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Talk To TSA Response: Are Liquids Really A Threat? Why 3-1-1?

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Friday, August 13, 2010
Talk to TSA Banner

After reading many of the great questions that have come in to "Talk to TSA" I think the best one to start off with is a commonly asked one: are liquids still a threat? The short answer is yes. I can appreciate how someone might wonder why their bottle of water is considered a threat. Having worked at the FBI back in 2006 when the UK liquids plot was disrupted, I understand why TSA’s procedures are in place. To answer your question, I’m going to tell you as much as I can about why the 3-1-1 liquids rule is necessary without getting into classified information.

On August, 10 2006, I was serving as the Deputy Director at the FBI. The FBI worked closely with other US Intelligence Community agencies and our close partners in the UK to disrupt the plot to blow up several airliners flying from the UK to the US. I know of the real and present threat those terrorists posed using chemicals disguised as everyday consumer items such as sodas and water. If undetected, I believe there is a high likelihood the terrorists would have killed hundreds of people that day. That's why we limit the amount of liquids you can bring on a plane.

The challenge with liquids and the vulnerability that terrorists tried to exploit in August 2006 is that liquid explosives don't look any different than regular liquids on the X-ray monitor. There is no way to tell one from the other without removing every liquid from every passenger's bag and testing it. I'm sure you could imagine the gridlock that would ensue if our officers had to test every liquid that came through the checkpoint. This led to an immediate ban on all liquids on August 10, 2006 because of the threat that was uncovered. Extensive testing started immediately to determine if there was a way liquids could be brought on board without posing a risk, because the total ban wasn't sustainable in the long term. These tests were conducted by multiple government agencies, national laboratories and other nations, and the end result was the 3-1-1 formulation: 3.4 ounce (100ml) containers, inside a 1-quart clear, plastic zip-top bag, 1 bag per passenger.

The sealed baggie limits the total volume of liquid per passenger and keeps all the liquids in one place so officers can get a good look at them.

Some have speculated on the possibility that several passengers each carrying a baggie full of 3.4 oz. bottles full of liquid explosives could all go through the checkpoint and combine their liquids in a larger bottle. That's a reasonable question. It's easy to dismiss 3-1-1 if you don't understand why this scenario is highly unlikely. Liquid explosives are extremely volatile and it was the general consensus of top explosives experts that it would be nearly impossible to create a successful explosive combining a small amount of liquids in a larger container on an airplane.

We understand that 3-1-1 is an inconvenience. But it's also an inconvenience to terrorists and significantly drops their chances of getting a liquid explosive on an airplane. The liquids rule continues to be a necessary step because current intelligence shows that liquids are still a threat, and until TSA has the technology to screen liquids at checkpoints, the only other alternative is to ban all liquids. We're not going to do that. TSA is getting closer to finalizing upgraded software for X-rays that will allow liquids to be screened. Until this happens, we will continue with 3-1-1 to keep you safe when you fly.

In the meantime, please continue using the 3-1-1 liquids rule, or put your liquids in your checked baggage.

I hope this has answered your questions on whether or not liquids are a threat and why we require the baggie.

John S. Pistole
TSA Administrator

Comments

Submitted by Anonymous on

So if liquids are such a threat why are we the only country that has restrictions in place? The only time any country has liquid restrictions are the ones forced on them for flights going to the United States. England dropped the restrictions and they were the point of origin for the plot.

Submitted by Anonymous on

If liquids are such a threat please explain how the TSA screens the tens of thousands of bottles of soda, water, and other beverages that are sold in airports?

Submitted by Anonymous on

In addition to the 2 previous comments, if they're such a threat then why are all water bottles, etc.. just put in a big bin at the security checkpoint?

Submitted by Anonymous on

Further, if liquids are such a threat, why is the threat disposed of without care or consideration in waste bins near the checkpoint? Surely explosive liquids disposed in such a way would pose a threat to at least as many people as a liquid bomb on a plane would.

Submitted by Jack on

Because terrorists would never think to pack ten 3-oz bottles of a dangerous liquid into the quart size baggie and then meet up with their other terrorist buddies who each also have 30 oz of nitroglycerin.

If we've learned anything from previous terror plots, it is that terrorists work alone.

Submitted by Jack on

By the way, I carried a 20 oz bottle of liquid through the security checkpoint only last month... right behind some lady who carried her bottle of water right on through right in her hand!

You guys are completely useless. You serve no other purpose than to make naive people feel secure, and I don't even think you do a great job of doing that.

Your first failure is apparent right when you walk up to the checkpoint and find out that the TSA assumes that criminals/terrorists are not able create fake IDs. Heck... I can name you 50 people from my class back in high school alone that had fake IDs.

Submitted by Anonymous on

Anonymous... with regards to your question about screening the ones sold in airports... I've seen it done. They go through the security checkpoint and through the x-ray machine.

Yes, the same x-ray machine that Pistole said can't scan YOUR liquids. Apparently the ones sold in the airport are special scannable liquids that we are not able to buy.

One last point.. I think it's funny that you guys are claiming that a SOFTWARE upgrade will improve the way an X-RAY machine works... what it can scan for, etc.

I'm installing a software upgrade to my refrigerator that will cook the food for me before I take it out. Pretty excited about it.

Submitted by A Librarian on

If liquids are such a threat, why are these possibly volatile chemicals thrown into one bin at the checkpoint, where they might mix together to form an explosive or poison substance? Doesn't OSHA prescribe specific rules for disposing of dangerous chemicals in the workplace? Does TSA follow these rules for disposal?

Submitted by Steve on

"So if liquids are such a threat why are we the only country that has restrictions in place? The only time any country has liquid restrictions are the ones forced on them for flights going to the United States. England dropped the restrictions and they were the point of origin for the plot."

Well that is just not true. England still has the restrictions and so have the rest of the countries in the EU.http://bit.ly/a0CCMp , http://bit.ly/bkqOZ9

Submitted by RB on

Anonymous said...
If liquids are such a threat please explain how the TSA screens the tens of thousands of bottles of soda, water, and other beverages that are sold in airports?

August 13, 2010 8:35 PM
..................
I have personally observed vendors rolling carts loaded with liquids right past the xray and screeners, all without a second look from anyone.

TSA's liquids policy is just more bs making air travel the least desirable means of travel.

Submitted by RB on

Anonymous said...
If liquids are such a threat please explain how the TSA screens the tens of thousands of bottles of soda, water, and other beverages that are sold in airports?

August 13, 2010 8:35 PM
................
If these liquids are such a threat then why are aircrew exempt from these same regulations?

Why does TSA violate EPA hazardous waste storage and disposal regulations by combining unknown and possibly explosive liquids in common trash containers.

Submitted by RB on

When will TSA update the signage and audio annoucements in airports to reflect 3.4 oz/100 ml instead of the current 3 oz signs and audio messages?

Seems like TSA could provide correct information to the public.

Submitted by DIRNSA Briefer on

A political appointee wrote -- or a staff member wrote for him: "...current intelligence shows that liquids are still a threat..."

I'll remind you what a non-retired director of the NSA (DIRNSA) told me during a 1-1 meeting with him at his Pentagon office back in the mid-90s: "The threat community never met a threat they didn't like."

If you don't get it, the retired three-start had little respect for people who invented and perpetuated non-credible threats.

And, I know you know him.

Submitted by Anonymous on

Nice try but we're not buying it at all.

Submitted by Anonymous on

So liquid explosives are extremely volatile, eh? So why are the confiscated liquids dumped into a garbage can? Seems to me that if a liquid is extremely volatile (your words), that disposing of it in the manner done at checkpoints should sometimes result in unpleasant chemical reactions(fires, explosions, containers melting through,etc). Why hasn't this occured?

Submitted by Jack on

They don't have answers to these questions. Just like they don't have the answer to why 3.4 oz of liquid is safe and 4.0 oz id dangerous.

Submitted by Gunner on

Sorry Mr. Director, your answer was nothing more than a parroting of the (failed) party line.

Strike One.

Submitted by Avxo on

Well, it's nice to hear from you. And to hear you addressing such a hot-button issue to boot.

I have two questions (which aren't novel -- they've been asked before):

Why, if the liquids are so volatile, are they disposed of in a manner consistent with the faux product label?

How many ounces or baggies of liquid explosives has the TSA confiscated from terrorists over the last month? Over the last 6 months? Over the last year? Since the program's inception?

Submitted by Cerulean Bill on

Good lord. That actually makes sense.

Submitted by Anonymous on

TSA doesn't have the time, talent, expertise, or even an interest in resolving the safe liquids issue in a traveler friendly manner. Really.

They picked an easy solution that wouldn't strain their employees- throw everything out, and quickly realized that they needed to compromise with 3-1-1, or face the probability that no one would fly. If they throw everything out, everyone gets angry. If you take exception to the mind numbing stupidity of tossing out harmless items, you get harassed further.

It is sad but hardly surprising that this solution is the very best answer that anyone at TSA could come up with.

Submitted by Adrian on
"I believe there is a high likelihood the terrorists would have killed hundreds of people that day."

Which day are you referring to? The alleged and convicted conspirators were supposedly still in the planning stages.

Terrorists have wanted to (and tried to) use liquid explosives for decades before the limits went into effect. One was actually detonated on a flight, killing one passenger in the mid 1990s. Why didn't we overreact then?

Most explosives come in solid form, and there have been far more terrorist attacks using solid explosives. Why don't we limit the amount of solids through the checkpoint?

The UK plot involving liquid explosives also depended upon a second (solid) explosive/detonator disguised as a AA battery. Why haven't we banned all batteries from flights? Can the X-ray machine tell the difference between a real Duracell and an explosive wrapped to look like one?

The UK plot may not have actually been targeting airplanes. Many of the convicted have claimed that the plan was to detonate a small, non-lethal explosive in the airport, not on an airplane. Indeed, NONE of the accused conspirators had plane tickets. Many did not even have passports. Even with liquid limitations, you could still carry out such at plot at the checkpoint, or before it at the ticketing or baggage claim areas. Since liquid explosives are so volatile, this would be much easier than (and just as effective as) setting them off on a plane.

I'd still love to see an open, peer-reviewed study into the feasibility of the plot. Science conducted in secret isn't science.

The fact of the matter is, that solid or liquid, explosives require a detonator. Detonators are hard to get through the checkpoint because they look funny on x-rays and they set off the metal detectors. Some may even be detected by the random residue testing. That's a big reason why Mr. Sizzlypants failed last Christmas. That is a security success. We don't need absurd restrictions on liquids. (We also don't need to waste hundreds of millions of dollars on privacy-invading whole-body imaging machines.) The only reason this stupidity isn't undone, is that nobody wants to admit it was stupid.
Submitted by Anonymous on

lol. looking at the responses on here it doesnt matter what mr pisotle would say it wouldnt make a difference. on the other blog people are so upset that he isnt answering their questions and now that he is, it isnt good enough. he is trying to give you answers and you throw it right back in his face because the info provided isnt good enough. so why should he attempt to answer any of the others when you all know the answers already. the people that should be upset at the way liquids are disposed of are the tsa people. however, they are "untrained, arrogant, and unprofessional" therefore who cares about them. they are trying to do things the best that they can based on the regs that their bosses have put forth. i am all for taking large liquids but they will have to be screened some way so that means longer lines, put them in your checked luggage. i am curious to the response on here if the liquids rule was recinded and a liquid explosive was used on a plane? liquid explosives have been used, google bojinka and you will see it, thats validation enough for me.

Submitted by Anonymous on

jack said
"Because terrorists would never think to pack ten 3-oz bottles of a dangerous liquid into the quart size baggie and then meet up with their other terrorist buddies who each also have 30 oz of nitroglycerin"
i would like you to try and carry 1oz oz of nitroglycerin and see if you can take 5 steps without losing an appendage.

Submitted by Anonymous on

So it has taken Mr Pistole One month to attempt to answer one question - can we assume he will attempt to answer one further question per month? It would takes years and years to answer even a small number of questions at this rate. It would make far more sense to just quickly answer the questions, most could be answered in a matter of minutes, not years,so why prevaricate like this?

Submitted by Anonymous on

Mr. Pistole, we know as well as you do that everything you just said is a lie. That said, if you're going to insist on this charade, can you at least post accurate signage? The policy is 3.4-1-1, not 3-1-1. Please tell the truth about the policy itself, even if you're going to continue lying about the justifications for it.

Submitted by Anonymous on

"Liquid explosives are extremely volatile and it was the general consensus of top explosives experts that it would be nearly impossible to create a successful explosive combining a small amount of liquids in a larger container on an airplane. "

I am guessing that Mr. Pistole did not in fact read the answers prepared for him, because this statement is the most laughable thing I've read in quite a while.

Submitted by Anonymous on

"Extensive testing started immediately to determine if there was a way liquids could be brought on board without posing a risk, because the total ban wasn't sustainable in the long term. "

Extensive testing? Really? In just a few days? Pull the other one.

Submitted by Anonymous on

Mr. Pistole, one simple question I know you won't answer: Did the London plotters have in their possession a liquid explosive? Answer yes or no.

Submitted by Anonymous on

Please share details of the "extensive analysis" you claim took place in just a few days to come up with your idiotic 3.4-1-1 policy.

Submitted by Anonymous on

If, as you claim, liquids present such a threat, why are TSA screeners and airline employees not subject to the liquid restrictions?

Submitted by Bubba on

It makes no sense to limit a state of matter. Explosives can be solids. Why not limit solids? Instead of the stupid baggie, how about testing for explosives and getting over this mindless show of force?

Meanwhile, I'm still waiting for an answer to that Nature (the top scientific journal in the World) article saying there is no science behind the SPOT program.

Submitted by Anonymous on

As a scientist, I'd like to see the quatitative, replicative data that led to 3-1-1, preferably performed by a regulated, trusted agency such as NSF or NIST.

Submitted by Ronnie on

First of all, thank you, Mr. Pistole, for taking time to try to address some of the questions we hear every day. But as you can see, even though you have done your best to provide an answer to one of the most often asked questions, it will never be enough for the public. Now you see what we have to put up with? I wish you much luck in your new post as you try to lead us forward. And again, thank you.

Ronnie
TSO DEN

Submitted by Anonymous on

Ronnie said...
First of all, thank you, Mr. Pistole, for taking time to try to address some of the questions we hear every day. But as you can see, even though you have done your best to provide an answer to one of the most often asked questions, it will never be enough for the public. Now you see what we have to put up with?
Ronnie
TSO DEN

**********
First of all, thank you, Mr. Pistole, for taking time to try to address some of the questions we have every day. But as you can see, even though you have done your best to provide an answer to one of the most often asked questions, it will never be enough for the public. Because your reply is a standard PR response anyone can give. But fails to address any of the underlying problems. Now do you see what we have to put up with?

Submitted by Anonymous on

"We understand that 3-1-1 is an inconvenience".

We understand that 3-1-1 is a ruse. To get passengers to buy $2.90 bottles of water airside.

And as for the "intelligence" regarding liquid explosives, surely Mr. Pistole (of all people, having come from the FBI) should realize that intelligence is what he's looking for, not what his agency has?

Submitted by Anonymous on

I believe that a large majority of United States citizens used to have dellusions of our country's invincibility and their personal entitlement, just like what I see being posted here....right up unitl 9/11/2001. It is truly sad and amazing that most citizens have slipped back to that state of mind once again. If you want to defnd your country and attempt to make changes YOU deem necessary to truly keep our country safe, join a military service or apply for an agency within the Department of Homeland Security. Otherwise, I think I'd rather you just say thank you to everyone that actively defends our nation everyday and let it go at that. And please do not passively denigrate the memory of those we lost on 9/11/2001 by slamming the TSA every chance you get just because you can't take your precious beverage (or whatever) through security and you feel you should be entitled to take whatever you please on your flight. The officers that I know take their job very seriously and try to do it to the best of their ability just to keep YOU safe. An old cliche comes to mind and seems to fit in this situation. "We'll defend them keep them and keep them safe...wether they like it or not."---Semper Vigilare

Submitted by Anonymous on

Anonymous said...
I believe that a large majority of United States citizens used to have dellusions of our country's invincibility and their personal entitlement, just like what I see being posted here........ An old cliche comes to mind and seems to fit in this situation. "We'll defend them keep them and keep them safe...wether they like it or not."---Semper Vigilare
*********
I believe that a growing percentage of United States Government employees have the delusion and personal entitlement that they should be allowed to make decisions regarding the security of this country without any oversight from American citizens. Our history is rife with examples of these failures; 110,000 American citizens were placed in prison camps during WWII because they were of Japanese descent and they lost everything they owned in the process, thousands of American citizens lives and livelihoods were destroyed by Sen. Joseph McCarthy, J. Edgar Hoover turned the FBI into an American version of the Stasi, and most recently the warrantless wiretapping program. It is truly sad and amazing that many government employees have slipped back to that state of mind once again.

Now we are supposed to take what the TSA tells us at face value? An old cliché comes to mind and seems to fit this situation. Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? “Who guards the guards”, or as it is more commonly referred to as “who watches the watchmen.

Submitted by Anonymous on

Perhaps, the new director should put on a pair of jean, t-shirt, get an overnight bag and go on a road trip and see what others experience first hand at the hands of his minions. Might be an eye opener for him. Seriously doubt any of the employees would recognize him out of a suit.

Submitted by Anonymous on

I have to travel for several weeks and need to bring at least 6 sets of contacts in their sterile unopened pouches. There is a drop of liquid in each contact lens container. Do they need to go in my quart sized bag?

Submitted by Anonymous on

I think it would a good idea for the Administrator to play "Undercover Boss". As for no oversight by the American people. Yes, we most certainly do. It is known as our elected officials. Congress (that we elected), especially, has direct oversight of TSA. Don't like the way any of the elected officials do business? Don't reelect them. Also, as I recall, the people of the U.S. complained loudly enough and TSA reversed its policy on no lighters. If neither solution pleases you, then I am afraid that there is noone and nothing that will be able to assauge your paranoia. I have a feeling that you might have been one of the first to demand of the government, "What are you going to do to protect us???" right after 9/11. Please make it easy on the rest of us and choose which side of the fence you want to be on.

Submitted by Anonymous on

Anonymous @ 8/15 5:52 PM

I never said "What are you going to do to protect us!" My first thought, once the immediacy of the tragedy had passed and the "what's next?" portion began, was to wonder what restrictions on our Constitutional freedoms, especially those conferred upon us by the 4th and 5th Amendments, would occur. Unfortunately, my fears at the time were correct.

As for changing the rules, they're politicians first, representatives second. And the second someone thinks about proposing the rules be changed, DHS and the TSA are before Congress talking about the death and destruction that will rain upon us if the rules are changed. So the rules stay the same.

Submitted by Anonymous on

Has anyone in the TSA even _bothered_ to go look at Narita International Airport's optical water bottle checker? It's in international arrival customs checkpoint. When you fly in, and you go through Japanese security, you will see it right next to their metal detector. TSA might, just might, want to check it out. That is unless the 'Not Invented Here' or 'No Kick-backs offered by manufacturer' rules for TSA operations are in effect.

Submitted by Anonymous on

Mr. Pistole thanks for taking the time to actually post here. What would have helped strengthen TSA and your case for why we need the 311 Rule to remain in place is INDEPENDENT proof that the 'liquid bomb plot' was indeed a viable plan and could have caused significant damage to either people on a plane or the plane itself.

Without this independent prof the 311 rule just appears to be a knee jerk rule in response to a plot that was still in the plaining stages and a means to show the public that the TSA is doing something.

Submitted by Ayn R Key on

part 1

Oh my god, I cannot believe that Mr. Pistole started off with his first "information" post by destroying his credibility. Seriously, he means to tell us that liquids are "still" a threat?

First of all, the question wasn't "are liquids still a threat" but "are liquids a threat". The word "still" is a deceptive addition to the question designed to lead the reader into thinking that there was a mythical time long ago when liquids were actually a threat when that mythical time never existed. We've already dissected every TSA talking point on this, and have come to the conclusion that there is no scientific basis for considering the liquid threat the way you do. There is a bureaucratic reason for saying liquids are the threat you say they are.

Yes, we are familiar with the 2006 plot, where they never got past the "gee this would be neat" stage. Hauling that old chestnut out does little to support your case. You cannot tell us what liquid explosive they planned to use, since they hadn't gotten to the point of figuring that one out themselves. Nor had they purchased airline tickets. Nor had the acquired funding for any aspect of their plot.

Your admission that standard liquid explosives are extremely volatile is quite telling. You use that to counter the asserstion that terrorists could pool their resources. IT DOESN'T COUNTER ANYTHING the way you use it. If they're planning on blowing themselves up, I'm pretty sure they won't mind that it is a little risky to pour several small bottles of explosives into one big bottle.

Submitted by Ayn R Key on

part 2

But you ducked the fact that the liquid you are protecting us from can only be brewed at Hogwarts Academy for Wizards and Witches. That is because due to TSA explanation, there are two possible liquid bombs that you are protecting us from.

1. The pre-mixed liquid bomb must be invisible to explosive detection and safe enough to transport to the airport.
2. The binary un-mixed liquid bomb must have all components insivible to explosive detection and simple enough to mix in the airport.

All the characteristics must be present, don't say "nitro-glycerine" and leave out the detecatbility issue.

But suppose your magic liquid does exist. I'm willing to make that assumption for the sake of argument, because that assumption proves you know your magic liquid doesn't exist. How can I tell? Because you throw all liquids into the non-hazardous general trash bin. As has been pointed out by someone else on this blog (I am glad someone else pointed it out because now I can quote it without being put on the NFL for stating it) all you need is one pax with a bottle of ammonia and another pax with a bottle of bleach. Next thing you know you have a chemical attack at the checkpoint. Your rule just makes everything less safe.

Submitted by Anonymous on

>>> "That's why we limit the amount of liquids you can bring on a plane."

You're not limiting the amount we can bring on a plane. You're limiting the amount we can bring through the TSA checkpoint.

Submitted by Anonymous on

I'm sorry, did you seriously say that "liquid explosives" are a) stable enough to carry around in large quanitities and b) too volatile to be combined from small containers into a larger one?

Submitted by George on

First, I want to thank Mr Pistole for taking the time from his busy schedule to respond to a long-standing question. The response is the same public relations "trust us" response we've consistently heard from the TSA since 2006, but that's beside the point. The fact that he responded indicates that he is aware of the credibility problem his agency has. Awareness doesn't necessarily mean he will take action beyond the TSA's standard approach of ignoring or spinning away all criticism. But acknowledging a problem is at least a prerequisite to correcting it.

The real problem with the liquid restrictions is that the TSA's visible actions are inconsistent with their claims that liquids are a threat. We can all clearly see when a TSO finds an oversized bottle, they simply toss it into an ordinary trash with other confiscated containers. When the trash can gets full, janitors carry them off the dumpster. There are none of the precautions normally associated with hazardous material. There's no sign that anyone at the TSA is the least bit worried about having all those bottles of "hazardous" liquids in constant proximity to valuable screening equipment and personnel (never mind the passengers).

There's a disconnect here. The TSA can endlessly cite their (conveniently classified) studies proving both the danger of liquids and the effectiveness of 3-1-1 as reason we should trust them. But how can anyone who sees for themselves how the TSA actually treats confiscated "hazardous" liquids at checkpoints believe any of the TSA's claims? Even a few seconds of thought compels one of two conclusions: Either the TSA takes an incompetently cavalier attitude toward their equipment and employees by constantly exposing them to hazardous confiscated liquids, or the TSA is lying about the danger of liquids. Neither conclusion inspires any credibility or respect.

The "last straw" for me in destroying any credibility about the liquid restrictions was something I witnessed a few years ago. I had to wait at a checkpoint as someone put about a dozen boxes of water bottles through the x-ray scanner, as the officer running the scanner peered intently at the images on the screen. Of course, I had a mighty struggle keeping my mouth shut to avoid asking the inevitable question, even though nobody made any attempt to conceal it. But when I was finished with my screening, a quick look at the concessionaire's stall revealed the very same brand of water, confirming my suspicion. If x-ray screening is apparently adequate to assure the TSA that bottles sold by concessionaires at extortionate prices are safe, why can't we bring our own?

The disconnect between what we see at checkpoints and what you insist that we believe is a large part of the reason so many of us don't trust the TSA and don't believe you do anything more than hassle us and waste a lot of our time and money. You seem to expect us to practice some kind of Orwellian "doublethink." You expect us to ignore the inept and inconsistent security theatre show we can see every time we fly. You also expect us to ignore the GAO's audit findings. And you expect us to trust you unquestioningly, and somehow Believe that behind the curtain of secrecy there's a highly competent, highly effective organization that's protecting aviation.

I'm sorry, Mr Pistole, but if that's what you really believe there's no reason we should pay any attention to the (new) man behind the curtain.

Submitted by Ayn R Key on

Anonymous wrote:
I'm sorry, did you seriously say that "liquid explosives" are a) stable enough to carry around in large quanitities and b) too volatile to be combined from small containers into a larger one?

Yes, it does appear that is exactly what he said. Good catch.

But they're not worried about facts, this is a spin piece.

Submitted by Anonymous on

I love how all the nay-sayers are questioning the former deputy director of the FBI. haha. You give Barney the Dinosaur more crediblity than one of the top officials of the FBI. You're all hopeless. The man has more expertise/experience than all of you put together, and you STILL doubt. Unbelievable...

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