) devices.
- On March 24, 300 Federal passenger screener-trainer candidates reported to Oklahoma City to begin training and were fitted for uniforms.
- On March 26, the Request for Proposals was issued for the explosives detection systems (EDS) integrator contract. The base contract value was \$508 million; however, funding for the contract was limited to \$60 million (estimated costs through July 31st) pending receipt of supplemental appropriations by TSA.

April

- On April 1, TSA ordered 300 InVision Technologies Inc. explosives detection systems (EDS), consisting of CTX 2500 and CTX 5500DS models, to be built from parts ordered in March. In addition, the TSA ordered 100 more components kits. The TSA agreed to pay InVision \$148.6 million for the manufacture of equipment and the additional component sets.
- On April 2, TSA ordered 100 L-3 Communications Examiner 3DX™ 6000 explosives detection systems (EDS) and provided long lead funding for an additional 200 units and ramp-up funding for more potential orders. A contract regarding intellectual property (IP) rights was also signed.
- From April 3-August 1, pilot program testing of checked baggage screening for explosives took place at Dallas Love Field airport using ETD in combination with EDS.
- TSA supported a joint law enforcement agency task force that enabled authorities to arrest more than 100 airport employees in the Washington-Baltimore metropolitan area for falsifying information on employment applications.
- On April 24, TSA awarded a contract of \$105 million to Lockheed Martin Services to begin the training of the airport security screening force. Under the contract, each screener received a minimum of 40 hours of classroom training, 60 hours of on-the-job training, and had to pass a final exam to graduate.
- On April 30, TSA announced that 200 Federal screening personnel began serving at Baltimore-Washington International Airport.

- Also on April 30, TSA posted an updated list of items, including “dual use” items, that passengers may not bring into the aircraft cabin. TSA will review the list periodically, train its screeners and announce any changes.

May

- In early May, TSA sent letters to all U.S. airports about the two year qualified private screening company pilot program with one volunteer airport selected from each of five airport categories.
- From May 13-17, the effectiveness of quality control measures and ETD screener performance was studied at Norfolk airport to improve training on sampling techniques and supervisor monitoring.
- From May 15-June 13, pilot program testing of checked baggage screening for explosives using various detection technologies alone and in combination continued at Grand Rapids airport with explosives detection systems (EDS).
- On May 18, TSA submitted a report to Congress on the deployment and installation of security screening equipment.
- On May 19, TSA submitted a report to Congress describing progress on the evaluation and implementation of enhanced security measures.
- Also on May 19, TSA submitted a report to Congress on a performance plan with measurable goals, objectives and specific actions to improve aviation security screening and access control.
- On May 20, TSA announced that five airports will serve as pilot test sites for different ways to deploy explosives detection technologies.
- On May 21, pilot program testing of checked baggage screening for explosives began at Jacksonville airport using explosives detection systems integrated into the baggage handling system.
- On May 28, TSA ordered 100 explosives trace detection devices each from Ion Track and Barringer for screening carryon and checked bags.

June

- On June 4, the Transportation Security Oversight Board met for the second time.
- On June 5, TSA completed its recruitment for many of the initial 81 Federal Security Director and Deputy Federal Security Director positions.

- On June 7, the Boeing Service Company was awarded the contract to be the General Contractor to deploy and install explosives detection systems (EDS) and explosives trace detection (ETD) devices in U.S. airports, manage maintenance of the equipment, and provide training for a minimum of 21,500 Federal baggage screeners to operate the equipment.
- On June 14, the Department of Justice published an interim final rule with comments due by July 15. The rule outlines the expedited process for certain aliens who are currently trained pilots and the kinds of information to be provided by flight schools. The accompanying proposed rule established the process for flight school notification and information submission for all other foreign candidates, and Attorney General response and approval if the applicant does not pose a threat. Once finalized, the process will be provided by FAA to flight schools and training centers, and will also be mailed to all certificated flight instructors in the United States.
- TSA also announced that VF Solutions of Nashville, TN was awarded the contract for up to 52,000 uniforms for Federal screeners.
- On June 18, TSA announced the five airports selected to participate in the Private Security Screening Pilot Program intended to test the feasibility of having private contractors perform Federally supervised passenger and property screening at U.S. airports. TSA's next step was to identify qualified private screening companies that were eligible to participate in the pilot program, then solicit, award, and administer screening contracts.
- On June 19, TSA issued a final rule effective August 19 on private charter security requiring operators of aircraft weighing 95,000 or more to ensure pre-board passenger and property screening.
- An Airport Access Control Program Plan was drafted and approved to establish pilot programs at 20 airports to test and evaluate new and emerging technology such as biometrics for providing access control and other security protections for secure areas of airports. On June 21, TSA sent a letter to airport managers announcing the program, soliciting volunteers and asking for a response by August.
- Also on June 21, FAA published a final rule effective the same day that requires improved flightdeck security and operational and procedures changes to prevent unauthorized access to the flightdeck on passenger-carrying aircraft and some cargo aircraft operated by foreign carriers under the provisions of Federal Aviation Regulations Part 129. The final rule applies the same flightdeck security enhancements to foreign air carriers as apply to U.S. air carriers detailed in the November 21, 2001, final rule.

- On June 25, TSA placed members of TSA's Mobile Screening Force (MSF) at Mobile Regional and Louisville International airports to assume responsibility for all passenger checkpoints and gate screening operations. These screeners were kept in place until TSA hired and trained the permanent workforce for each airport.

July

- On July 8, TSA began sending assessment teams to conduct initial studies for the federalization of passenger and baggage security screening at 111 U.S. airports. Over 200 airports have been visited by site assessment teams.
- On July 11, TSA ordered from InVision 50 model CTX 9000DSi explosives detection systems, and parts to build 50 additional systems. A similar order was placed with L-3 for 80 units and 125 long lead time parts kits.
- As of July 16, TSA Federalized checkpoints in three airports, accepted job applicants for over 300 airports, announced 47 Federal Security Directors, and sent site assessment teams to over 280 airports.
- As of July 17, for EDS, TSA had trained 134 TSA screeners and 575 contract screeners, while for ETD, TSA had trained 60 TSA screeners and 554 contract screeners since February.
- On July 19, TSA announced the selection of 24 more Federal Security Directors, bringing the total to 71 at U.S. airports.
- On July 24, TSA published a notice in the Federal Register on the criteria for certification of explosives trace detection (ETD) systems.

August

- On August 2, Secretary of Transportation Mineta announced the selection of 47 additional Federal Security Directors (FSDs), bringing the total to 118 responsible for security at 149 U.S. airports.
- Unisys Corporation was selected on August 2 to provide effective, secure and reliable computing resources and technology services to TSA employees in the field and at headquarters.
- On August 8, Orlando International received \$5.6 million to acquire security equipment from grants from the Airport Improvement Program.
- The Private Charter Security Rule published on June 19, 2002, requires operators of certain larger aircraft to ensure that passengers and accessible property are

screened prior to departure. Private charter aircraft that enplane from or deplane into an airport sterile area, regardless of their size, are required to screen passengers and their baggage. This rule was effective on August 19, but an additional comment period was added on August 28 to allow for review and comment through October 30, 2002, on TSA's proposed security program. As a result, the security program and other aspects of the rule were reviewed and revised by TSA.

- By August 29, TSA had named 145 Federal Security Directors (FSDs), who have responsibility for 380 airports.

September

- By September 17, TSA completed funding for a total of 425 L-3 Communications examiner 3DX(TM) 6000 explosives detection systems, supplementing previously announced agreements for 180 examiner 3DX 6000 systems and component kits with long-lead funding for an additional 245 units.
- By September 24, the total number of airports to which Federal screeners were deployed reached 122 of 429 U.S. airports.
- Also by September 24, Boeing-Siemens had sent site survey teams to 332 airports to meet with airport and TSA officials to discuss the location of the required explosives detection equipment and perform assessments.

October

- By October 3, TSA had ordered 25 new explosives detection systems (EDS) and funded the production of systems from parts kits previously purchased, including CTX 5500 DS and CTX 9000 DSi models that are designed for integration into baggage handling systems. These orders brought to 625 the number of EDS that TSA had ordered from InVision since March 2002.
- By October 22, TSA had announced 154 Federal Security Directors, who are responsible for approximately 420 airports.
- The FAA published picture identification requirements in the Federal Register on October 28 that requires a pilot to carry an acceptable photo ID and present it when asked by an authorized person.

November

- By November 11, TSA had installed over 230 explosives detection systems (EDS), over 1000 advanced checkpoint x-ray devices and over 1630 explosives trace detection (ETD) devices in U.S. airports.

- On November 12, TSA deployed the first group of federally trained private contract screeners to San Francisco International Airport.
- On November 19, TSA completed the deployment of over 44,000 Federal security screeners and 158 Federal Security Directors responsible for 429 U.S. airports and so certified to Congress.
- Also on November 19, TSA submitted a report to Congress on screening requirements for aircraft with 60 seats or less used in scheduled passenger service.
- On November 20, DOT and Customs jointly announced Operation Safe Commerce (OSC), a program to fund business initiatives designed to enhance security for container cargo moving throughout the international transportation system. It provides a test-bed for security techniques with the potential to increase the security of container shipments. DOT and Customs will use the program to identify existing vulnerabilities in the supply chain and develop improved methods for ensuring the security of cargo entering and leaving the United States. Security techniques that prove successful under the program will then be recommended for implementation systemwide.

December

- On December 6, fingerprint based criminal history record checks were completed or in process on all screeners, employees granted unescorted access to secure areas or other employees performing security functions at U.S. airports.
- On December 8, enhanced security procedures and preventive measures were provided to FSDs to assist them in their work with airport authorities on issues relating to the use of explosive devices in attacks against airport passenger terminals and other critical airport infrastructure.
- As of December 20, there were 267 TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams at 63 of the nation's largest airports. The TSA has requested additional resources to expand the program to 325 teams in 82 airports by the end of 2003.
- On December 30, FAA published a final rule on flight deck security and foreign carriers operating to and from the United States effective on the same date with comments due by February 28, 2003. The rule clarifies requirements published on June 21 and ensures that U.S. and foreign air carriers.
- On December 31, TSA was screening all checked baggage at U.S. airports with explosives detection systems (EDS), explosives trace detection devices(ETD), TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams or combinations of measures allowed by law.