TSA Chief's Goal: Win Back the Passengers
News & Happenings
January 18, 2008
Kip Hawley, head of the Transportation Security Administration, is an easy target.
The TSA is one of the most visible public symbols of the post-9/11 world, and has come to represent for many the often petty inconveniences the civilian population faces in the war on terrorism.
So, combine public visibility with a job description that almost guarantees an annoyed customer, sprinkle in an opposition Congress, and what you have might not be a recipe for a happy final year in office.
Hawley sat down with CQ Homeland Security Reporter Eleanor Stables to talk about a wide range of challenges facing TSA as the Bush administration enters its last 12 months, and to take a look back at the agency's accomplishments and failings since he took over the job in July 2005.
Q. The omnibus spending bill (PL 110-161) enacted in December includes funding for the domestic airline passenger screening program Secure Flight. When do you expect to complete Secure Flight testing and when will it be operational?
A. Our plan going in to the budget process was that if we got what we needed - and I think we do have what we need - that we could get it up and running some time in calendar '08. And that's what we're working through right now. That is definitely our target. And the funding level would allow that. Now the rule needs to be published and then the technical pieces need to be accomplished, tested and those are the key points.
Q. The omnibus bill also included funding for more TSA screeners at airports and removed the cap of 45,000. Do you plan to hire more screeners in '08?
A. There are a couple of programs that the Congress has provided resources for us to do, which include the behavior detection piece, which as you know we have begun, and this will continue it. And Viper [Visible Intermodal Protection and Response teams of uniformed and covert air marshals and other security personnel] programs are important, and there are some resources in there for that. We were not really constrained by the cap itself because it was a dollar level that we lived within, so that the number of FTEs was never the real driver for us, it's the cash. We had enough cash in the last couple of years to do our job, and we expect this is the same here. The question is how well do we use our cash and that's the piece we focus on - how do we improve the security result for the dollars that we invest, or that the American public invest?
Q. So it sounds like you probably aren't planning on hiring additional screeners?
A. We have our hiring plan set and there is growth in traffic so our goal is to cover the traffic. It ebbs and flows . . . you don't want to staff year round at this peak number so we do ebb and flow. We also changed our mix to a greater number of part-time and split-shift employees so that we can be, you know, in the morning rush hour and then maybe a lunchtime and maybe an evening, so you've got three basic peaks during the day. So we've arranged our workforce so that we have part-time so that we'll cover the peaks, but not have people not utilized during other parts of the day.
Q. You're testing active millimeter-wave and backscatter technology. Do you have any preliminary results?
A. They're both good at detection. The millimeter-wave has had slightly higher acceptance rates - in the 90 percent range, 90 percent plus. The backscatter's been in the 70-75 percent range, but the numbers are not big enough that I would draw a whole lot from that. I think the public is demanding better technology to do personal screening and I think that's a good thing and it's, I believe it is less invasive to use this technology than to do the pat-down. The pat-down can be pretty invasive and we like these technologies because they are effective and we have privacy measures built into them. So I think that most people realize that there really is not a privacy risk when they go through.
Q. What about the puffer machines? I see those in different places. Are you planning to expand use of those?
A. No. We're focused, for '08, we're looking very much at millimeter wave and backscatter. The puffer's out there operating and there are improvements being made to it and certainly we want to stay in touch with the producers of those, so it's part of the portfolio.
Q. And what about the other security technologies? Are there any that you're planning on discontinuing or expanding?
A. Well the AT X-ray [advanced x-ray technologies] at the checkpoint for carry-on bags is one that you'll see a lot of in the coming year. We've bought 250 of them and they'll start being deployed in the spring and those will be very much in evidence. So I think that's probably the biggest impact across the country and that will have the effect of a very much sharper image for our ability to detect what we need to detect. And it's clearer and it's a faster process so that our officers can make an evaluation and then identify something or clear something, and that will have the effect of speeding up the checkpoint process.
Q. What is it you're planning on achieving in '08, what's the big picture for the last year of this administration?
A. I think our big challenge for '08 is to win the passengers back, to realize we're all on the same side and to be active and good-humored participants in the security process, knowing the seriousness of it, and participating and helping. I think what I see a lot, or have seen, is frustration with the process and "I'm not sure why I'm taking my shoes off" or "I don't get the baggy" and things like that, and we'd like to engage with the public and have them really understand that they're very much part of the security process and they can improve the speed and the efficiency of it by doing a few things that make it easier for us to determine, "hey, you're not a threat and let's get you out of the way" and we can focus on someone who might be more of one.
Q. Is there anything we haven't talked about yet that you would plan on purchasing or implementing?
A. Well the major priority is IEDs [improvised explosive devices] at the passenger checkpoint and that is major focus for training, for equipment and for our process. The new technology you're going to see is the AT X-ray. We've got a few other things that we do, but AT X-ray, millimeter-wave, maybe some more backscatter, are the principle things. Canines, we're going to have a whole lot, if you want to look at technology more broadly, our canine teams are going to increase significantly.
Q. What kind of increase do you expect?
Well, we're going to add about 170 teams to the 400-odd that we have now so that's a fairly significant increase, and those resources will largely be focused on air cargo, and that will provide additional security in the air cargo area.
Q. Shifting gears a bit, why are some airlines worse at using the terrorist watch lists than others are?
A. Some airlines, everybody's got their own systems, and some are better capable of doing the matching than others and from their point of view, why would I go and invest a whole lot in watch-list matching when Secure Flight is coming and it'll all go to the government anyway? So there hasn't been a big incentive for them to invest their money in better watch-list matching. The problem is that all those people that think they're on a watch list, that's a huge public perception problem and it won't be cured until we get Secure Flight up. Secure Flight takes the watch list matching into the government. Right now we send the watch lists out to the airlines, they do the matching. That's the problem we're talking about and when Secure Flight's up we won't be sending the watch list out. And therefore from a security point of view that's better and also from a matching point of view it's better.
Q. DHS is trying to get the airlines to do the fingerprint gathering for the exit portion of the entry-exit monitoring program U.S.-Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology program (US-VISIT). The airlines say TSA should gather the fingerprints. How are the negotiations going and what do you think's going to result?
A. Congress and the law says you've got to get the fingerprints of people leaving. That's the law and it totally makes sense. Then the question is how do you do it. It's not part of our specific mission but really it's up to the airlines and US-VISIT to work out how it is. If we are going to do it we clearly don't have fingerprint readers at checkpoints, we can't make them out of whole cloth, so somebody would have to figure out who would pay for that and where they'd be and how to work them into the system, but we're used to dealing with all of our other agency partners and we work together.
Q. A man on an Air Canada flight recently started shouting loudly in midflight, "Shoot me! I'm going to die today! I'm going to die! Allahu Akhbar!" The incident was caught on video by a fellow passenger, so that any chance that he might sue the airline for any alleged mistreatment is lessened. Do you think there might come a time when airlines, the Federal Aviation Administration or TSA would put cameras in planes to guard against such incidents, or to provide evidence of mistreatment, or a defense against false charges of mistreatment?
A. Certainly possible and the topic comes up now and again. I think when the capacity for air-to-ground communication comes up with sufficient bandwidth that the issue will get more traction. Right now it's something that's talked about and it has many uses and for us the real value would be in having real-time access to it. If you wanted to have an image of what's going on in the plane right now, having that is more valuable than after the fact being able to pull the tape.
Q. TSA used to refuse to admit publicly that there was such a thing as a "dry run." After the London plane plot was foiled, the administration changed its tune. What is TSA doing now to detect dry runs?
A. We did not deny dry runs, somehow that's wrong. The story behind that . . . there's a lot of information out there. Basically the deal's this: al Qaeda, the way they work is they figure out whatever we're doing and figure out a way around it. And so there's a whole long background to this but anyway, they are looking at our security measures and changing their approach accordingly. So in order for them to figure out what we can find and what we can't find they will run with things that simulate what they really want to bring and see if we can catch it. That's been happening for a long time, and it happens today and will continue to happen. Our mission is clearly we have to make sure we can pick up on when they're bringing a bomb through - we have to stop that bomb. But it is almost as interesting to us to find someone who's doing a dry run because then you have an opportunity to stop them before they even get their explosive, whatever - it's much, much better obviously to get it earlier in the process.
Q. When will airports have a TWIC-like program [Transportation Worker Identification Credential, a biometric identification card program] and how would that work exactly?
A. We're talking with the airports now about that. There is a brand appeal to the word biometric that, biometrics certainly have a role but unless you have certainty as to the identity of the individual that you're taking the fingerprint of, the biometric doesn't do much good. So, for instance, if I say, "I'm John Smith, the great public-spirited citizen," and then I go get my biometric as John Smith. But suppose I forged the identity as John Smith and instead I'm somebody else who's not so good. So if you can fake your way in the system a biometric will seal you on the inside - so if we run on just taking everyone and giving them biometrics you may not in fact be improving security. So what you need to do is first button up the front-end to make sure you've got the right guy or woman and then give them the biometric. Then it's great, an excellent security measure. But so often we get enamored of deadlines and requirements - "you must have everybody with a biometric ID." Yeah, we can get everyone with a biometric ID, you just won't know who they are. So the question is usually as you've asked - when are you going to get the biometric? The security role is to first solidify that first point, identify who that individual is, and then at that point get the biometric. We're working on that first part, getting that first part locked up right now, with the airports. And then as we're confident of that the biometrics will be added on.
Q. When you say you're trying to do that with the airports - how is that being done at the seaports? Is there not already a good way to do it?
A. The ports have a centralized process where the government is actually doing the card issuance. Airports are different in that they've been using this credentialing system for years and they have their systems already built. So you could say, okay the government will take this over, and then that would be like what we're doing with TWIC for port workers. Or you could say, let's use the existing credentialing process - which is a good process, it's just a different process. So that's the issue - why we're not just replicating TWIC for port workers and moving it to airports.
Q. With the TWIC roll-out in Long Beach, I've heard that's one port where there's a lot of temporary workers that will just occasionally be used to drive cars off a ship. Are those type of workers going to have to get a TWIC as well, even though they won't often need one?
A. If they're going to have secure access to a port, they will. But the Coast Guard captain of the port designates what are the secure areas. So if there are areas that are not in that secure area, then you don't need a TWIC card and temporary workers would be well-suited to that environment. But for people who are going to have unescorted access to secure areas of ports they will need a TWIC, and it's not an unduly burdensome process - you just have to identify who you are, you don't have a very limited number of prior convictions, in terms of what crimes you've committed, and you're not on the watch list, you're pretty much good to go.
Q. Clark Kent Ervin, the first inspector general of the Department of Homeland Security, suggested in a piece in The New York Times that security checkpoints be moved further out in airports. What do you think of that idea?
A. You know what I liked about that article - I thought it was very thoughtful because it looked at the broader issues. I think it is a legitimate argument. Our answer to that is we have the sterile area protected to the level that you know, and we have other layers that are out into the public area that he was describing, and in fact out into the parking garage and the parking lot and out in front of the airport. So we actually do have - though it's not particularly visible, it's not as visible as the TSA checkpoint - we have security measures that go all throughout that and you'll see if you go next time at the airport you'll see canine teams that are out in the public area in different places, you'll see TSA people outside. The central fact you have to know is that this is not a column of tanks approaching through a valley where you know exactly what's coming and if you build a big wall they can't go through. These airports are huge facilities and they have all the time to plot and scheme that they want and they take their time, they plot it out, and they'll go where we're not. So if you build a big thing here but not over here they'll say "thanks very much, that's interesting what you did there," and walk by over here. So we try to have a baseline of security everywhere and a moving kind of layered system where they can't predict. So, yes, there will be times where there's not a security presence here, but you can't be sure that an hour from now that's the case, or a day from now or a week, because we move around everywhere. That's the basic concept of everything we do, which is why when somebody comes up and says "aha! We found this vulnerability at this place!" we're always in a position of saying well, duh, there are vulnerabilities but the point is how do you exploit a vulnerability that you don't know is constantly going to be there . . . or if you know this is a vulnerability, [we] put other measures in front or behind.
Q. In response to questioning about bomb detection problems and test notification, you have compared aviation security to something like a combination lock, saying if an attacker gets through one layer of security, there will be other layers that might stop the attack. While that's true, the TSA screening checkpoint is the last layer, and failures are occurring there, too. How should the public feel safe when the final layer of a multilayer system is also failing?
A. OK, so just bear with me [he draw's a rough sketch of an airport terminal]. Let's say this is the checkpoint, this is the final layer. Did you know that there are roving teams in all of this area, a lot of them undercover? We have thousands of federal air marshals that are flying every day. When they're not in the planes they're changing planes, or in the sterile area, they're all over there. There are cameras everywhere. We take our canine teams to go through there. We do gate checks on a random basis - we'll have people out there on planes. We have air marshals in the planes. We have federal flight deck officers in the planes. We have every FBI agent, Secret Service agent, any federal law enforcement - they all fly with guns and they're trained as sort of a certain base-level air marshal. They're on planes, they're working in sterile areas. There is so much security behind the checkpoint and so much security in front of the checkpoint, the problem is it's such a bottleneck at the checkpoint, we stand there in our white shirts and we're so visible there that [critics] don't consider anything else. And that's when I said that we need to get the passengers back on our side in '08. That's one of our big things. It's so the passengers realize it's not just the shoeless shuffle at the checkpoint that we're doing, it's the whole integrated process and they can participate and they can make it got a lot smoother. . . . So it's not the last line of defense.
