Secure Flight
Secure Flight
Public Hearing for Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)
Grand Hyatt, Washington, D.C., Sept. 20, 2007
Thank you for joining us. We're here to discuss TSA's published Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the Secure Flight program. We want to hear from the public and industry to get your feedback on the changes TSA is proposing for aviation security.
A week ago our nation commemorated the sixth anniversary of 9/11. The events of that day are a stark reminder that we face an adaptive enemy that has a continued appetite for attacking the West. We are today in a heightened threat environment and this threat is real. As time passes from 9/11, it does not mean the threat is fading. It means there is more time available for preparation—for the terrorists and for us. We have the responsibility to use every moment that we have to our best advantage.
Since 9/11, we've taken substantial steps to improve security, but we still have more work to do, particularly because the enemy is continuing to adapt and to rebuild itself. We must stay ahead of them by enhancing our ability to stop people known to us as posing serious terrorist risk.
TSA has begun to add another layer of security in advance of Secure Flight: the introduction of trained Document Verification Transportation Security Officers at airport checkpoints. This will address a current vulnerability to effective use of watch lists.
Secure Flight lets us identify in advance potentially dangerous people who we don't want to let through an airport or allow on board an aircraft. TSA's Secure Flight program implements a key 9/11 Commission recommendation: TSA will perform uniform watch list matching, and transmit the results back to aircraft operators.
As it stands now, airlines are responsible for checking domestic passenger names against a terrorist watch list provided by TSA. This leads to inconsistencies in how the list is checked and maintained by the airlines, and it creates inefficiency and frustration for travelers.
Under the proposed rule, TSA will receive limited passenger information from airlines as early as 72 hours in advance of a flight, and we will continue to receive information until the flight leaves. We will check this information against the watch list provided to us by the Terrorist Screening Center, and transmit the results back to aircraft operators.
In the case of a watch list match, we will now have the time to coordinate appropriate actions. For example, we can send a person through secondary screening, notify law enforcement to conduct an interview, or, if necessary, prevent a person from boarding the plane.
The practical security measure already exists of checking airline passenger information for matches against the terrorist watch list. We are streamlining and improving the process by taking on the responsibility at TSA rather than giving it to dozens of different air carriers. The result is better security, a more consistent passenger process, and a reduction in potential misidentifications.
In 2005, GAO [Government Accountability Office] and the Secure Flight Working Group issued reports saying that more needed to be done in terms of privacy and program integrity for Secure Flight. In February 2006, I testified before Congress that we were going to re-baseline Secure Flight and rebuild it from the ground up to address the concerns expressed in the reports. That work has been completed and now the implementing rule is ready for public scrutiny and discussion.
I am confident we have the team in place to make Secure Flight a success. The program team has been exceptionally transparent about what we are doing. We've conducted extensive stakeholder outreach. We met with aviation industry associations and privacy advocacy groups, and we used their feedback to help design this program. Their feedback has been crucial, especially from a privacy perspective. I appreciate the working relationship that we have had and the constructive engagement that has gone on through this process.
I'd like to point out that Secure Flight is a very focused program. It does not use commercial data, and it does not assign a score based on risk. In addition, TSA does not maintain the watch list. We receive the watch list from the Terrorist Screening Center at the FBI.
While some say it's a difficult balance—increasing security while protecting individual privacy rights—I want to make very clear that I believe privacy and security are essential ingredients of each other. The program will not go forward without both privacy and security needs baked into the process.
The benefits of the program are many. It starts with enhanced security for air travelers. Secure Flight decreases the chance of watch list data being compromised because the distribution of the list will be much more limited. It creates one consistent process for the passenger across all aircraft operators. An integrated redress process clears individuals who believe they have been improperly delayed or prohibited from boarding an aircraft because of previous misidentification; this is called the DHS TRIP program. Secure Flight will result in better security and create a more consistent and uniform pre-screening process for passengers while reducing misidentifications. It's a win-win for all.
I look forward to your input through this public meeting process.
For those of you who would like to make comments or ask questions, we have elected to go with five minute statements, as opposed to three minutes or some other length, in order to give more people time to express their views on this important subject. We are also providing a live audio webcast of this public hearing. It is available now on our public web site at www.tsa.gov.
We have the Secure Flight Senior Program Managers and associated Executives here in person today. We have a strong team up here, and we'd be happy to listen to your comments and to take them on board during the rulemaking process.
Thank you for your participation and I look forward to the discussion.