

change, cancellation) or any **significant event** (detention, arrest etc.) an additional closeout ASR needs to be submitted.

If there were no changes to the operation or **nothing significant to report**, the closeout ASR is not required. VIPR Operations are composed of transportation security stakeholders, local, state, and Federal law enforcement and available TSA elements (e.g. - FAMs, TSOs, BDOs, BAO/ESS, TSIs, K-9).

1.1 LOCATION / CATEGORY

Name and Address of **Location(s)**: AMTRAK Terminal, 350 S. Illinois St., Indianapolis, IN (manned); 1012 Eastern Ave., Connersville IN; Spring and Green St., Crawfordsville, IN; 200 N. 2nd St., Lafayette, IN; 619 N. Cullen St., Rensselaer, IN; 913 Sheffield Ave., Dyer, IN; 131 Tyler Ave., Elkhart, IN; 2702 W. Washington Ave., South Bend, IN (manned); Lincoln and Center St., Waterloo, IN; 1135 N. Calumet Ave., Hammond/Whiting, IN; 100 Washington St., Michigan City, IN Platform Stations/Surface/Mass Transit

TSA Risk Based Scheduling Methodology

The categories listed below are described in detail in WebEOC (File Library, under VIPR templates). The DOP drafter needs to refer to these categories to see if their city location or Transportation Authority is contained in one or more of these categories.

(b)(3)-49 U.S.C. § 114(f)



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1.2 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Executive Summary is a short paragraph (1000 characters or less) that addresses who, what, when, where, why, and how of your specific VIPR operation. The Executive Summary supports enhanced security operations and provides the executive reader with a concise operational overview of planned VIPR operations.

➤ Indianapolis, IN

January 26 - February 7, 2012

National Railroad Passenger Corporation (AMTRAK)

Mass Transit - Locally Generated VIPR operations will be conducted prior to, during and post SuperBowl XLVI at the AMTRAK terminal, 350 South Illinois Street in downtown Indianapolis, a designated (b)(3), 49 U.S.C. § 114(f). The station and tracks are an increased risk due to their location directly across the street from Lucas Oil Stadium, venue for the SuperBowl game, and its proximity to large crowds attending the NFL Experience throughout the week. Terminal security, the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department, ICE, and TSA assets will participate. VIPR Teams will provide a visible presence and SPOT screening in and around the transportation system looking for suspicious activity and threats. VIPR operations may consist of both overt and covert law enforcement and security teams. Operations focus on, but are not limited to, passenger boarding platform areas, baggage claim, lobby/ticket counter, and public parking areas, visual inspection and K-9 sweep of trains for IEDs or suspicious items, and perimeter areas around the terminal. FAMS will deploy Preventive Radiological Nuclear Detection (PRND), and TSA certified explosive detection canine teams will be deployed. Only armed TSA law enforcement may be deployed to ride between stops during VIPR operations to detect and deter possible terrorist activity and related threats to the transportation system. If available, an ICE agent, acting under their own authority, will provide covert law enforcement presence and patrol for suspicious activity. ICE will support the operator or local law enforcement during follow up inquiry. ICE may check IDs in accordance with ICE policies and procedures. VIPR operations may also be conducted at Connersville, Crawfordsville, Lafayette, Rensselaer, Dyer, Elkhart, South Bend, and Waterloo, IN platform stations. Local law enforcement will participate with TSA assets at these platforms within the state.

POC: Roy Gooch, FAMS Supervisor-CINFO

Cell: (b)(6)

POC: Toby Knight, FAMS Supervisor-CIIFO

Cell: (b)(6)

POC: Richard L. Adams, AFSD-LE

Cell: (b)(6)

1.3 TSA VIPR OPERATIONS & STAKEHOLDER LEADERSHIP

TSA Leadership Point of Contact: for oversight, command and control of VIPR Operations.

FSD Only SAC Only Both - FSD & SAC Other:

FSD/SAC Federal Security Director (FSD) & Special Agent in Charge (SAC) for VIPR Operations:

FSD: David W. Kane	AREA/FAA ID: IND	(b)(6)	317-390-(b)(6) O (b)(6) C
SAC: John Wallace	FO: CIN	(b)(6)	859-594-(b)(6) - O (b)(6) - C
SAC: Howard Jordan	FO: CHI	(b)(6)	(b)(6) - C

Date: [TSA HQ Review Date 10/26/2011]

VIPR MASS TRANSIT DOP v.06APR2010

AUTH. Transportation Authority Stakeholder/Manager Coordinating with TSA VIPR Leadership:

TRANS AUTH POC: (b)(6) (b)(6)	Title/Pos: DISTRICT MGR. AMTRAK	Email:	419-244-(b)(6) (o) (b)(6) (c)
TRANS FACILITY MANAGER: (b)(6)	Title/Pos: DISTRICT MGR. AMTRAK	Email	419-244-(b)(6) (o) (b)(6) (c)
TRANS MODE LAW ENF AGENCY: AMTRAK PD POC NAME: (b)(6)	Title/Pos: Deputy Chief	(b)(6)	(b)(6) (c)

Operations Deployment Plan Drafter:		
Name: Timothy J. Halligan DOP Sent to Field Counsel: 10-13-2011	Email: (b)(6)	Cell # (b)(6) Office # 317-612-(b)(6)
Team Leader(s): SFAMS Listed in "Other Contacts"	Email: See other contacts	Cell # See other contacts Office # N/A
Field Counsel (1) / OFC Location: CLE Name: (b)(6) DOP Reviewed by Field Council <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No Date Reviewed: 10-13-2011	Email: (b)(6)	Cell # (b)(6) Office # 571-227-(b)(6)
Field Counsel (2) / OFC Location: Name: DOP Reviewed by Field Council <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No Date Reviewed:	Email:	Cell # Office #
TSA JCC Reviewer: Ed Chaney Date Reviewed:	Email: (b)(6)	Cell # Office # 703-563-(b)(6)
TSA HQ OCC Review: Karen Hickey Date Reviewed: 10/26/2011	Email: (b)(6)	Cell # Office #

The Yearly DOP must be reviewed by the Federal Security Director (FSD), the Office of Law Enforcement, Federal Air Marshal, Special Agent in Charge (OLE/FAMSAC), and local Legal Counsel. After approval by the FSD, OLE/FAMSAC, and local Legal Counsel, the DOP can be forwarded to the JCC for headquarters review and final concurrence. * VIPR Operations Coordinator: A TSA management official selected by Federal Security Directors (FSDs) or OLE/FAMS Field Office Special Agents in Charge (SACs) to oversee the VIPR operation.

** Team Leader: A TSA employee selected by FSDs or OLE/FAMS SACs to serve as the on-site lead for the VIPR operation.

~~WARNING: THIS RECORD CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PARTS 15 AND 1520. NO PART OF THIS RECORD MAY BE DISCLOSED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A "NEED TO KNOW," AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR PARTS 15 AND 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION OR THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC DISCLOSURE IS GOVERNED BY 5 U.S.C. 552 AND 49 CFR PARTS 15 AND 1520.~~

National Special Security Event (NSSE) & Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) level (1-5) Events - Integrated Federal Security Plan (IFSPs); is a document developed by the DHS Special Events Working Group (SEWG) from input provided by the various DHS agencies who identify various special events nationwide. National Security Special Events (NSSE) are significant domestic or international events, occurrences, contests, activities, or meetings, which, by virtue of their profile or status, represent a significant target, and therefore, warrant additional preparation, planning, and mitigation efforts. By definition, a NSSE is an Incident of National Significance as defined in the National Response Plan. Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD-62) establishes the designated process for NSSEs, May 1998. (DHS MD # 6001, 1/31/2004).

Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) - The DHS Special Events Working Group (SEWG) makes the determination of Special Event Assessment rating levels for events in the United States. A Special Events Risk Methodology is used to determine the SEAR of the events.

Check the appropriate box

- National Special Security Event (NSSE) EVENT: Super Bowl XLVI**
- Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) level (1-5) EVENT/SEAR LEVEL: 1**

Comments/Additional Information:

Federal Coordinator (FC) Name: David W. Kane	Email: (b)(6)	Office: 317-612-(b)(6) Cell: (b)(6)
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1.4 ADDITIONAL POINTS OF CONTACT (POCs)

POC Name	POC Organization	POC Contact Info	
(b)(6)	SFAM - DTW	313- 942-5714	(b)(6)
	SFAM - CLE		
John Beckius	AFSD-I	317-518-2069	(b)(6)
Kennis Bourne	TSI Supervisor	317-416-2218	
Matt Pecar	TSI Supervisor (TSI K-9)	317-695-0361	
Dan Dill	ICE - RAIC	317-248-4151	
(b)(6)	IMPD DT Commander	317-234-6995	
	AMTRAK PD - Sgt.	(b)(6) (c) 317-263-(b)(6) (o)	
	IAA AOC/EOC	(b)(6)	
Edwin Walker	TSA Coordination Center		
TBD	JOC	TBD	TBD
Tim Halligan	VIPR ICC - TSA	(b)(6)	
Brad Hayes	IN Fusion Center - TSA		
Watch Desk	IN-DHS EOC	800-669-(b)(2)	N/A
James Holbrook	Connersville PD Chief	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	
Kurt Knecht	Crawfordsville PD Chief		
(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)	Crawfordsville PD Sgt. EOD	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (c) 765-364-(b)(6) (p) (b)(7)	

POC Name	POC Organization	POC Contact Info	
Richard Quinn	Dyer PD Chief	(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)	
Dale Pflibsen	Elkhart PD Chief		b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
Brian Miller	Hammond PD Chief		
Don Roush	Lafayette PD Chief		b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
Ben Neitzel	Michigan City PD Chief		
(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)	Rensselaer PD		
Jeff Phillips	Rensselaer PD Chief		
(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)	South Bend PD Chief		b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
Jason Huber, Commander	Tippecanoe Co. Sheriff EOD (Lafayette Response)	765-423-(b)(6); (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)	(o) (c)
Bill Gleason	DHS-Protective Security Advisor	(b)(6)	
(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)	FBI	(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)	

1.5 NON-TSA OPERATIONS CONDUCTED DURING THE VIPR

ICE, acting under their own authority, will provide covert law enforcement presence and patrol for suspicious activity in and around the terminal. ICE will support the operator or local law enforcement during follow up inquiry. ICE may check IDs in accordance with ICE policies and procedures. IMPD will provide uniformed foot patrol.

1.6 VIPR INITIATION

Indicate which entity initiated this VIPR operation.

- DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY (DHS/MULTI-AGENCY)
- LOCAL
- JOINT COORDINATION CENTER - ASSISTANT SECRETARY - TSA SENIOR LEADERSHIP
- DEDICATED VIPR TEAM (b)(3);49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

1.7 NOTIFICATION AND COORDINATION

The following entities have been consulted and have concurred with the operation. TSA will continue to consult these entities, as appropriate, prior to and during the deployment:

- Transportation Entity: National Railroad Transportation Corporation (AMTRAK)
- Local Law Enforcement Agencies: Indianapolis Metro PD, Above listed local law enforcement agencies
- Federal Law Enforcement Agency: ICE, FBI, JTTF, CBP
- State Law Enforcement Agencies: IN-DHS, Indiana State Police

1.8 PRE-DEPLOYMENT BRIEFINGS

Prior to commencement of the VIPR operation, briefings are strongly encouraged. By checking these boxes you are acknowledging these briefings were or will be conducted.

Briefings to be provided by:

- FSD FAM SAC TRANSPORTATION OPERATOR / STAKEHOLDER
- OPERATIONS COORDINATOR
- FIELD INTELLIGENCE OFFICER AFSD-LE
- LOCAL FIELD COUNSEL PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER
- FEDERAL, STATE OR LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
- TRANSPORTATION SECURITY INSPECTOR - SURFACE /AVIATION
- BDO TSO TSS-E
- CANINE

1.9 COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT

- CELL PHONE

PROVIDED BY: Each agency provides cell phones. VIPR does not furnish GIVEN TO:

- TWO-WAY RADIO

PROVIDED BY: Organic VIPR Team equipment GIVEN TO: VIPR Team FAMs

Crypto fills will be coordinated with each VIPR Team SFAM and TSA Indianapolis LMR POC to ensure consistent crypto fill and inter-team communications ability.

PROVIDED BY: Airport Public Safety GIVEN TO: VIPR Team SFAMs

800 MHz Marion County Public Safety radios provided to each team lead SFAM. These radios are used by all public safety in Marion Co and several agencies regionally. Radios allow monitoring of public safety activity from the field and immediate *emergency communication* with first responders. Internal TSA communications are via TSA two way radios.

- INTER-OPERABILITY BOX

PROVIDED BY: GIVEN TO:

- RADIO REPEATER

PROVIDED BY: GIVEN TO:

- VIDEO SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT

PROVIDED BY: GIVEN TO:

- OTHER:

**Section
2**

2. LOCAL INFORMATION

2.1 HAZMAT DISCOVERY AND DISPOSAL

Policy adopted from transportation operator and has been or will be briefed to VIPR Team.

Insert a description of the HAZMAT discovery plan.

VIPR team members will contact stakeholder, who will assume control and management of any HAZMAT.

2.2 FIREARM RESTRICTIONS

AMTRAK policy states the following are prohibited as carry-on baggage: Any type of gun, firearm, ammunition, explosives, or weapon.

Local laws and ordinances, as well as transportation entity policies, restrict the possession of firearms on railway property to sworn local, state, and Federal law enforcement officers.

Indiana Code, Title 35 enumerates the restrictions on firearms under Indiana law. There are also many other local and municipal laws and ordinances that vary by location. Any issues beyond reasonable officer safety actions will be referred to local law enforcement for further determination of violation.

Local Law Enforcement Contact Information for Discovery of Firearms/Illegal Items: On scene LEO is the point of contact should any illegal items be located, or call 911.

Should a suspicious or illegal item be discovered incidental to a search for IEDs, as addressed under section 4.7 of this DOP, the item will be referred to local law enforcement for appropriate action. See 4.7.2 Suspicious or illegal Item Discovery

2.3 LOCAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND EVACUATION PROCEDURES

Team Leaders have reviewed local emergency response and evacuation plans for the location(s) for where the VIPR operation(s) will occur and will brief VIPR team members.

Describe the local emergency plan. The stakeholder has emergency plans for evacuation and sheltering in place for various incidents.

Describe evacuation and personnel recovery plan. Full plan is provided in briefing - generally, evacuated team members will follow the direction of local public safety officials and assist as appropriate. During evacuation, members remain alert for diversions, secondary devices, and suspicious behaviors. Reporting locations and accountability/reporting procedures will be briefed. Team Leads will coordinate with responders in accordance with ICS and NIMS.

2.4 LOCAL ARREST AUTHORITY (OLE/FAMS)

- FAMS have received TSA Legal Briefing
- FAMS have been or will be advised of their arrest authority under the laws of the jurisdiction where the VIPR will take place.

Briefing conducted by: AFSD-LE Briefing conducted by: TSA Field Counsel

49 U.S.C. § 114(p) gives FAMS law enforcement authority to:

- carry a firearm
- arrest without a warrant for any federal offense committed in his/her presence
- arrest without a warrant for a federal felony, based upon probable cause that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing a federal felony
- seek and execute warrants for arrest or seizure of evidence, issued under the authority of the U.S. upon probable cause that a violation has been committed

**Section
3**

3. VIPR OPERATIONS

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

[Redacted content area]

All protocols must be performed in accordance with applicable SOPs.

For each item checked above, provide an operational description in the appropriate section:

**Section
4**

4. TSO SCREENING PROTOCOL

4.1. SCREENING LOCATION & DESCRIPTION

- TSA SCREENING OPERATIONS (TSA POLICY & PROCEDURES)
- TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY SCREENING OPERATIONS (AUTH. POLICY & PROCEDURES) Name of Transportation Authority: _____
- NONE, THE STAKEHOLDER HAS BEEN PROVIDED A TSA CAPABILITIES BRIEFING ON TSA ASSETS AND AT THE REQUEST OF THE STAKEHOLDERS NO TSA SCREENING OPERATIONS WILL BE DEPLOYED DURING THIS VIPR OPERATION(S).

Briefly describe the Transportation Access Area, per Section 2.2 of the VIPR SOP, and the location where security screening will be conducted.

N/A

4.2. SCREENING OF

- INDIVIDUALS FOR:
- PROPERTY FOR:
- VEHICLES FOR:

4.3. SIGNAGE REQUIREMENTS

Pursuant to section 2.3 of the VIPR SOP, provide:

- A. The exact language of the signage, or a photograph or copy of the sign(s) to be posted:
- B. The approximate dimensions and specific location(s) of the signage:
- C. If possible, Insert Photo of Signage

4.4. SCREENING PROTOCOL

For each section (Individual / Property / Vehicle) indicate whether all persons, property, and vehicles will be searched (100% screening). If less than 100% screening will be conducted, identify the random selection protocol that will apply and specify which TSA official, if any, will have authority to modify the protocol and will have responsibility for documenting any changes.

TSA Official: _____

PROPERTY

100%

RANDOM CONTINUOUS

SELECTION METHODOLOGY: (b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

INDIVIDUALS

100%

RANDOM CONTINUOUS

SELECTION METHODOLOGY: (b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

SPOT Referral

VEHICLES

100%

RANDOM CONTINUOUS

SELECTION METHODOLOGY: (b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

4.5. DESCRIBE SCREENING PROCESS

Briefly describe the applicable primary and additional screening procedures, and identify the corresponding section of the VIPR SOP. Threat resolution will be described in DOP Section 4.7

4.6. EQUIPMENT

HHMD Hand-Held ETD SABRE 4000 FIDO ETD

Search Tables Stanchions Signage TWIC Reader Other

Explain type of "Other" equipment to be used:

4.7. THREAT ITEM DISCOVERY

If a suspected IED or IED component is discovered, the VIPR team will (b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)
(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

4.7.1. IED OR SUSPECTED IED COMPONENT DISCOVERY

Should a suspicious or illegal item be discovered incidental to a search for IEDs, the AFSD-LE will be notified and the item will be referred to local law enforcement for appropriate action.

Local Explosives Ordinance Disposal Contact Information: IMPD EOD, 317-327-(b)(6),(b)(7)(C) or 911; Sgt. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) IMPD, Cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Rensselaer (Porter Co Sheriff) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C); Crawfordsville, Sgt. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C); Connersville, Indiana State Police EOD (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C), (b)(6),(b)(7)(C), (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) ISP EOD: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) and (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Lafayette - Tippecanoe County Sheriff's Department, Commander (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C); Elkhart - (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C); South Bend - (b)(6),(b)(7)(C) Cell: (b)(6),(b)(7)(C).

4.7.2 SUSPICIOUS OR ILLEGAL ITEM DISCOVERY

Should a suspicious or illegal item be discovered incidental to a search for IEDs, the item will be referred to local law enforcement for appropriate action.

Local Law Enforcement Contact Information for Discovery of Illegal Items: 911, 317-327-(b)(2) on scene AMTRAK security, on scene IMPD

4.7.3 ITEMS PROHIBITED BY OPERATOR

Should an item prohibited by the operator be discovered incidental to this VIPR, the item will be referred to the operator for appropriate action.

Local Operator Contact Information: Sgt. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C), AMTRAK PD, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

The following kinds of items are prohibited as both checked and carry-on baggage:

- Any type of gun, firearm, ammunition, explosives, or weapon.
- Incendiaries, including flammable gases, liquids and fuels.
- Large, sharp objects such as axes, ice picks and swords.
- Corrosive or dangerous chemicals or materials, such as liquid bleach, tear gas, mace, radioactive and harmful bacteriological materials.
- Batteries with acid that can spill or leak (except those batteries used in motorized wheelchairs or similar devices for mobility-impaired passengers).
- Club-like items, such as billy clubs and nightsticks.
- Fragile and/or valuable items (including but not limited to electronic equipment).
- Animals (except service animals).
- Oversized and/or overweight items.

Local Operator Contact Information: Sgt. (b)(6),(b)(7)(C), AMTRAK PD, (b)(6),(b)(7)(C)

4.8. BREACH PROCEDURES

N/A - there is no transportation security area in the terminal and no screening of persons

**Section
5**

5. TSI Activities

Transportation Security Inspectors (TSI) – Surface are specially trained TSA employee who conducts security assessments of transportation systems, works with transit officials to enhance the security, and conduct inspections to determine compliance with TSA regulations and orders.

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)



All activities will be coordinated with the Operations Coordinator conducted in a random manner to deter and detect terrorist and suspicious activity.

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)



**Section
6**

6. TSA LAW ENFORCEMENT PROTOCOL

Federal law enforcement agents trained to operate overtly and covertly within a public environment to investigate, detect, and respond to criminal behavior indicators.

6.1. LOCATION & DESCRIPTION

IMPD and Marion County Terminal Security have law enforcement jurisdiction at the AMTRAK Terminal. AMTRAK Police are on call. All incidents involving suspicious persons and/or suspicious items, IEDs, or criminal activity will be reported to and investigated initially by IMPD and Terminal Security. AMTRAK PD will be notified and assume ongoing investigations.

Local police departments have law enforcement jurisdiction at their AMTRAK platforms. AMTRAK Police are on call. All incidents involving suspicious persons and/or suspicious items, IEDs, or criminal activity will be reported to and investigated by local law enforcement in their jurisdiction. FAMS will provide an overt presence for operational support and patrol, and will assist and support the police departments as directed consistent with OLE/FAMS authority and policy. FAMS may, as directed, transit on trains location to location.

ICE, when available, provides covert law enforcement support for patrol and detection of suspicious activity. ICE may conduct ID checks consistent with ICE policies and procedures.

6.2. GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

6.3 EXPLOSIVES DETECTION CANINE TEAMS (EDCTs)


(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)




6.4 PREVENTIVE RADIOLOGICAL NUCLEAR DETECTION (PRND)

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)



6.5 RADIATION ALARM RESOLUTION

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)



(b)(3):49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

Section

7

7. Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) Enforcement

*** Per TSA Senior Leadership, TWIC enforcement is limited to OLE/FAMs and TSIs.

(b)(3)-49 U.S.C. § 114(f)

Transportation Workers Identification Credential (TWIC)

The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) was created as a system-wide common credential that could be used across all transportation modes. TWIC could be used for all personnel requiring unescorted physical and/or computer access to secure areas of the national transportation system. TWIC was developed in response to threats and vulnerabilities identified in the transportation system. TWIC was developed in accordance with the legislative provisions of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) and the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA).

TSA Authority to Inspect Credential

§ 1570.9 Inspection of credential.

- (a) Each person who has been issued or possesses a TWIC must present the TWIC for inspection upon a request from TSA, the Coast Guard, or other authorized DHS representative; an authorized representative of the National Transportation Safety Board; or a Federal, State, or local law enforcement officer.
- b) Each person who has been issued or who possesses a TWIC must allow his or her TWIC to be read by a reader and must submit his or her reference biometric, such as a fingerprint, and any other required information, such as a PIN, to the reader, upon a request from TSA, the Coast Guard, other authorized DHS representative; or a Federal, State, or local law enforcement officer.

In accordance with 49 CFR 1570.1, 1570.3, 1570.5, 1570.7, 1570.9(a), 1570.11, 1572.19(c) and Coast Guard Law Enforcement Informational Bulletin (Procedures for Handling Seized TWICs) dated June 30th 2009, if TSA personnel are presented with a Transportation Workers Identification Credential (TWIC) card by either a commercial vehicle operator or during the course of an investigation being conducted by a state, local or Federal Law Enforcement Officer (LEO), the following action should be taken.

- Notify the on-scene Operations Coordinator.
- Authenticate the seven (7) physical security features integrated into the card
- Verify that the identity of the individual represented on the TWIC is the same as the presenter
- Contact Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing (TTAC) to compare the TWIC card number # against the "Hot List" of reported lost or stolen cards
- TWIC Program POC/Credential Check - (571) 227-1011 (Monday-Friday)
 - TTAC POC (571) 227-4513 or (571) 227-4517 / 3949 (FAM) (Monday-Friday);
- Return the TWIC card to the presenter once it is determined that the card is authentic and legally possessed.
- If a TWIC card is suspected to be altered, fraudulent, lost or stolen; or a TWIC card is in possession of the holder who has been stopped, detained or interviewed for having committed a crime, the TSA Supervisor or OLE-FAMS ATSAC will notify and confer with the following:
 - TSA Field Office Operations Center and/or TSOC (703) 563-3419 or 3400
 - TSA Office of Chief Counsel (OCC) Field Representative
- Notify TTAC report fraudulent, lost/stolen cards or criminal offenses.

TWIC Frequently Asked Questions http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/layers/twic/twic_faqs.shtml


**Section
8**

8. EXPLOSIVES OPERATIONS

Specialized in detecting explosives and improvised explosive devices in all transportation environments.

TSS-E ACTIVITY MAY INCLUDE:

(b)(3):49 U.S.C. § 114(r)



All activities will be coordinated with the Operations Coordinator conducted in a random manner to deter and detect terrorist and suspicious activity.

**Section
9**

9. BEHAVIOR DETECTION OFFICERS (BDOs)

Trained in non-intrusive behavior observation and analysis to detect involuntary physical and physiological reactions that people who fear being discovered exhibit when trying to suppress high levels of stress, fear, or deception.

BDO ACTIVITY MAY INCLUDE:

(b)(3):49 U.S.C. § 114(r)



Date: [TSA HQ Review Date 10/26/2011]

VIPR MASS TRANSIT DOP v.06APR2010

All activities will be coordinated with the Operations Coordinator conducted in a random manner to deter and detect terrorist and suspicious activity.

TSA Operations Plan

Super Bowl XLVI

Annex 8.3

VIPR Protocols and Coordination Information

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

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**Transportation
Security
Administration**

MEMORANDUM TO: Federal Security Directors (FSD)
Supervisory Air Marshals in Charge (SAC)

FROM: Lee R. Kair
Assistant Administrator, OSO
Robert S. Bray
Assistant Administrator, OLE/FAMS

SUBJECT: Counter-Terrorism Focus of VIPR Operations

The mission of the VIPR Program is to promote public confidence in and protect our Nation's transportation systems through risk-based targeted deployment of integrated Transportation Security Administration (TSA) assets in coordinated activities to augment the security of any mode of transportation.


All VIPR operations should be focused on prevention, deterrence and detection and of terrorism-related activities, not based on local anti-crime initiatives. VIPR assets should continue to augment, rather than replace, local law enforcement and transportation security assets.

Examples of VIPR operations that would not meet the guidance of this directive include:

- Fare/ticket checks in mass transit venues
- Primary enforcement of Transportation Worker Identification Card (TWIC) status
- Deployment on local and interurban buses
- Operations focused specifically on the detection of general criminal activity
- Screening of individuals when leaving a transportation venue


Please reference MD 100.4 Transportation Security Searches for additional guidance regarding screening.

FSDs and SACs should review the planning and deployment of VIPR assets, focusing on counter-terrorism operations. Of particular importance is to focus deployments at locations of high risk, considering the potential human and economic consequences of a successful terrorist attack and the vulnerabilities that a VIPR deployment can mitigate.



Lee R. Kair, Assistant Administrator, OSO

1 MAR 2011
Date



Robert S. Bray, Assistant Administrator, OLE/FAMS

March 1, 2011
Date

VISIBLE INTERMODAL PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

VIPR Standard Operating Procedures



Transportation
Security
Administration

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) personnel and contractors must use and implement these standard operating procedures in carrying out their functions related to security screening of passengers and property. Nothing in these procedures is intended to create any substantive or procedural rights, privileges, or benefits enforceable in any administrative, civil, or criminal matter by prospective or actual witnesses or parties. See *United States v. Caceres*, 440 U.S. 741 (1979).

Revision: 2
Date of Revision: June 09, 2008
Implementation Date: June 09, 2008

TABLE OF CONTENTS

- 1. GENERAL 1-1
 - 1.1. SOP PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION 1-1
 - 1.2. DOCUMENT CONTROL AND AVAILABILITY 1-1
 - 1.3. COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT 1-2
- 2. VIPR TSO PROTOCOLS 2-1
 - 2.1. GENERAL SCREENING PROCEDURES 2-1
 - 2.2. TRANSPORTATION ACCESS AREA 2-1
 - 2.3. SIGNS AND NOTIFICATION 2-1
 - 2.4. SPECIALIZED AND ALTERNATIVE SCREENING PROCEDURES FOR INDIVIDUALS 2-2
 - 2.5. WITHDRAWAL FROM SCREENING 2-2
 - 2.6. SUPERVISOR/LEO NOTIFICATION 2-2
 - 2.7. SUSPECTED IED OR IED COMPONENT DISCOVERY 2-3
 - 2.8. MAINTENANCE AND TESTING OF SCREENING EQUIPMENT 2-3
 - 2.9. SCREENING OF INDIVIDUALS 2-3
 - 2.9.1. HAND-HELD METAL DETECTION (HHMD) SEARCH 2-4
 - 2.9.2. PAT-DOWN SEARCH 2-5
 - 2.10. SCREENING OF PROPERTY 2-6
 - 2.10.1. HAND-HELD ETD SAMPLING 2-7
 - 2.10.2. PHYSICAL SEARCH 2-8
 - 2.11. TSO ROVING OPERATIONS - VISIBLE DETERRENT 2-9
 - 2.12. SCREENING OF PASSENGERS BY OBSERVATION TECHNIQUE (SPOT) 2-11
 - 2.13. ENHANCED ADASP 2-12
 - 2.14. SCREENING OF VEHICLES 2-12
 - 2.14.1. VISUAL INSPECTION OF VEHICLE CONTENTS 2-12
 - 2.14.2. HAND-HELD ETD SAMPLING OF VEHICLE CONTENTS 2-14
- 3. VIPR TSI INSPECTION PROTOCOLS 3-1
 - 3.1. ENHANCED SECURITY MEASURES – AIRCRAFT AND AIRPORT OPERATORS 3-1
 - 3.2. ENHANCED CARGO SECURITY MEASURES – INDIRECT AIR CARRIER, PASSENGER, AND ALL-CARGO FACILITIES 3-1
 - 3.3. ENHANCED SECURITY MEASURES – PASSENGER TRAIN OPERATIONS 3-2
- 4. VIPR LAW ENFORCEMENT PROTOCOLS 4-1
 - 4.1. GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES 4-1
 - 4.2. NATIONAL EXPLOSIVES DETECTION CANINE TEAM PROGRAM (NEDCTP) PROTOCOLS 4-1

Revision: 2
Date of Revision: June 09, 2008
Implementation Date: June 09, 2008

4.2.1. NEDCTP OPERATIONS PROCEDURES 4-1
4.2.2. NEDCTP OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES 4-2
4.3. EXPLOSIVES OPERATIONS PROTOCOLS 4-2
4.3.1. INTRODUCTION 4-2
4.3.2. EXPLOSIVES OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES 4-2
5. REPORTING 5-1
5.1. ROUTINE REPORTING 5-1
5.2. DAILY REPORTING 5-1
5.3. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 5-1
5.4. AFTER ACTION 5-1

SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION

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Chapter 1

1. GENERAL

In accordance with the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 1112), the Department of Homeland Security, through the Transportation Security Administration, may develop Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams to augment security in any mode of transportation at any location within the U.S. VIPR teams may consist of one or any combination of the following TSA personnel: Transportation Security Officers (TSOs), Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs), Explosive Security Specialists (ESSs), Bomb Appraisal Officers (BAOs), Federal Air Marshals (FAMs), Transportation Security Inspectors (TSIs), and Explosives Detection Canine Teams (EDCTs). VIPR teams may use a variety of screening equipment and technologies. VIPR team leaders must consult with local security and law enforcement officers (LEOs) as well as affected transportation entities when planning a VIPR operation.

1.1. SOP PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION

- A. This Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) establishes uniform procedures and standards for a VIPR team operation.
- B. This SOP must accompany the VIPR Deployment Operations Plan (DOP) which describes the specific VIPR operation. All VIPR operations must be conducted in accordance with applicable TSA Management Directives. Certain screening procedures used during a VIPR operation are described in the TSA Screening Checkpoint SOP, TSA Screening Management SOP, Screening of Passengers by Observation Technique (SPOT) SOP, or the Aviation Direct Access Screening Program (ADASP) SOP.

1.2. DOCUMENT CONTROL AND AVAILABILITY

- A. TSA management must maintain at all VIPR deployment locations:
 - 1) A complete copy of this SOP and the DOP for the specific operation.
 - 2) A complete copy of any other applicable SOPs.
 - 3) Any other document required by TSA, such as alarm logbooks.
- B. This SOP is Sensitive Security Information (SSI). If maintained electronically, it must be password protected to prevent unauthorized access in accordance with 49 C.F.R. Part 1520.

Revision: 2
Date of Revision: June 09, 2008
Implementation Date: June 09, 2008

VIPR SOP

- C. Because SOPs contain SSI, TSA management and personnel must take measures to safeguard the information. The Supervisory Transportation Security Officer (STSO) must protect all SOPs from unauthorized access and ensure they are properly secured at all times. All hardcopies of this SOP and any other applicable SOPs must be placed in a stand-alone binder with the VIPR DOP during the specific operation. The binder must be appropriately marked and separated from other SSI materials (for example, ETD alarm logs and calibration/verification forms). Individual binders or folders containing other SSI materials may be secured in the same locked storage container, such as a file cabinet, desk drawer, or other storage container.
- D. This SOP and any other applicable SOPs must be available to VIPR personnel for their review. TSA management must establish procedures to make the SOP(s) available to TSA VIPR deployment personnel as necessary.
- E. No one, except for TSA management and Transportation Security Managers (TSMs), may take this SOP home or to any other location away from the VIPR deployment location, TSA's office areas, screening locations, training rooms, or break rooms.
- F. Direct all SOP questions to local VIPR management and headquarters staff at TSAScreeningSOPs@dhs.gov.

1.3. COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT

Communications equipment must be available at the VIPR location to provide direct communication with the LEO supporting the VIPR. This equipment must be tested daily. The equipment type must be specified in the VIPR DOP.

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**Chapter
2**

2. VIPR TSO PROTOCOLS

This section sets forth procedures for TSOs deployed to screen individuals, property, and/or vehicles and procedures for TSOs participating as part of a roving visible deterrent team.

2.1. GENERAL SCREENING PROCEDURES

Upon consultation with local security, law enforcement, and transportation venue personnel, screening procedures may be implemented based on an assessment of vulnerability, threat information, and the availability of equipment, personnel, and law enforcement assistance. Procedures for screening individuals and property must be conducted in accordance with the Screening Checkpoint, Screening Management, SPOT, and ADASP SOPs. TSA management, STSOs, Lead Transportation Security Officers (LTSOs), and TSOs are not to deviate from this SOP or other applicable TSA SOP, or create "local" policies contrary to the procedures in this SOP or any applicable TSA SOP.

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(f)

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(f)



2.2. TRANSPORTATION ACCESS AREA

The transportation access area is the area designated in Section 4.1 of the VIPR DOP to which access is controlled by TSA through the screening of individuals and/or property.

2.3. SIGNS AND NOTIFICATION

- A. When the VIPR operation includes searches of individuals and/or property, approved signs must be posted clearly stating that individuals and property are subject to search.

Revision: 2
Date of Revision: June 09, 2008
Implementation Date: June 09, 2008

- B. The signs must be prominently displayed such that they will provide adequate notice to individuals before they enter the screening location.
- C. The approximate dimensions and specific location of signs must be described in the VIPR DOP.
- D. When the DOP includes screening of persons and/or property, the signs must indicate "All persons and property are subject to search beyond this point."
- E. When the DOP includes screening of vehicles, the signs must indicate "Vehicle inspection ahead. All vehicles are subject to search beyond this point."

2.4. SPECIALIZED AND ALTERNATIVE SCREENING PROCEDURES FOR INDIVIDUALS

Sections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 of the Screening Management SOP list the individuals and property eligible for specialized or alternative screening. Related procedures must be conducted in accordance with the Screening Checkpoint SOP. Any additional details regarding eligibility and/or credential requirements will be outlined in the VIPR DOP. The VIPR DOP may specify that employees of the transportation entity with valid employee identification are exempt from screening when on duty.

2.5. WITHDRAWAL FROM SCREENING

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)



2.6. SUPERVISOR/LEO NOTIFICATION

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)



Revision: 2
Date of Revision: June 09, 2008
Implementation Date: June 09, 2008

VIPR SOP

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

2.7. SUSPECTED IED OR IED COMPONENT DISCOVERY

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

2.8. MAINTENANCE AND TESTING OF SCREENING EQUIPMENT

Equipment used in support of VIPR deployment must be maintained and tested in accordance with the manufacturer's operations manual and Chapter 3 of the Screening Management SOP.

2.9. SCREENING OF INDIVIDUALS

The screening of individuals must be conducted in accordance with the Checkpoint Screening SOP. The purpose of such screening is to detect threat items, such as explosive vests and IED components, and to prevent and deter individuals from carrying such items into a transportation access area. (b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)


(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

Revision: 2
Date of Revision: June 09, 2008
Implementation Date: June 09, 2008

2.9.1. HAND-HELD METAL DETECTION (HHMD) SEARCH

TSOs must perform the **HHMD SEARCH** per the Screening Checkpoint SOP before the individual enters the transportation access area. Individuals may request a **FULL BODY PAT DOWN** instead of an **HHMD SEARCH**. Except under extraordinary circumstances, **HHMD SEARCHES** must be conducted by a TSO of the same gender as the individual presents himself/herself to be.

HHMD SEARCH VIPR




Revision: 2
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2.9.2 PAT-DOWN SEARCH

All PAT-DOWN SEARCHES must be conducted in accordance with the Screening Checkpoint SOP. (b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r) Individuals must undergo a PAT-DOWN SEARCH before entering the transportation access area. PAT-DOWN SEARCHES are also used to resolve HHMD alarms. Except under extraordinary circumstances, PAT-DOWN SEARCHES must be conducted by a TSO of the same gender as the individual presents himself/herself to be.



2.10. SCREENING OF PROPERTY

The screening of property must be conducted in accordance with the Screening Checkpoint or ADASP SOPs. The purpose of property screening is to detect threat items, such as IEDs and IED components, and to prevent and deter individuals from carrying such items into a transportation access area. (b)(3).49 U.S.C. § 114(r)


(b)(3).49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

Revision: 2
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2.10.1. HAND-HELD ETD SAMPLING

Property must undergo **HAND-HELD ETD SAMPLING** pursuant to Section 3.1 of the ADASP SOP before it enters the transportation access area.

HAND-HELD ETD SAMPLING VIPR




(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

2.10.2 PHYSICAL SEARCH

Property must undergo a **PHYSICAL SEARCH** in accordance with the Screening Checkpoint SOP before entering the transportation access.

PHYSICAL SEARCH VIPR



(b)(3):49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

2.11. TSO ROVING OPERATIONS - VISIBLE DETERRENT

The purpose of TSO roving operations is to detect and deter terrorist and other hostile threats directed against transportation systems through a visible and mobile presence in public areas of a transportation venue. TSOs conducting roving operations have neither been trained nor certified in Screening of Passengers by Observation Technique. When possible, TSOs conducting roving operations should work in pairs. TSOs who observe one or more of the following activities must not approach the individual or vehicle, but must notify a BDO, STSO, or LEO as available.

A. Individuals:

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

B. Vehicles:

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)


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Revision: 2
Date of Revision: June 09, 2008
Implementation Date: June 09, 2008

VIPR SOP

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)



2.12. SCREENING OF PASSENGERS BY OBSERVATION TECHNIQUE (SPOT)

BDOs must conduct SPOT screening in accordance with the SPOT SOP.

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

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Revision: 2
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2.13. ENHANCED ADASP

- A. Enhanced ADASP screening must be conducted in accordance with the ADASP SOP. The purpose of enhanced ADASP operations is to detect and deter the carriage of items of interest as contained in Appendix 1 of the ADASP SOP into the secured areas of the airport.



2.14. SCREENING OF VEHICLES



2.14.1. VISUAL INSPECTION OF VEHICLE CONTENTS



Revision: 2
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VIPR SOP

(b)(3)-49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

(b)(3)-49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

2.14.2. HAND-HELD ETD SAMPLING OF VEHICLE CONTENTS

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

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**Chapter
3**

3. VIPR TSI INSPECTION PROTOCOLS

Upon consultation with local security, law enforcement, and transportation venue personnel, TSI inspection measures can be implemented based on an assessment of threat, vulnerability, and availability of equipment and personnel. If designated as part of the VIPR team, TSIs will deploy in and around the VIPR location to act as a visual deterrent, provide modal-specific expertise, and respond to security related incidents. The VIPR DOP must specify which TSI inspection measures will be deployed as part of the VIPR deployment. TSIs will be available to the transportation operator representatives as a resource to enhance security measures.

3.1. ENHANCED SECURITY MEASURES – AIRCRAFT AND AIRPORT OPERATORS

When the VIPR DOP specifies enhanced security measures for aircraft operators, air carriers, and/or airport operators, TSIs will:

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)



3.2. ENHANCED CARGO SECURITY MEASURES – INDIRECT AIR CARRIER, PASSENGER, AND ALL-CARGO FACILITIES

When the VIPR DOP specifies enhanced cargo security measures for indirect air carrier, passenger, and all-cargo facilities, TSIs will:

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)



Revision: 2
Date of Revision: June 09, 2008
Implementation Date: June 09, 2008

VIPR SOP

3.3. ENHANCED SECURITY MEASURES - PASSENGER TRAIN OPERATIONS

When the VIPR DOP specifies enhanced security measures for passenger train operations, TSI-Surface will perform the activities listed below. Local LEOs must be briefed on TSI-Surface participation.

- A. Maintain a visible presence in public areas of the transit system terminals, passenger drop-off areas, and parking facilities. (b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)



**Chapter
4**

4. VIPR LAW ENFORCEMENT PROTOCOLS

Upon consultation with local security, law enforcement, and transportation venue personnel, law enforcement procedures may be implemented based on an assessment of threat, vulnerability, and the availability of personnel. General law enforcement procedures, explosives detection canine team operations, and explosives operations law enforcement protocols conducted by TSA's Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service (OLE/FAMS) may be used in any combination necessary to support the VIPR operation as specified in the VIPR DOP. The VIPR DOP must specify which law enforcement protocols will be deployed as part of the VIPR deployment.

4.1. GENERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES

General law enforcement capabilities within VIPR operations include the following:

- A. **Surveillance:** Conduct surveillance and surveillance detection in accordance with all applicable procedures. Incidents and suspicious activity must be reported as specified in OLE/FAMS Policy.
- B. **Law Enforcement Presence:** Provide armed support and conduct investigations.
- C. **Liaison to Other Law Enforcement:** Coordinate operations with other Federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel.

4.2. NATIONAL EXPLOSIVES DETECTION CANINE TEAM PROGRAM (NEDCTP) PROTOCOLS

NEDCTP protocols support VIPR operations by deterring and detecting explosive devices, and providing a timely and mobile response support to facilities, rail stations, airports, passenger terminals, seaports, and surface carriers.

4.2.1. NEDCTP OPERATIONS PROCEDURES

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(f)



Revision: 2
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Implementation Date: June 09, 2008

VIPR SOP

4.2. NEDCTP OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES

(b)(3)-49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

4.3. EXPLOSIVES OPERATIONS PROTOCOLS

4.3.1. INTRODUCTION

(b)(3)-49 U.S.C. § 114(r)


4.3.2. EXPLOSIVES OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES

(b)(3)-49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

Revision: 2
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Implementation Date: June 09, 2008

VIPR SOP

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)



Revision: 2
Date of Revision: June 09, 2008
Implementation Date: June 09, 2008

VIPR SOP

**Chapter
5**

5. REPORTING

5.1. ROUTINE REPORTING

The VIPR Team Leader must use WebEOC to report VIPR operations activity. Web reporting must include: VIPR operations start and stop times, shift changes, and any significant events.

5.2. DAILY REPORTING

The VIPR Team Leader must post the daily activity summary on WebEOC and submit it to FC-JCC@dhs.gov.

5.3. SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

The VIPR Team Leader must report significant events to the TSOC as described in Operations Directive 400-18-2B: *Reporting Security Incidents to TSOC* and located at <http://topweb.tsa.dhs.gov/intraweb/assetlibrary/OD-400-18-2B.pdf>.

5.4. AFTER ACTION

The VIPR Team Leader must submit an After Action Report (AAR) to FC-JCC@dhs.gov no later than 10 working days following the completion of the VIPR operation. The AAR must be completed using the template available in WebEOC.

~~SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION~~

TSA Operations Plan

Super Bowl XLVI

Annex 8.4

CSX Operational Plan

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CSX POLICE SUPER BOWL 2012 OPERATIONS ORDER

SITUATION DEPLOYMENT: Super Bowl 2012, Indianapolis, Indiana
DATE(S): Jan 29 thru Feb 5, 2012
DEPLOYMENT HOURS: 24/7

THREAT: Current Intelligence reports indicate no known threat to the 2012 Super Bowl, particularly as it relates to CSX assets and Infrastructure within the downtown area of Indianapolis, IN. Under current information, consider all Intelligence reports for Extremist groups and Terrorist organizations when approaching any situation.

MISSION:

Primary: CSX Police and Rapid Response Team will provide security to diminish any liabilities as it relates to CSX Infrastructure within the downtown Indianapolis area: as well as protecting the general public during this event.

Secondary: The CST Police and RRT members will provide emergency assistance to any other Law Enforcement organization if warranted and/or requested during this event.

TERRAIN: Primary area of operation is the elevated CSX Tracks in the downtown Indianapolis area, this area is referred to as the CSX IU Interlocking controlled by IC Dispatcher (refer to Radio Frequencies listed) Agents will inspect and maintain security using Indianapolis Union Station as central location. East to CP IJ (QS 0.80) and west to E. Washington St. Bridge at (QI 283.20). CSX elevated tracks are located ½ block north of Lucas Oil Stadium, venue for Super Bowl 2012, street location is Capital and South Streets. Secondary areas of operations are CSX Avon yard located in the city of Avon, Hendricks County Indiana and South Anderson yard located in the city of Anderson, Madison County Indiana. The secondary areas will have inspection teams in place to conduct inspection of all trains carrying hazardous material moving into the Indianapolis area. **See Annex A:**

CONCEPT OF OPERATION (COMMANDER'S INTENT):

Great Lakes Division Agents, RRT and DHS Viper team members will work as one unit and will be strategically deployed to provide security during the above-mentioned event and heightened security hours during game time activities.

Annex B. Shift Schedule:

SCHEME OF MANUEVER:

All operations will be based upon a 24 hours period with 9 hour overlapping shifts review. Note: Members of DHS Transportation Security Administration will accompany team members during patrols. Members of the Federal Air Marshal's VIPER Teams will be assigned to the team also upon review of their schedules and assets.

Day 0) (Jan 27) – Operational Meeting

Operational Briefing will be held at Great Lakes Division HQ, 31 E. Georgia St. Indianapolis, Indiana to begin 1600 hours, 3rd Floor Conference Room

The Operation has three separate teams working at the following locations.

Indianapolis Terminal – IU interlocking – located near 31 E. Georgia St. Indianapolis.

Avon Yard – Located Avon Indiana – 401 S. CR 800E, Avon, IN 46123

Anderson yard – 3301 Main Street, Anderson, IN

Day 1 (Jan 28)

(Day 1) Operation patrols beginning @ 0600 hrs, along with team briefing CSX Police office 31 E. Georgia St., Indianapolis, IN. All Train operations will continue as normal during this period. Agents/RRT members will track all incoming trains on the NOW/YES System as well as lineup information from IC Dispatcher. Shift supervisor will advise Marion County EOC (subject to change) of any HazMat material traveling through the downtown area during this time frame (POC TBA). Team members will be responsible for escorting trains through the area of operations and inspect all critical Infrastructures within this area of operation. SA's will be assigned areas of protection as follows:

IU Tower to Indianapolis Heliport

IU Tower area

Union Station

Missouri ST

White River at CP IJ

Two Assigned escort and inspection vehicles : Pickup escort locations for eastbound Trains are on QS Line at Tibbs and Washington St. and QSC line 600S Warman Ave. Escort locations for Westbound trains QI line Post Rd. **See Annex A:**

Terminal teams are responsible for Train Inspection off the BD line, Hawthorne yard local jobs (note: TIH is switched into and out of this yard, primarily Chlorine), Louisville and Indianapolis Railroad Company (LIRC) and Indiana Railroad (INRD) 500 S. Senate Ave Indianapolis. **See Annex A:**

Infrastructure defined: All bridges, switches, track and structures between CP IJ (QS line) and E. Washington ST (QI line). All Eastbound trains will have a (b)(3):49 U.S.C. § 114(r) at CP IJ and Westbound (b)(3):49 U.S.C. § 114(r) at Indianapolis Heliport. All Units will coordinate with IC Dispatcher (channel 30/Road 46) prior to inspecting White River Bridge to ensure proper safety clearance. **See Annex A:**

Note: K-9 Explosive detection team will conduct sweeps of the following critical areas in this order with a vehicle escort team.

(b)(3):49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

(Sweeps will be conducted (b)(3):49 U.S.C. § 114(r) – additional is needed)

K-9 Units are on call 24/7 and will support IMPD operations. K-9 units are assigned to conduct several operations with IMPD and be on call for their HIT Teams. K-9 units will be on call for both Avon and Anderson Inspection Teams.

See Annex B shift schedule

(Day 1) Avon yard operations will begin @ 0600 hrs. Conduct of operation will be the inspection off all eastbound trains coming into the Indianapolis Terminal through the time lines of the entire operation out of the Avon yard area. Primary concern is the inspection of trains built in the Departure yard and any relays from the main line. Avon team members will conduct inspections and escort to a relay point at Tibbs and Washington Streets Indianapolis on the QS Line and 600 S. Warman Ave on the QSC Line; where the terminal units will pick up escort and security operations. Any Eastbound train stopping between Avon and IU interlocking will be protected until it moves through area. **See Attached Avon Operation Order**

(Day 1) Anderson yard operations will begin @ 0600 hrs. Conduct of operation will be the inspection off all westbound trains coming into the Indianapolis Terminal through the time lines of the entire operation out of the S. Anderson yard area. Anderson team members will conduct inspections and escort to a relay point on the QS line at Post Rd Indianapolis; where the terminal units will pick up escort and security operations. Any westbound train stopping between Anderson and IU interlocking will be protected until it moves through area. All inspections will be slow roll by inspections on the western end of town at QS 252.00 unless train stops in Anderson for switching and a ground inspection will be conducted of all Hazmat loads. **See Attached Anderson Operation Order**

Operations of Day 1 will continue with the following exceptions: Game Day: From **(Times TBA)** hrs all trains carrying HazMat materials listed in **Annex 4** will be halted **(Times TBA)** prior to the game and will not be released until **(Times TBA)** after the conclusion of the game. Note: All trains will be halted during game time lines. Note: Hazardous Material Manager (b)(6) is assigned to the EOC Located at during all games with cell and radio contact with ID Dispatcher and CSX PD. (refer to contact list).

JAN 29 (Day 2) Same operations as Day 1 **(Daily Ops TBA)**
JAN 30 (Day 2) Same operations as Day 1 **(Daily Ops TBA)**
JAN 31 (Day 2) Same operations as Day 1 **(Daily Ops TBA)**
FEB 01 (Day 3) Same operations as Day 1 **(Daily Ops TBA)**
FEB 02 (Day 4) Same operations as Day 1 **(Daily Ops TBA)**
FEB 03 (Day 5) Same operations as Day 1 **(Daily Ops TBA)**
FEB 04 (Day 6) Same operations as Day 1 **(Daily Ops TBA)**

FEB 05 (Day 7) Normal train operations will be in effect with the exception of the Super Bowl game. Train operations will mirror Day 1 (exceptions will be noted), Timeline for Super Bowl TBA. Security detail will continue until 0200 hrs or crowd as disperses.

Note: All Operations and Maneuvers will be completed prior to briefing on Day 0.

RRT/CSXPD MEMBERS ASSIGNED/CELL PHONE NUMBERS/RADIO CALL SIGNS:

All Subject to change

Indianapolis Terminal Detail – IU Interlocking

1st Shift 0600-1800 hrs:

SAIC	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
SAIC	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
Tactical Operator	(b)(6)	
Tactical Operator		
Tactical Operator		
Tactical Operator		
K-9 Team	(b)(6)	
K-9 Team		
TBA (to be announced)		
Hazmat Manager	(b)(6)	

1st Shift 1800-0600 hrs:

SSA	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
Tactical Operator	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
Tactical Operator		
Special Agent	(b)(6)	
Tactical Operator	(b)(6)	
Tactical Operator		
Tactical Operator/Hazmat	(b)(6)	
K-9 Team	(b)(6)	
K-9 Team		
TBA		

Avon Yard Detail:

1st Shift 0600-1800 hrs:

SA	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
TBA	(b)(6)	
TBA		

2nd Shift 1800-0600 hrs:

SA	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
TBA		
TBA		

Anderson Yard Detail:

1st Shift 0600-1800 hrs:

SSA (b)(6)

(b)(6)

SA (b)(6)

TBA

2nd Shift 1800-0600 hrs:

SA (b)(6)

(b)(6)

SA

TBA

DSH/TSA/FAMS: TBA

Hazmat Manager, JOCC:

(b)(6)

(b)(6)

DEPLOYMENT SITES OF RRT:

CSX - IU Interlocking at Milepost QI 284.00 in relation to the Great Lakes General Office building at 31E Georgia St. Indianapolis, IN 46204
CSX- Avon Yard at MP QS 10.00, 401 S. Cr Rd 800E Avon, IN 46123, Hendricks County
CSX-South Anderson Yard QI 250.00, Anderson, IN

ASSISTING AGENCIES/CONTACT NUMBERS:

See Annex: D

UNIFORM & EQUIPMENT:

Standard issue RRT or CSX PD uniform with all tactical gear. Protective APR w/canister is required to be readily available. Protective vest required by department policy. Night Vision Equipment will be consolidated for rotation to 2nd shift with 1st Shift collecting equipment each day to organize for the next shift rotation.

WEAPONS REQUIRED:

Department-issued Glock, Model 22/23. Patrol rifles will be accessible but not displayed unless emergency situation dictates.

AMMUNITION REQUIRED:

Standard Department issue .40 cal pistol ammunition (3) magazines and 5.56 patrol rifle ammunition (3) magazines.

ACTION ON CONTACT:

Rules of Engagement - Team members within the deployment area will warn, evict and release all trespassers unless otherwise warranted. In the event of an arrest, District Agents (b)(6) and SAIC (b)(6) will transport to appropriate lock-up and file all necessary arrest documents (note: IMPD will transport any within the Indianapolis area if wagons are available). All trespassers will be screened through the PSCC. Serious incidents will be reported to shift supervisor and commander. Rules of Engagement and Use of Force will follow CSX Police policy and procedure and will be discussed at the per-deployment briefing.

USE OF FORCE:

CSX Agents/RRT shall use force only in a lawful and justifiable manner. Officers shall identify themselves as **Police Officers** immediately upon encountering or confronting a subject. Officers should **only** use deadly force when necessary, that is, when an officer has a reasonable belief that a subject poses immediate danger of death or serious physical injury to the officer or to others.

ACTION AT EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER:

CSXPD Commander and Unit Supervisors will be directly contacted by IMPD on any issues that directly effect CSX operations or infrastructure.

REPORTS REQUIRED:

All incidents will be recorded within the CSX Police TCIS Reporting System. Any serious incidents will be reported to the command center in a timely manner. Unit will use Daily Shift Incident code during the nine day operation and shift supervisors are responsible to update all events in summary reports in the TCIS reporting system. Inspection teams in Anderson and Avon will use one event on all train inspections and refer to Indianapolis event (will be posted) in initial reporting remarks. All Trespassers, Arrest or incidents outside of the Level III inspections will be given there own incident codes which will be noted in the Daily Shift report.

CONSOLIDATION/RE-ORGANIZATION INSTRUCTION:

In the event no serious incidents occur during the deployment, the Team members will conduct an After Action Review (AAR) at the termination of the deployment. Serious incidents may require the Team or Shift Commander to conduct on-the-scene reorganization as the situation dictates.

INTELLIGENCE GATHERING PRIORITIES:

All pre-deployment information is to be gathered by SAIC (b)(6) with the assistance of the CSX District Agents (b)(6) and (b)(6). During the actual event, all Intelligence will be disseminated and shared between Team members and Emergency Operations Center personnel. **ANNEX D:**

TRANSPORTATION DEPLOYMENT TO MISSION:

CSX Police assigned Cruiser cars. One high rail vehicle will be available during the day of the event.

MEET LOCATIONS:

CSX Police Office
31 East Georgia Street
Indianapolis, IN 46204

EMERGENCY MEDICAL/FIRST AID/DECONTAMINATION:

Should the need arise, all above related issued will be directed to the nearest medical and Emergency Response Units facility for immediate handling.

SAFETY OFFICER/HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SPECIALIST:

In accordance with OSHA 29CFR1910.120 (q) (3) (vii) and 29CFR1910.120 (q) (6) (iii) (iv) CSX HazMat Contractors will be available to perform both tasks should the need arise.

CSX Hazmat Manager (b)(6) will be on call and respond to any hazmat incident.
Cell - (b)(6)

HOSPITAL:

Wishard Hospital
1001 West 10th Street
Indianapolis, IN
911

FIRE:

Indianapolis Fire Department
911

VETERINARIAN SERVICE:

Indianapolis Veterinary Referral
5425 Victory Dr.
Indianapolis, IN 46203
317-782-4484

OPERATION COMMANDER:

Commander SSA (b)(6)

LOCATION OF COMMANDER:

CSX Great Lakes Office
31 E. Georgia St.
Indianapolis, IN

LOCATION OF EMERGENCY OPERATION COMMAND CENTER:

Primary: TBA

Seconday: TBA

Field Command Post: TBA
See Annex D

PERSONNEL ASSIGNED TO EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER:

Hazardous Material Manager (b)(6) will be operating inside the security operation Lucas Oil Stadium. Trainmaster will have direct radio contact with ID dispatcher and CSX Police

CSX TRANSPORTATION SSOP 040106:

See reference section for Special Operating Plan. See Annex C/TBA

CHAIN OF COMMAND:

VP Public Safety and Environment:	Skip Elliott
CSX Chief of Police:	Jackie Litzinger
SAIC	(b)(6)
SAIC	
SSA Terminal	2 st Shift Egan
SSA (b)(6)	(b)(6)
SA's	

RADIO FREQUENCIES: (CSX Police)

Primary: 160.875 – PD 51

Alternate: 155.555 Tactical

INDIANAPOLIS IMPD:

Indianapolis Citywide Radio – CD-1 – (subject to change)

Avon/Hendricks County – HCP – OP-1

Anderson PD – TBA

RAILROAD:

Operations Officer - TBA	317-267-4850
Emergency#	317-267-4078
Primary	
IC Dispatcher – INDY Terminal – 30	317-267-4979
Road - 46	
IB Dispatcher – St. Louis LN - 64	317-267-4611
Road - 08	
ID Dispatcher – Indianapolis LN – 38	317-267-4964
Road- 46	
Avon Yard – Yard Channel - 58	

AMTRAK SCHEDULE:

Amtrak Trains Operating during the event is as follows: **(subject to change)**

P050 – Chicago to Washington DC – Tue-Thru-Sat – 0010 hrs

P051 – Washington DC to Chicago – Wed-Fri-Sun – 0444 hrs

P318 – Chicago to Indianapolis – Mon-Wed-Fri-Sun – 2350 hrs

P317 – Indianapolis to Chicago – Tue-Wed-Fri-Sun – 0630 hrs

ANNEX/REFERENCES:

Annex A - Satellite Images of Deployment Areas/Maps/TBA

Annex B – Work Schedules/TBA

Annex C- CSX Transportation Special Operating Plan/Hazmat restriction list/TBA

Annex D- IMPD Public Safety Plan with all POC numbers/ TBA

GENERAL SAFETY NOTES: (subject to change)

1. Conduct Shift Operation Briefing Changes and Safety Briefings
2. Conduct personal risk assessments
3. All CSX/DHS members are required to wear Police Safety Vests when operating on or near Rail Operations and daily infrastructure inspections
4. During shift change, outgoing unit will brief relieving unit on any and all incidents or information prior to departure from operational area.
5. K-9 – No unit member will open or enter K-9 vehicle without direct permission from handler – reference new department policy
6. All Injuries will be reported to shift leader and Commander in a timely manner.

– BE SAFE!

~~SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION~~

TSA Operations Plan

Super Bowl XLVI

Annex 8.5

City of Indianapolis Operational Plan

~~SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~WARNING: THIS RECORD CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PARTS 15 AND 1520. NO PART OF THIS RECORD MAY BE DISCLOSED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A "NEED TO KNOW," AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR PARTS 15 AND 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION OR THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, DISCLOSURE GOVERNED BY 5 U.S.C. 552 AND 49 CFR PARTS 15 AND 1520.~~

**Fire/Life Safety/Hazardous Materials Subcommittee
Operational Response Plan
XLVI Super Bowl - Indianapolis, IN
February 5th, 2012**



Sub Committee Members

NAME	DEPT	WORK	CELL	EMAIL
(b)(6)	IFD/DPS	317-327	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
	IFD	317-327		
	IMPD/EOD	317-327		
(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)	FBI	317-639	(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)	(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
(b)(6)	ISP	317-615	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
	INDPLS DHS	317-327		
	ISDH	317-351		
	IDEM	317-308		
	53 rd CST			
	53 rd CST			
	53rd CST			
	LOS	317-262		
	NORTHCOM	719-554		
	DOE	630-252		
	DOE	630-252		
	EPA			
	USPS	317-328		
Laura Dresen	IDHS	317-605		
(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)	FBI HMOU	540-368	(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)	(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
	FBI HMOU	540-368		
	FBI HMRTU	703-632		
(b)(6)	USSS	317-226	(b)(6)	(b)(6)
	MCHD	317-221		
	IFD/DPS	317-327		

**Fire/Life Safety/Hazardous Materials Subcommittee Operational Response Plan
XLVI Super Bowl - Indianapolis, IN
February 5th, 2012**

Mission Statement:

The mission of this sub-committee is to implement an operational plan for the response to and mitigation of incidents involving fire, life safety, and hazardous materials incidents to include Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) which may impact the SEAR 1 (Special Event Assessment Rating Level 1) Event. The committee is comprised of representatives from local, state and federal agencies which have crisis and consequence management responsibilities related to these subjects.

General Overview:

The 2012 Super Bowl Event Area is defined as the Lucas Oil Stadium (LOS) and the area within the LOS secure perimeter, and supporting areas such as the NFL Experience in the Indianapolis Convention Center, and the official NFL venues/hotels. This committee has assessed the defined areas and developed a response plan which includes dedicated assets, predetermined evacuation routes, predetermined staging areas, predetermined decontamination areas and an integrated response from mutual aid responders local, state and federal. Included in this plan is the composition, numbers, specific role, area of responsibility, and staging location of each element as it pertains to the Operational Response Plan. Several specialized personnel from various government agencies are being utilized to enhance the capabilities of local and state assets.

The Indianapolis Fire Department (IFD), and the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) are providing the majority of the assets and personnel dedicated to fire/life safety and hazardous materials operations.

Additional supporting agencies:

53rd Civil Support Team (Indiana National Guard)
Indiana State Police (ISP)
Marion County Health Department
FBI Hazardous Materials Response Units
Department of Energy (DOE)
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Transportation Safety Administration (TSA)
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, & Firearms (ATF)
Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI)
Indiana Department of Homeland Security (IDHS)
Indiana Department of Emergency Management (IDEM)
Indiana State Fire Marshalls Office
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
CSX Railroad Police Department
United States Postal Inspectors
United States Secret Service

Indianapolis Fire Department Area Command:

In order to maintain situational awareness of events happening throughout the metropolitan area, and to insure that responses to actual or perceived incidents are responded to in a timely, effective, and appropriate fashion, it is proposed that an Area Command be established. Representatives from the Indianapolis Fire Department, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department and the Division of Homeland Security will make up the area commanders in the unified command post. The Indianapolis Fire Area Commander will oversee hazardous materials responders, fire department personnel, emergency medical personnel and environmental health activities in the Hard and Soft zones related to Super Bowl XLVI venues. Fire Control will notify the SB XLVI Area Command of any incident commands established in the city in order to maintain situational awareness and determine if that incident may be related to the events related to SB XLVI or of another large scale incident that may require re-distribution of manpower and assets.

The Fire Area Commander will maintain contact with the five functional Section Chiefs in the downtown area.

The Area Command Post will be established on the grounds of the Public Safety Compound located at 545 W. McCarty St.

Continuity of Operations:

It will be necessary to continue normal public safety operations during the Super Bowl so it will be very important to use resources only where needed. Any service requests that are outside operational times and dates of this plan will be handled by the normal 911 system and following IFD standard operating procedures.

The Indianapolis Fire Department resources assigned to the downtown area during events leading up to and including the super bowl are made up of units fixed in place, mobile units within the hard/soft zone, and units staged outside the immediate area. This organization provides for the initial operations to begin immediately, with a progressive reach back capability, if on site resources and fixed sites are compromised.

The Indianapolis Fire Department will operate a typical Incident Management Team structure that consists of Command and General Staff positions as well as functional branches. The Area Commanders and most of the general staff positions will be in the Unified Command Center located at the Public Safety Compound located at 545 W. McCarty St.

The exception to this will be on game day when the Area Command will move to the Lucas Oil Stadium Public Safety Operations Center. This will allow situational awareness through the technology in the center as well as close contact with National Football League Officials.

Joint Hazard Interdiction Teams (HIT)

The Joint Hazard Interdiction Teams (HIT) was developed to provide a quick and cohesive response team that is able to provide immediate incident assessment as well as joint command, control, and communications during actual or potential incidents at Special Events. During the 2012 Super Bowl, each HIT will be comprised of hazmat technician representatives from Indianapolis Fire Department (IFD), the Indianapolis National Guard 53rd Civil Support Team (CST), the FBI Hazardous Materials Operations Unit (FBI HMOU) and the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Explosive Device Response Team (IMPD EDR).

The partnership created by joining these agencies provides for a rapid, effective, and concise deployment of technical resources during major events. Each HIT is able to share information and request appropriate response

elements based on a rapid on-site assessment and the advanced knowledge of all security and response plans. General responsibilities of the members are as follows:

- IFD - Represent the local agency having jurisdiction with respect to Fire/Life Safety/Hazmat incidents and operations. The IFD representative is the leader on all life safety issues.
- IMPD EORD – Represents the local agency having jurisdiction with respect to Explosive Ordinance incidents and operations, The IMPD representative is the leader on all explosive ordinance issues.
- 53rd CST – Support local assets with respect to Fire/Life Safety/Hazmat incidents.
- FBI HMOU – Support local assets with respect to Fire/Life Safety/Hazmat incidents. This asset will be in a supporting role unless it is determined to be a criminal incident.

Note: All members will consult/confer with each other and ranking officials as to actions being taken and further actions advised, i.e.; level of response, evacuations, etc.

Command and Control

The HIT assets assembled for Super Bowl 46 will be dispatched from the HIT Desk located at the Public safety Compound. A HIT Group Supervisor will be available to manage the HIT assets in the event of multiple HIT requests.

HIT will respond to the following:

- Any fire or rescue incident, or medical emergency involving multiple patients.
- An actual/suspected release of an unknown chemical, biological, or radiological agent.
- Unattended/suspicious packages.
- The functioning of any hazardous device or improvised explosive device (IED).
- Any structural collapse.
- Any confined space emergency.
- Any Law Enforcement Tactical operation involving Hazardous Materials.
- Any incident that may have an impact on the LOS site, ICC or any Super Bowl venue/hotel.
- Any incident when directed by the All Hazard Desk in the JOC.

HIT Duties:

HIT will perform the following:

- Rapid situation assessment.
- Establish incident command.
- Request the appropriate resources as needed (Sampling Team, Fire, EMS, etc).
- Notify and advise the HIT Desk at the PSC of all actions being taken and any recommendations.
- Each member will make appropriate notifications to their respective agencies as required.

Note: Command of the incident will subsequently change/be relinquished to the appropriate responding units in accordance with established procedures/jurisdiction or as directed by the Hit Desk at the PSC.

HIT will offer an immediate response capability to provide an on scene assessment of any fire/life safety incident, hazardous materials concerns evaluate the threat and make recommendations and coordination of additional response resources as appropriate.

HIT team members will be in communication with their respective agencies, the HIT Desk at the PSC, and will ensure all matters of significance are receiving adequate attention and resources from the responding HIT(s).

The HIT's will carry minimal portable detection/monitoring equipment along with their own PPE (Personal Protective Equipment) to aid in the detection of hazardous materials, will coordinate sampling and testing of samples by calling the appropriate Sampling Team assets forward.

HIT personnel will be dressed discreetly, without agency logos.

HITs will not be used to mitigate the problem except where an immediate and inescapable threat to human life exists.

Communications Plan for HIT:

- A HIT Operations Channel will be established and monitored by the HIT Desk at the Public Safety Compound and IFD Area Command. This will be the primary HIT dispatch mechanism through the HIT Desk at the PSC.
- Each member of HIT will maintain and monitor all additional means of communication supplied by their respective agencies.
- Each member of HIT will maintain cellular and/or other commercial communications as a backup to radio communications,

reserve HIT will be staged at the Public Safety Compound located at 545 W. McCarthy.

The staging location for the HIT teams working the event venues will be decided at a later date.

Areas of Responsibility/Hours of Operation:

Joint Operations Center (JOC)

All Hazards Desk

City & State Desk

Two command staff personnel for the Indianapolis Fire Department, in support of the JOC at the All Hazards Desk and City & State Desk located at the Marion County Regional Operations Center (ROC) during scheduled operational periods.

The JOC all Hazards Desk will manage all incidents with a CBRNE nexus and communicate and coordinate all responses with the Public safety Compound (PSC) for subsequent investigation and resolution applicably deployed public safety assets.

The JOC City & State Desk will support resource requests from the Super Bowl Area Command and stay updated on other fire/life safety/hazardous materials incidents within Indianapolis and State of Indiana. The JOC City & State Desk must be ready to support resource requests and communicate with the Public Safety Compound (PSC) to maintain situational awareness between the City, State, JOC and PSC.

The JOC will be staffed as follows:

Thursday, January 26, 2012
 2:00pm – 10:00pm – IFD Chief Officer – City & State Desk
 IFD HM Tech – All Hazards Desk

Friday, January 27, 2012
 2:00pm – 10:00pm – IFD Chief Officer – City & State Desk
 IFD HM Tech – All Hazards Desk

Saturday, January 28, 2012
 2:00pm – 10:00pm – IFD Chief Officer – City & State Desk
 IFD HM Tech – All Hazards Desk

Sunday, January 29, 2012
 2:00pm – 10:00pm – IFD Chief Officer – City & State Desk
 IFD HM Tech – All Hazards Desk

Monday, January 30, 2012
 6:00am – 2:00pm – IFD Chief Officer – City & State Desk
 IFD HM Tech – All Hazards Desk
 2:00pm – 10:00pm – IFD Chief Officer – City & State Desk
 IFD HM Tech – All Hazards Desk

Tuesday, January 31, 2012
 6:00am – 2:00pm – IFD Chief Officer – City & State Desk
 IFD HM Desk – All Hazards Desk
 2:00pm – 10:00pm – IFD Chief Officer – City & State Desk
 IFD HM Tech – City & State Desk

Wednesday, February 1, 2012
 6:00am – 2:00pm – IFD Chief Officer – City & State Desk
 IFD HM Tech – All Hazards Desk
 2:00pm – 10:00pm – IFD Chief Officer – City & State Desk
 IFD HM Tech – All Hazards Desk

Thursday, February 2, 2012
 6:00am – 2:00pm – IFD Chief Officer – City & State Desk
 IFD HM Tech – All Hazards Desk
 2:00pm – 10:00pm – IFD Chief Officer – City & State Desk
 IFD HM Tech – All Hazards Desk

Friday, February 3, 2012
 6:00am – 2:00pm – IFD Chief Officer – City & State Desk
 IFD HM Tech – All Hazards Desk
 2:00pm – 10:00pm – IFD Chief Officer – City & State Desk
 IFD HM Tech – All Hazards Desk
 10:00pm – 6:00am – IFD Chief Officer – City & State Desk
 IFD HM Tech – All Hazards Desk

Saturday, February 4, 2012

6:00am – 2:00pm – IFD Chief Officer – City & State Desk
IFD HM Tech – All Hazards Desk
2:00pm – 10:00pm – IFD Chief Officer – City & State Desk
IFD HM Tech – All Hazards Desk
10:00pm – 6:00am – IFD Chief Officer – City & State Desk
IFD HM Tech – All Hazards Desk

Sunday, February 5, 2012

6:00am – 2:00pm – IFD Chief Officer – City & State Desk
IFD HM Tech – All Hazards Desk
2:00pm – 10:00pm – IFD Chief Officer – City & State Desk
IFD HM Tech – All Hazards Desk
10:00pm – 6:00am – IFD Chief Officer – City & State Desk
IFD HM Tech – All Hazards Desk

Monday, February 6, 2012

6:00am – 2:00pm – IFD Chief Officer – City & State Desk
IFD HM Tech – All Hazards Desk
2:00pm – 10:00pm – IFD Chief Officer – City & State Desk
IFD HM Tech – All Hazards Desk

Public Safety Compound (PSC)

HIT Desk (Bomb Management Center) (BMC)

15 West McCarty Street, Indianapolis, IN

The primary operational location for the CBRNE group will be the HIT Desk and will be located at the PSC. The Hit Desk will be staffed with a representative from the EDR group, IFD Hazmat Team, and/or HDOC. The HIT Desk will commence operations on Thursday, January 26, 2012 commensurate with the initiation of the JOC. The HIT Desk will cease operations on February 6, 2012.

All responses to potential BBRNE incidents are managed by the HIT Desk/BMC, which will act as a forward command post, provide applicable support, and ensure that all incidents with a CBRNE nexus are subsequent investigated and resolved with applicably deployed public safety assets, to include HITS. The Hit Desk/BMC will ensure that investigative and resolution status of all incidents with a CBRNE nexus are immediately communicated to the JOC All Hazards Desk.

The HIT Desk will be staffed as follows:

Thursday, January 26, 2012

2:00pm – 10:00pm – IFD HM Tech

Friday, January 27, 2012

2:00pm – 10:00pm – IFD HM Tech

Saturday, January 28, 2012

2:00pm – 10:00pm – IFD HM Tech

Sunday, January 29, 2012

2:00pm – 10:00pm – IFD HM Tech

Monday, January 30, 2012
6:00am – 2:00pm – IFD HM Tech
2:00pm – 10:00pm – IFD HM Tech

Tuesday, January 31, 2012
6:00am – 2:00pm – IFD HM Tech
2:00pm – 10:00pm – IFD HM Tech

Wednesday, February 1, 2012
6:00am – 2:00pm – IFD HM Tech
2:00pm – 10:00pm – IFD HM Tech

Thursday, February 2, 2012
6:00am – 2:00pm – IFD HM Tech
2:00pm – 10:00pm – IFD HM Tech

Friday, February 3, 2012
6:00am – 2:00pm – IFD HM Tech
2:00pm – 10:00pm – IFD HM Tech
10:00pm – 6:00am – IFD HM Tech

Saturday, February 4, 2012
6:00am – 2:00pm – IFD HM Tech
2:00pm – 10:00pm – IFD HM Tech
10:00pm – 6:00am – IFD HM Tech

Sunday, February 5, 2012
6:00am – 2:00pm – IFD HM Tech
2:00pm – 10:00pm – IFD HM Tech
10:00pm – 6:00am – IFD HM Tech

Monday, February 6, 2012
6:00am – 2:00pm – IFD HM Tech
2:00pm – 10:00pm – IFD HM Tech

Lucas Oil Stadium (LOS)
Super Bowl XLVI
500 South Capitol Avenue, Indianapolis, IN.

HITs assigned to LOS will have primary responsibility for all incidents and/or requests for service occurring both inside LOS and Immediately outside LOS within the security perimeter. HITs will maintain their presence within their assigned areas unless directed by the Hit Desk to respond to another area to assist.

HITs assigned to LOS will stage at pre-designated locations which are still being identified.

LOS will be staffed as follows:

Friday, February 3, 2012:

8:00pm – 2:00am (Sat) – Facility Sweep – All Hands

Saturday, February 4, 2012:

9:00am – 4:00pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

9:00am – 4:00pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

4:00pm – 12:00 midnight – HIT – IFD HM Tech

4:00pm – 12:00 midnight – HIT – IFD HM Tech

Sunday, February 5, 2012:

10:00am – 4:00pm – HIT (interior) – IFD HM Tech

10:00am – 4:00pm – HIT (interior) – IFD HM Tech

10:00am – 4:00pm – HIT (exterior) – IFD HM Tech

10:00am – 4:00pm – HIT (exterior) – IFD HM Tech

4:00pm – 2:00am (Mon) – HIT (interior) – IFD HM Tech

4:00pm – 2:00am (Mon) – HIT (interior) – IFD HM Tech

4:00pm – 2:00am (Mon) – HIT (exterior) – IFD HM Tech

4:00pm – 2:00am (Mon) – HIT (exterior) – IFD HM Tech

Indianapolis Convention Center (ICC)

NFL Experience (NFLX)

100 South Capitol Avenue, Indianapolis, IN.

HITs assigned to ICC for NFLX events will have primary responsibility for all incidents and/or requests for service occurring both inside and immediately adjacent to ICC.

HITs assigned the ICC venue will also have responsibility for the NFL Village located on Georgia Street between Capitol and Pennsylvania avenues as well as the NFL Tail Gate/Game day Fan Plaza Event located in the parking lots between the ICC and LOS. HITs will maintain their presence within their assigned areas unless directed by the Hit Desk to respond to another area to assist.

HITs assigned to the ICC will stage in rooms 108/109 in the interior of ICC. HITs will also stage one (1) Bomb Response Truck on Maryland Avenue which will provide flexibility for response to either the ICC or adjacent related SBXLVI venues.

The ICC will be staffed as follows:

Friday, January 27, 2012:

8:00am – 12:00pm – Facility Sweep – All hands

2:00pm – 10:30pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

2:00pm – 10:30pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

Saturday, January 28, 2012:

9:30am – 4:00pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

9:30am – 4:00pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

4:00pm – 10:30pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

4:00pm – 10:30pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

Sunday, January 29, 2012:

8:30am – 3:30pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech
10:30am – 3:30pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech
3:30pm – 8:30 – HIT – IFD HM Tech
3:30pm – 8:30 – HIT – IFD HM Tech

Monday, January 30, 2012:

12:30pm – 8:30pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech
2:30pm – 10:30pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

Tuesday, January 31, 2012:

2:30pm – 10:30pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech
2:30pm – 10:30pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

Wednesday, February 1, 2012:

10:30am – 2:30pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech
2:30am – 10:30pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech
2:30am – 10:30pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

Thursday, February 2, 2012:

12:30pm – 8:30pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech
2:30pm – 10:30pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech
2:30pm – 10:30pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

Friday, February 3, 2012:

2:30pm – 10:30pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech
2:30pm – 10:30pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

Saturday, February 4, 2012:

9:30am – 3:30pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech
9:30am – 3:30pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech
3:30pm – 10:30pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech
3:30pm – 10:30pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

Sunday, February 5, 2012:

12:00pm – 9:30pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech
12:00pm – 9:30pm – HIT – IFD IIM Tech

Indianapolis Area / Downtown (IAD)

HITs assigned to IAD are considered area mobile teams and will have responsibility for all incidents and/or requests for service occurring outside the SBXLVI perimeter. This responsibility includes all NFL venues, sanctioned events, and request for service which occur exterior to the SBXLVI perimeter. In addition, IAD HITs will be prepared to respond into the SBXLVI perimeter should the need arise.

HITs assigned to IAD will stage at a pre-designated area still to be determined

IAD will be staffed as follows:

Friday, January 27, 2012:

4:00pm – 12:00 midnight – HIT – IFD HM Tech

Saturday, January 28, 2012:

4:00pm – 12:00 midnight – HIT – IFD IIM Tech

Sunday, January 29, 2012:

4:00pm – 12:00 midnight – HIT – IFD HM Tech

Monday, January 30, 2012:

4:00pm – 12:00 midnight – HIT – IFD HM Tech

Tuesday, January 31, 2012:

4:00pm – 12:00 midnight – HIT – IFD HM Tech

Wednesday, February 1, 2012:

4:00pm – 12:00 midnight – HIT – IFD HM Tech

Thursday, February 2, 2012:

4:00pm – 12:00 midnight – HIT – IFD HM Tech

Friday, February 3, 2012:

9:30am – 6:30pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

4:00pm – 12:00 midnight – HIT – IFD HM Tech

Saturday, February 4, 2012:

9:30am – 6:30pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

4:00pm – 12:00 midnight – HIT – IFD HM Tech

Sunday, February 5, 2012:

10:00am – 4:00pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

4:00pm – 2:00pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

4:00pm – 2:00pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

VACIS Operational Site (VOS)

514 Drover Street, Indianapolis, IN.

HITs assigned to VOS will have primary responsibility for all incidents and/or requests for service occurring with a nexus to VACIS operations. The VOS site will also possess a Large Vehicle Bomb Improvised Explosive Device (LVBIED) mitigation area.

For purpose of operational clarification, the VACIS site will operate two (2) inspection lanes dedicated to NFL deliveries. On Friday, February 3, 2012, a third VACIS lane will be established and dedicated to United States Postal Service (USPS) related deliveries. This third VACIS lane will operate on a continual basis until 4:00 am on Sunday, February 3, 2012.

VOS will be staffed as follows:

Monday, January 30, 2012:

6:00am – 12:00pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

12:00pm – 6:00pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

Tuesday, January 31, 2012:

6:00am – 12:00pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

12:00pm – 6:00pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

Wednesday, February 1, 2012:

6:00am – 12:00pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

12:00pm – 6:00pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

Thursday, February 2, 2012:

6:00am – 12:00pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

12:00pm – 6:00pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

Friday, February 3, 2012:

6:00am – 12:00pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

12:00pm – 6:00pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

Saturday, February 4, 2012:

6:00am – 12:00pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

12:00pm – 6:00pm – HIT – IFD HM Tech

Sunday, February 5, 2012:

6:00am – 10:00am – HIT – IFD HM Tech

Sampling Team

A Sampling Team will be established for the purposes of providing a rapid, cohesive response element in support of HIT Operations during the SBXLVI Event. The Sampling Team will be comprised of local, state, and federal assets that provide a capability to detect, monitor, collect, and in some instances analyze hazardous materials.

The Sampling Team will have the capability to collect Public Safety Samples for the purposes of providing the Incident Commander with information to guide response. This capability will be led by the Marion County Health Department.

The Sampling Team will have the capability to collect evidence in support of a criminal investigation. This capability will be led by the FBI.

The Sampling Team will have the capability to respond to situations involving Biological, Chemical, and/or biological materials.

The Sampling Team will be comprised of personnel from the following agencies:

- Marion County Health Department
- 53rd Indiana National Guard Civil Support Team
- Department of Energy
- Environmental Protection Agency
- FBI Hazardous Materials Science Response Unit
- FBI Hazardous Materials Response Team Unit
- FBI Hazardous Materials Response Team
- IDEM

The Sampling Team will be staged in the Public Safety Compound. Upon discovery of a potential or credible hazardous materials incident, the HIT will contact the HIT Desk to request specific assets from the Sampling Team to move forward to the incident site.

The entire Sampling Team will not normally move forward as a unit, only the assets required to perform the task requested.

The Sampling Team will develop Standard Operating Protocols for the collection, transportation, and analysis of samples and evidence. (See Annex #1)

Areas of Responsibility/Hours of Operation:

Individuals assigned to the Sampling Team are qualified experts from their respective agencies. During the 2012 Super Bowl the Sampling Team will be on standby in the PSC anytime the HITs are operational in the field.

Indianapolis Fire Department Fast Action Suppression Team (FAST)

FAST will consist of two (2) Indianapolis Fire Department representatives. Each FAST will be dedicated to a specific division of the venue. They will provide initial assessment, establish incident command, and mitigate incidents involving fires, smoke, or alarms within their assigned area of operation.

FAST Response

FAST will respond to the following situations:

- Any fire incident within their sector
- Any location as directed by HIT
- Any location as directed by LOS Stadium Command or IFD Area Command

FAST Duties

FAST will perform the following duties:

- General Fire/EMS/Life Safety surveillance
- Fire Suppression activities as needed
- Size-up and resource requesting through Stadium Public Safety Operations or IFD Area Commanders
- Technical Rescue size-up and simple mitigations

- EMS functions as directed by Stadium Command or IFD Area Command

Area of Responsibility

FAST 1,2,3,4 will be inside LOS on Sunday 2/5

FAST 5 & 6 will be inside the Inner Perimeter on Sunday 2/5

FAST 7 will be assigned the Convention Center/NFL Experience on Sunday 2/5

FAST 8 (Grass Rig 53) will be used for inaccessible areas of downtown in lieu of full-size assets

To support the FAST teams in LOS and Convention Center, an IFD Engine Company will be stationed on the Fire Department Connection (Capitol St. Side of LOS & Maryland St. side of ICC) with the intent to supply the fire department connection if the FAST requests water.

Communications Plan

Each member of a FAST will maintain and monitor all means of communication supplied by their respective agency.

FASTs will report to the assigned IFD Branch Director

Structural Fire Suppression Operations Plan

Reports of structural fire alarms, smoke in the area, or visual fire reports in the area of LOS or ICC will be managed by the FAST teams.

the event that additional resources are needed it will be requested through the Area Commander and will be under the direction of the LOS or ICC Branch Director.

Station 19 staging:

Resource	Type	Manpower
Engine 19	A	4 - 3+OIC
Engine	A	4 - 3+OIC
Ladder 19	A	4 - 3+OIC
Ladder	A	4 - 3+OIC
Battalion Chief		2 - Aide+OIC

A resource list of Suppression companies assigned to staging will be included at a later date.

The resources assigned to the staging area will report to the staging area manager.

Urban Search & Rescue (US&R)

- The Indiana Task Force 1 US&R Team will on standby during the Super Bowl. During daytime hours, the team will be available within a 2-hour response time. After hours response will be via normal US&R request procedures.

Emergency Medical Services

IFD, IEMS and IU Health are the lead agencies for all emergency medical services supporting the Super Bowl; they will be providing assets and personnel for routine operations as well as assets and personnel to provide medical care and support emergency operations within the event area of operations

Hazardous Materials Response

In the event of a full hazardous materials response in the venue or in other locations in downtown Indianapolis, the following assets will respond:

Resource	Type	Manpower
Engine 13	A	4 - 3+OIC
Ladder 13	A	4 - 3+OIC
Tactical 13		Dual Staffed
Squad 13		2 - 1+OIC
Battalion 13		2 - 1+OIC

ALS transport will be needed if team moves up.

As needed:

- (1) HIT
- 53rd Civil Support Team (CST) assets
 - o Analytical Laboratory System
 - o Unified Communications Suite (UCS)
 - o Advon Command Suburban.
- DOE Assets
- EPA Assets
- FBI Assets

Hazardous Materials Operations Plan

The Hazmat Branch Director shall locate at IFD Station 13 and provide command and control of Hazmat Branch resources as directed by Operations Section Chief.

Hazmat Task Force 13 (Hazmat 13) will be staged at IFD Station 13 and conduct Hazmat operations as directed by the Hazmat Branch Director. Their areas of responsibility include the venue areas supporting SB XLVI.

53rd WMD CST will be staged at the Public Safety staging area and conduct Hazmat operations as directed by the Hazmat Branch Director or Area Command. Their areas of responsibility include the entire Hard/Soft Zone.

The 53rd WMD CST will also provide members for each HIT team in operation.

Hazmat Branch Staffing

Hazmat Branch Director –	IFD Battalion Chief (Command Unit)
Hazmat 13 -	IFD 2 officers, 1 engineer, 5 FF's/Hazmat Tech (Tactical Unit)
ad 13 -	IFD 1 officer, 1 engineer (ALS Unit)
Engine Company ? -	IFD 1 officer, 1 engineer, 2 FF's (Type 1 Fire Engine)
53 rd CST -	Indiana National Guard Unit

ALS Transport

IEMS 1 EMT, 1 Paramedic (ALS transport Unit)

Decontamination (Gross Decontamination/Technical Decontamination Plan):

The following make up the dedicated assets for a decontamination response:

- One Battalion Chief – IFD
- Four Engine Companies – IFD
- Two Ladder Companies – IFD
- One Hazardous Materials Unit – IFD
- Four ALS Ambulance Units – IFD
- IMPD Resources

As needed:

- (1) HIT
- 53rd Civil Support Team (CST) assets
 - o Analytical Laboratory System
 - o Unified Communications Suite (UCS)
 - o Advon Command Suburban.
- DOE Assets
- EPA Assets

Primary sites:

Location: South St. & Senate

Purpose: Gross Decontamination

Number: Decon Site 1

Staffing: Two Engine Companies & One Ladder Comp

Location: Post Office Maintenance Garage

Purpose: Technical Decontamination

Number: Decon Site 2

Staffing: Two Engine Companies & One Ladder Company & IFD Decontamination Task Force

Environmental Monitoring

Environmental monitoring in and around LOS will be conducted by (to be determined and written by committee)

Any samples collected within LOS will be Field Screened to determine the appropriate laboratory for analysis.

Biological samples will be transported to the Marion County Department of Public Health Lab, which is the local LRN Laboratory. Samples will be transported by FBI personnel. For further details, refer to the Sampling Team Guideline Document (Annex #1).

Chemical samples will be Field Screened for their relative volatility and threat, and transported to an appropriate laboratory for analysis. For further details, refer to the Sampling Team Guideline Document (Annex

Radiological samples will be Field Screened to rule out other threats, spectra obtained, and identified via DOE assets. For further details, refer to the Sampling Team Guideline Document (Annex #1).

Radiological Screening

Screening for the presence of radiological materials will be performed in support of Super Bowl 2012. Activities will include but are not limited to screening of vehicles and persons entering the LOS perimeter.

Agencies involved in radiological screening will include:

- Department of Energy
- Environmental Protection Agency
- Transportation Safety Administration

The DOE is the lead Federal Agency for the radiological screening initiative, and will develop the plan for that activity (Refer to Annex #2)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI)

The FBI is supporting the 2012 Super Bowl with the following assets:

Hazardous Materials Response Teams Unit (HMRTU) & Hazardous Materials Response Team (HMRT)

The HMRTU & HMRT component at the Super Bowl will be comprised of:

- Two (2) Supervisory Special Agents (SSAs)
- TBD #'s HMRT
- Program Analyst

The SSA's will be assigned to the Sampling Team and the JOC/FBI CP (TBD), the HMRT will be assigned to the Sampling Team, and the Program Analyst will be assigned to the JOC.

The SSA's will provide command and control of HMRT resources, and will act as team leaders in the event of a hazardous materials crime scene response.

The FBI will deploy HMRT personnel to support the Sampling Team. All requests to deploy HMRT resources will be coordinated by the HMRTU SSA. Once deployed to a scene, the HMRT Team Leader will maintain communication through the HMRTU SSA. Operational and safety guidance will be sought through the on-scene HIT and HMOU Hazmat Officer. Each HMRT will respond to an incident with appropriate equipment and personnel to effectively collect evidence within a hazardous environment.

Hazardous Materials Science Response Unit (HMSRU)

The HMSRU component at the Super Bowl will be as follows:

- (1) Chemist
- (1) Microbiologist
- (1) Nuclear Specialist

HMSRU scientists will provide scientific and technical assistance, including scientific assessments of hazardous materials incidents, and technical advice during field screening, material recognition, and collection and preservation activities. HMSRU will be assigned to the Sampling Team, and will take the lead by developing the sampling plan during the collection of evidentiary samples.

Hazardous Materials Operations Unit

The HMOU component at the Super Bowl will be as follows:

- (2) Supervisory Hazardous Materials Officers (S/HMO)
- (5) Hazardous Materials Officers (HMO) & Hazardous Materials Specialists (HMS)

The HMO/HMS will provide real-time evaluation and assessment of evolving and potential threats as part of the HITs. The HMO/HMS will provide support to any investigation that involves Confined Spaces or other technical hazards. The HMOs will provide support to any FBI Tactical Operation requiring a HMO.

HMOU will provide a Supervisory HMO for LOS Stadium Command to assist in the coordination of the HITs.

Department Of Energy (DOE)

The Department of Energy is supporting Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) and the 53rd CST (Civil Support Team) in operations related to radiological hazards. It is anticipated that pre-mapping and real time surveillance will be provided.

DOE Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) teams will conduct pre-event surveillance of radiological emanations from areas designated by the FBI, IMPD or IFD. RAP members will be assigned to the Sampling Team as appropriate in order to identify any radiological sources of concern during the Super Bowl.

DOE Radiological Identification Teams will be located outside the LOS in order to conduct analysis of potential radiological sources. They will be deployed at the request of the responding HIT via the appropriate Command Element.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

The EPA is supporting FBI and DOE operations related to radiological hazards. EPA will be coordinating with DOE on pre-mapping and real time surveillance.

The EPA will be assigned to the Sampling Team as appropriate in order to assist in the identification of radiological sources during the Super Bowl.

Transportation Safety Administration (TSA)

The TSA is supporting FBI and DOE operations related to radiological hazards. TSA will be coordinating with DOE on pre-mapping and real time surveillance.


The TSA will be deploying VIPR teams as appropriate in order to assist in the identification of radiological sources during the Super Bowl. All responses and/or alarms will be reported to the Hit Desk

53rd Indiana Civil Support Team (CST)

The 53rd CST supports civil authorities at a domestic Chemical, Biological, Radiological, or Nuclear incident site by identifying CBRN agents/substances, assessing current and projected consequences, advising on response measures, and assisting with appropriate requests for additional support.

CST personnel will be assigned to HIT as well as the Sampling Team. CST vehicles will be staged in the Public Safety Staging Area.

Fire Department Organizational Chart




NSSE Evolution

if the SEAR 1 Event transitions to a National Special Security Event (NSSE) the United States Secret Service (USSS) must be included in the Fire/Life Safety/Hazmat plan.

In the event that Super Bowl 2012 is declared an NSSE, the following inclusions will be made to the plan:

- The USSS will assume the lead for all security planning for the Event
- A member of the USSS Technical Security Division will join each HIT Team
- A member of the USSS TSD will join LOS Stadium Command
- A member of the USSS TSD will join IFD Area Command
- A USSS Multi-Agency Coordination Center (MACC) will be established, and Public Safety agencies may be requested to have a presence.
- The USSS will deploy additional resources to augment radiological detection capabilities, and will coordinate with DOE and FBI assets.



~~SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION~~

TSA Operations Plan

Super Bowl XLVI

Annex 8.6

Contact List/Staffing Matrix

~~SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~WARNING: THIS RECORD CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PARTS 15 AND 1520. NO PART OF THIS RECORD MAY BE DISCLOSED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A "NEED TO KNOW," AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR PARTS 15 AND 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION OR THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC DISCLOSURE GOVERNED BY 5 U.S.C. 552 AND 49 CFR PARTS 15 AND 1520.~~

SUPERB VI
TSA ICC CL CTS

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
2	C-CENTER		TSA	(b)(6)		(b)(6)	Airport
3	ICC-TSA		TSA				8303 W. Southern Ave
4							
5	JOC		Multiple	TSA Desk			401 N. Shadeland Ave.
6	IAA AOC-EOC		IAA	TSA Desk	317-487-5089		8101 South Service Rd
7	IN-EOC		Indiana	TSA Desk			7200 E Troy Ave.
8	Public Safety Compound			TSA Desk	317-327-7282	317-327-7297 7293 HIIT	545 W. McCarty Street
9							
10	FSD STAFF						
11	(b)(6)		TSA IND	FSD	(b)(6)		8303 W. Southern Ave
12	Adams	Richard	TSA IND	AFSD-LE			8303 W. Southern Ave
13	Beckius,	John	TSA IND	AFSD-I			8303 W. Southern Ave
14	Bourne,	Kennis	TSA IND	AFSD-S (Act)			8303 W. Southern Ave
15	Nelson,	Matt	TSA IND	AFSD-G			8303 W. Southern Ave
16	Saucerman	Brent	TSI-A	S-TSI (Act)			8303 W. Southern Ave
17	Pecar	Matt	TSA IND	S-TSI			8303 W. Southern Ave
18							
19	FAMS		SSI			Best Western 317-837-7500	
20	Gooch	Roy	FAMS CINFO	S-FAM	(b)(6)		Best Western
21	(b)(6),(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)		FAMS CINFO	FAM	(b)(6),(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)		Best Western 1/26 - 2/6
22			FAMS CINFO	FAM			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6
23			FAMS CINFO	FAM			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6
25			FAMS CINFO	FAM			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6
26			FAMS CINFO	FAM			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6
27			FAMS CINFO	FAM			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6
28	Chapski	Jon	FAMS DTWFO	S-FAM	(b)(6)		Best Western 1/26 - 2/6
29	(b)(6),(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)		FAMS DTWFO	FAM	(b)(6),(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)		Best Western 1/26 - 2/6
30			FAMS DTWFO	FAM			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6
31			FAMS DTWFO	FAM			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6
32			FAMS DTWFO	FAM			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6
33			FAMS DTWFO	FAM			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6
34			FAMS DTWFO	FAM			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6
35	Craigo	James	FAMS CLEFO	S-FAM	(b)(6)		Best Western 1/26 - 2/6
36	(b)(6),(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)		FAMS CLEFO	FAM	(b)(6),(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)		Best Western 1/26 - 2/6
37			FAMS CLEFO	FAM			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6
38			FAMS CLEFO	FAM			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6
39			FAMS CLEFO	FAM			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6
40			FAMS CLEFO	FAM			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6
41			FAMS CLEFO	FAM			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6
42							
43							

SUPERE (LVI
TSA ICC C ACTS

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	
44	TSI							
45	Cessna	Lorna	TSI-CARGO	TSI	(b)(6)			
46	Cessna	Stephen	TSI-CARGO	TSI				
47	Crane	Scott	TSI-K9	TSI				
48	Hart	Dell	TSI-K9	TSI				
49	Kagen	Boris	TSI-CARGO	TSI				
50	Maclin,	Kametra	TSI-CARGO	TSI				
51	Millott,	Chris	TSI-SUR	TSI				
52	Molnar	Lindsey	TSI-CARGO	TSI				
53	Roark	Chris	TSI-SUR	TSI				
54	Roberts	Jim	TSI-A	TSI				
55	Wills	David	TSI-K9	TSI				
56	Frank	Daryn	TSA GYY	TSI Surface			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6	
57	Grey	Richard	TSA GYY	TSI Surface			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6	
58	Schmitt	Tim	TSA EVV	TSI Aviation			Best Western 1/29 - 2/6	
59	Erne	Jim	TSA CLE	TSI Surface			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6	
60	Wozniak	John	TSA CLE	TSI Surface			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6	
61	Heffelfinger	Guy	TSA CMH	TSI Aviation			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6	
62	Mann	Derick	TSA CMH	TSI Aviation			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6	
63	Caley	Charles	TSA -PIA	TSI Surface			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6	
64	Hanks	Mark	TSA-LEX	TSI Aviation			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6	
65	Chrobak	Wojciech	TSA MDW	TSI Surface			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6	
66	Lloyd	Paul	TSA MDW	TSI Aviation			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6	
67	Pierre	Kenneth	TSA SDF	TSI Surface			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6	
68	Tonnies	Gene	TSA SDF	TSI Aviation			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6	
69								
70	BAO							
71	Dunphy	Mike	TSA-IND	TSS-E		(b)(6)		
72	Miller	Ty	TSA-IND	TSS-E				
73	Davis	Jason	TSA-IND	TSS-E				
74	McCary	Ryan	TSA-IND	TSS-E				
75	Burgess	Robert	FAM-CIN	TSS-E			Holiday Inn Exp 1/26 - 2-6	
76	Konyu	Michael	MSP	TSS-E			Country Inn Suites	
77	Rose	David	STL	TSS-E			Country Inn Suites	
78								
79								
80								
81								
82								
83								
84								
85								

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
86	BDO						
87	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)		TSA IND	BDO TSM	(b)(6),(b)(7)(C)		
88			TSA IND	BDO TSM			
89			FAM CIN	BDO			Holiday Inn Exp 2/4 - 2/8
90			SJC	BDO			Courty Inn Suites
91			SEA	BDO			Courty Inn Suites
92			MCO	BDO			Courty Inn Suites
93			CVG	BDO			Courty Inn Suites
94			CHA	BDO			Courty Inn Suites
95			BWI	BDO			Courty Inn Suites
96			BWI	BDO			Courty Inn Suites
97	K-9						
98	Jackson	Davarone	TSA-ATL	K-9	(b)(6)		Best Western 1/26 - 2/6
99	Draeger	Michelle	TSA-ATL	K-9			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6
100	Vaidya	Sachin	TSA-IAD	K-9			Holiday Inn Exp 1/26 - 2-6
101	Clements	Wes	TSA-IAD	K-9			Holiday Inn Exp 1/26 - 2-6
102	Chase	Nathan	TSA-JFK	K-9			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6
103	Buchanan	Randy	TSA-JFK	K-9			Best Western 1/26 - 2/6
104	Cobb	Walter	TSA-ORD	K-9			Holiday Inn Exp 1/26 - 2-6
105	Forbes	Ryan	TSA-ORD	K-9			Holiday Inn Exp 1/26 - 2-6
106							
107	LEGAL						
108	Mulligan	Scott		OCC			Best Western 2/2 - 2/6
109							
110	AVIATION JOC						
111	Wise	Melissa	TSA	GA	(b)(6)		Best Western 2/2 - 2/6
112							
113	NEW ORLEANS						
114	Gilbert	Burns	TSA MSY	DAFSD	(b)(6)		Holiday Inn Exp 2/2 - 2/6
115	Lundsgaard	Randell	TSA MSY	TSM			Holiday Inn Exp 2/2 - 2/6
116	Ramon	Patrick	TSA MSY	TSI			Holiday Inn Exp 2/2 - 2/6
117							
118	FIO						
119	Gasser	Matthew	TSA CLE	FIO Area	(b)(6)		Best Western 2/2 - 2/6
120	Tortorich	Larry	TSA MSY	FIO			Best Western 2/2 - 2/6
121							
122							
123							
124							
125							
126							
127							

SUPERE 'LVI
TSA ICC C .CTS

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
128							
129	NDO				4325 Southport Crossing Way		
130	Iseminger	Beth	MSP	STSO	(651) 260-6730	beth.iseminger@dhs.gov	Country Inn Suites
131	(b)(6)		CVG	STSO	(b)(6)		Country Inn Suites
132			SEA	LTSO			Country Inn Suites
133			MSP	LTSO			Country Inn Suites
134			SEA	LTSO			Country Inn Suites
135			SAN	LTSO			Country Inn Suites
136			CLT	LTSO			Country Inn Suites
137			PHL	LTSO			Country Inn Suites
138			PDX	TSO			Country Inn Suites
139			ONT	TSO			Country Inn Suites
140			BOS	TSO			Country Inn Suites
141			DAY	TSO			Country Inn Suites
142			AUS	TSO			Country Inn Suites
143			LAS	TSO			Country Inn Suites
144			IND	TSO			Country Inn Suites
145			MDW	TSO			Country Inn Suites
146			PHX	TSO			Country Inn Suites
147			PBI	TSO			Country Inn Suites
148			PDX	TSO			Country Inn Suites
149			PNS	TSO			Country Inn Suites
150			DFW	TSO			Country Inn Suites
151			BWI	TSO			Country Inn Suites
152			DFW	TSO			Country Inn Suites
153			PDX	TSO			Country Inn Suites
154			STX	TSO			Country Inn Suites
155			GSN	TSO			Country Inn Suites
156			DTW	TSO			Country Inn Suites
157			JAX	TSO			Country Inn Suites
158			AUS	TSO			Country Inn Suites
159			PHF	TSO			Country Inn Suites
160			PIT	TSO			Country Inn Suites
161			CVG	TSO			Country Inn Suites
162			AOO	TSO			Country Inn Suites
163			DEN	TSO			Country Inn Suites
164			BNA	TSO			Country Inn Suites
165			MOB	TSO			Country Inn Suites
166			SNA	TSO			Country Inn Suites
167			DAY	TSO			Country Inn Suites
168			PHX	TSO			Country Inn Suites
169			BUR	TSO			Country Inn Suites
170							

~~SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION~~

TSA Operations Plan

Super Bowl XLVI

Annex 8.7

Airspace Security Operations

~~SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~WARNING: THIS RECORD CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PARTS 15 AND 1520. NO PART OF THIS RECORD MAY BE DISCLOSED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A "NEED TO KNOW," AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR PARTS 15 AND 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION OR THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC DISCLOSURE GOVERNED BY 5 U.S.C. 552 AND 49 CFR PARTS 15 AND 1520.~~

Super Bowl XLVI

Lucas Oil Stadium
February 5, 2012



Transportation Security Administration

Airspace Security Operations Plan

TSA - Airspace Security

Table of Contents

Background:.....	3
Airspace Security	4
1. Description.....	4
2. Size and Location of TFR.....	4
3. Authorized Flight Operations	4
4. Prohibited Operations	5
5. Divert Airports.....	5
6. Aviation Operations Center (AOC)	6
ADVISORY	7
NOTAM.....	9
TFR GRAPHIC.....	11
POINTS OF CONTACT.....	12

Background:

The Super Bowl is the championship game of the National Football League (NFL), the highest level of professional American football in the United States, culminating a season that begins in the late summer of the previous calendar year. The game is played annually on a Sunday as the final game of the NFL Playoffs.

Airspace Security

The intent of the below airspace security measure is to promote and facilitate the movement of people and commerce within restricted airspace by mitigating security risks and vulnerabilities associated with aircraft operations. The FAA in consultation with DoD, TSA, and other interagency partners will impose temporary flight restrictions (TFR) that are of adequate time duration to meet the objective stated above.

1. Description

At the request of the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Defense, the FAA has established airspace restrictions over Super Bowl XLVI, to be played February 5, 2012, at Lucas Oil Stadium in Indianapolis, IN. These restrictions will begin at 1630 local and end at 2359 local.

2. Size and Location of TFR

The TFR consists of two concentric circles/rings centered on a fixed latitude/longitude coordinate (lat/long). Each of the concentric circles prescribes various operational requirements and/or prohibitions.

The outer ring consists of a 30 nautical mile radius (NMR) circle fixed on 394536N/0860950W or the Brickyard (VHP) VORTAC 108 degree radial and will include airspace up to but not including 18,000 FT MSL.

The inner ring or "Inner Core" consists of a 10NMR circle fixed on the same center point.

3. Authorized Flight Operations

All emergency/life saving flights (medical/law enforcement/firefighting) must coordinate with the FAA at the Air Operations Center (b)(6) prior to their departure to avoid potential delays.

- a. Between the 10 NMR Inner Ring and the 30 NMR Outer Ring
 - i. All aircraft must be on an active IFR or VFR filed flight plan
 - ii. All aircraft must squawk an Air Traffic Control (ATC) assigned discrete beacon code prior to and during flight
 - iii. All aircraft must remain in two-way communications with ATC; and
- b. Between 0NM and 10NMR Ring (Inner Core)
 - i. Approved and pre-coordinated Law Enforcement and military aircraft directly supporting the Super Bowl and approved Air Ambulance flights with assigned beacon codes

- ii. ¹Regularly scheduled commercial passenger and all-cargo carriers operating under the below TSA approved security programs and are arriving into or departing from 14 CFR Part 139 airports:

- 1. AOSSP
- 2. FACAOSPP
- 3. MSP
- 4. TFSSP All Cargo
- 5. ACISP

4. Prohibited Operations between 10 NM and 30 N

- a. Flight training
- b. Practice instrument approaches
- c. Aerobatic flight
- d. Glider operations
- e. Parachute operations,
- f. Ultralight, hang gliding,
- g. Balloon operations,
- h. Tethered aerostats,
- i. Agriculture/crop dusting,
- j. Animal population control flight operations,
- k. Banner towing operations,
- l. Model aircraft operations,
- m. Model rocketry, and
- n. Seaplane/amphibious water operations
- o. Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS)
- p. Sightseeing operations

5. Divert Airports

- a. In the unlikely event that an aircraft is diverted for security purposes, the following airports have been pre-established as the desired divert locations
 - i. (KAID) Anderson
 - ii. (KBAK) Columbus
 - iii. (KHUF) Terre Haute
- b. TSA Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) and Transportation Safety Inspectors (TSIs) will be part of the Ground Enforcement Teams located at each divert airport.

¹ The Aircraft Operator must employ the full measures specific to the security program for each flight entering or departing the TFR.

6. Aviation Operations Center (AOC)

The AOC will be located within the Joint Operations Center at 401 North Shadeland, Building E, Indianapolis, IN 46219. The purpose of the AOC is to coordinate any necessary information or response measures in the event of an airborne incident. The AOC is the primary point of contact for all TSA locations, for any matter that involves an emergent airborne threat or incident. The TSA number is (b)(6)

**SUPER BOWL XLVI
DIVERT AIRPORTS**

FUNCTION	LOCATION	NAME	CONTACT NUMBER	CONTACT EMAIL ADDRESS
FAM	ANDERSON (AD)	Ben Burkenmeyer	b)(6)	
TSI		Chris Hickman		
FAM	COLUMBUS (BAK)	Michael Hanftwurzel		
TSI		Paul Lloyd		
FAM	TIERRE LAUTE (LUN)	Robert Miller		
TSI		Gene Tonalessi		

COMMAND CENTERS

FUNCTION	LOCATION	NAME	CONTACT NUMBER	CONTACT EMAIL ADDRESS
TSA POC	ACC	Melissa Wise	b)(6)	
TSA LEAD	ICC	Tim Halligan		
AFSD-1E		Bob Adams		
AFSD-1		John Beckius		
TSI Supervisor		Mark Regan		

~~SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION~~

TSA Operations Plan

Super Bowl XLVI

Annex 8.8

Integrated Federal Support Overview

~~SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION~~

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~~SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION~~

TSA Operations Plan

Super Bowl XLVI

Annex 8.9

TSA/ICC Communication Plan

~~SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION~~

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Transportation Security Administration

COMMUNICATION PLAN



SUPERBOWL XLVI

January 26 - February 6, 2012


(b)(6)





TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. OVERVIEW	3
2. PURPOSE	3
3. PROTOCOLS	4
4. STAFFING	4
5. SUPPORT STAFF	5
6. COMMUNICATION HARDWARE	6
7. DATA BASES	9
8. WEB CAM	11
9. SECURE COMMUNICATIONS	11
10. MARS	12
11. CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS	12



ATTACHMENTS

A. ICC ROOM SET UP	14
B. ICC STAFF SCHEDULE	
C. OTHER OPERATION CENTERS	
a. Hours of Operations	
b. Shift Hours	
c. TSA Staffing Hours	

TSA INCIDENT COMMAND CENTER SUPERBOWL XLVI



1. OVERVIEW

SuperBowl XLVI, a (b)(7)(E) requires extraordinary security. Success demands a wide array of resources from around the country supporting local officials to ensure fans, teams, venues, the city, and the nation have confidence the entire event period is safe and risks are minimized.

Operations Centers across Marion County provide operational elements with planning, logistical, and administrative support required to guarantee their safety and well being. Centers include the JOC, INDHS-EOC, Marion Co. EOC, Airport AOC/EOC, TSA Coordination Center, and the TSA ICC. Each has a specific mission, but all are charged with working cooperatively across jurisdictions and levels. This guide focuses on the specific purpose and mission of one Center - the **TSA Incident Command Center (ICC)**, located at the TSA Administrative Office Emergency Operations Center, 8303 W. Southern Avenue, Indianapolis, IN. **Main Phone: 317-612-9082 Email: IND-ICC@TSA.DHS.GOV**

2. PURPOSE

The ICC is responsible for supporting VIPR operations for the duration of SuperBowl XLVI, January 26 to February 6, 2012. The ICC is the Single Point of Contact (SPOC) for all VIPR operations in all modes.

The ICC is the platform for VIPR Planning, Logistics, and Administration (PL&A) Sections in support of the VIPR IC and Operations Section. The ICC PL&A staff helps identify and track what human and material resources VIPR teams have, what they need, and how to get it. Planning includes short and long term action plans, changes approved by the IC, and tracking resources once procured by logistics. Logistics includes acquiring any necessary material or human resources, as well as maintaining the proper level of resources. Administration ensures the budget supports the requests, and tracks and retains all event related documentation and costs.

Should a VIPR related incident occur, the initial report is made to the ICC. The ICC in turn makes initial reports to the CC and TSOC. Should the incident be long term and reportable, the ICC relinquishes *notification and alerts* to the CC per VIPR and TSOC incident reporting and management policies and procedures with the TSA Coordination Center assuming the lead for communication and notification during any reportable incident, supported by the ICC. *Incident Management* remains with senior staff and the ICC.

To ensure maximum communication, the ICC:

- Coordinates situational awareness in all directions - to the JOC and TSOC, to the field, and across to the airport AOC and Coordination Center (C-Center)
- Provides a one-stop-shop Critical Information Heads Up Display for staff, the IC, and senior management via monitors and displays, detailed in the "Communication" Section

TSA INCIDENT COMMAND CENTER SUPERBOWL XLVI



- Provides near Real Time Information Sharing across the ICS system via a variety of sources detailed in the "Communication" Section
- Throughout the period, develops, collects data and feedback for, and populates the After Action/Lessons Learned Report (AAR/LL) for final review and approval

3. PROTOCOLS

Protocols provide an environment which promotes maximum effectiveness while minimizing disruption. The ICC can get hectic, and the more critical the situation, the more important the need for positive control through established protocols. The list below is not all inclusive - protocols can be adjusted as determined by staff in cooperation with the ICC Manager to meet the current operational tempo.

- 3.1. The ICC manager is responsible for establishing and maintaining protocols
- 3.2. Only those assigned to the ICC, or on official business, may remain in the ICC. Step outside or into another room for side discussions, lengthily organizational meetings, and visitors.
- 3.3. Keep noise to a minimum. Use headsets, earpieces, mute computer sounds, regulate television volume, set blackberries to vibrate, use notes to pass information, avoid speaker phones except as operationally appropriate
- 3.4. Food and drink, while not prohibited, should be handled in a manner that maximizes the work environment. Eat large meals in the break room
- 3.5. Clean up before the end of each shift, and empty trash whenever needed
- 3.6. Provide in-briefs to incoming duty personnel at each shift rotation

4. STAFFING

- 4.1. Beginning January 26, the ICC is staffed until termination of the last VIPR operation currently scheduled for February 6, 2012
- 4.2. As the control center for all VIPR operations, ICC staffing must match operational needs. ICC leads may expand and contract staffing in accordance with NIMS and the NRF to accomplish the mission.
- 4.3. Schedule according to operational need (Schedule and Hours (See Attachment X))
- 4.4. **OSO and FAMS ICC Representatives**
 - Must have decision making authority
 - Responsible for ensuring real time and historical tracking and accountability is completed for all VIPR operations and resources, human and material
 - Coordinate communication between and among field and support functions
 - Document current conditions and operational status locally and in Web-EOC
 - Establish Planning, Logistics, and/or Administrative Branches as needed per NIMS

TSA INCIDENT COMMAND CENTER SUPERBOWL XLVI



4.5. ICC Manager

The ICC Manager is on site to support assigned personnel by ensuring the ICC operates smoothly throughout the operational period. Prior to operations, the manager equips and prepares the facility, and provides training as necessary. Each day, the manager should have the ICC operational prior to staff arrival, and should be prepared to troubleshoot any equipment problems. At the end of each day, the manager ensures the room is clean and prepped for the next day, all equipment is accounted for, and computers and the room are secure.

4.5.1. Manager Responsibilities

- Set up
- Equipment Acquisition and Maintenance
- Supplies - Acquisition and Restocking
- Documents - ICC Manual, Maps,

5. STAFF SUPPORT

Support staff varies according to need. Every effort should be made to follow NIMS, dividing and assigning tasks into planning, logistics, and administration sections. The C-Center representative supports the ICC as noted below. Administrative support is a generic term indicating any function required to meet staff needs. ICC staff can add or reduce support functions and personnel as necessary to ensure a proper workload balance based upon operational tempo in consultation with the operations coordinator.

5.1. Coordination Center Representative

The ICC is staffed by a Coordination Center representative during all hours of operation to support command staff and provide continuity and effective communication by:

- Maintaining, updating and completing Web-EOC and other information system logs and documents
- Posting all relevant information, such as schedules, personnel, contacts, on heads up displays (monitors, white boards, etc) throughout the ICC
- Coordinate and liaison with other operation/coordination centers
- Assist and support the Coordination Center during an incident or increased operational tempo as determined by ICC and C-Center command staff

5.2. Administrative Support

No specific personnel are dedicated to a seat in the ICC to provide administrative support; however, ICC staff may draw from various FSD staff to assist on an as needed basis depending upon the expertise of the group or individual and ICC activity level.

TSA INCIDENT COMMAND CENTER SUPERBOWL XLVI



- Procurement
- Human Resources
- Make copies, print, fax
- Answer phones and other systems
- Data entry and information updates
- IT Support - Contract employee on call

6. COMMUNICATION HARDWARE

The ICC is equipped with hardware and software to support both normal and emergency operations. Some equipment is general use (phones), while others (I-VIEW, Smart Board, Web-EOC) require software installed on the specific computer or pre-approved access. The ICC manager can assist with all communication system needs and is the POC for troubleshooting.

6.1. Phones

6.1.1. VOIP **DIAL 9 FOR OUTSIDE LINE**

- Eight VOIP lines around the staff table
- Eight Head Sets with volume control adaptable to VOIP phones are available and recommended for use

6.1.2. Blackberry

- Blackberry phones are not furnished by TSA or the Super Bowl. Each agency uses their authorized cell device
- There are reports cell coverage is overloaded on Super Bowl Sunday. Text messaging and landlines are viable options
- Contact information for all cell phones are maintained in the ICC and CC contact list
- **Blackberry email is the preferred means of forwarding VIPR updates and regular reports to the ICC at IND-ICC@TSA.DHS.GOV**

6.2. Computers

6.2.1. Main Controller

The main controller is located in the far right corner (see diagram) and is the computer "nerve center."

6.2.1.1. Staffed by C-Center Representative

6.2.1.2. Time Out Feature is Deactivated

6.2.1.2.1. Person logged in remains and there is free access to this computer

6.2.1.2.2. This computer must be accessible only to assigned ICC personnel and security maintained to prevent any unauthorized use

6.2.1.3. Controls TV Wall Monitors 2 through 5 and Smart Board White Board



6.2.2. Position Switch

A position switch, located under the conference table, is operated by the ICC manager or designee. The switching device allows any of eight computers at the table, one at a time, to be displayed on the whiteboard through the overhead projector. The number of items displayed is dependent upon splitting the computer's screen. The more items displayed, the smaller the size of each. The switch can also display items from the master control with the same constraints.

6.2.3. Data Bases

6.2.4. Web Communicator (See # 8 Below)

6.2.5. Internet Connectivity

6.2.5.1. Eight TSA Ethernet Connections are available around the main conference table

6.2.5.2. Additional TSA Ethernet Connections are available on walls around the room. The STE and TRACE phone and Ethernet may not be unplugged or disconnected at any time.

6.2.5.3. No WI-FI in the Southern Ave Office

6.2.5.4. Cell phone with VPN tether capability is a backup option

6.2.6. FAMS Computers

6.2.6.1. Provide their own lap tops

6.2.6.2. Require VPN to connect

6.2.6.3. May require other means to connect depending on systems and firewalls

6.3. SMART Board

SMART Board is an electronic whiteboard with wide ranging functions, including mapping similar to the WEB-EOC MAPTAC. If saved, information from the board can be emailed or stored. Constraints:

6.3.1. Must be connected via white USB cable

6.3.2. Can only be used with one computer

6.3.3. Computer must have software installed

6.4. Monitors

Monitors provide heads up display of information selected by staff based upon capabilities listed below. To provide consistency and reduce confusion, each monitor is assigned specific display information throughout the operational period. (ie: monitor 1 - INDHS and TSOC Web EOC, monitor two - today's VIPR schedules and contacts)

6.4.1. Six monitors

6.4.1.1. Monitor A - Cable TV

6.4.1.2. Monitor 1 to 5 - Operational Awareness

TSA INCIDENT COMMAND CENTER SUPERBOWL XLVI



- Web-EOC
- Current Operations
- Schedules
- Contacts
- FAA Flight Tracker
- Weather
- Plans

6.5. Radios

FAMS, TSA-IND and IAA radios, batteries, and accessories are stored in a secure office near the ICC. Bank chargers are available and batteries will be kept in a charger until checked out to ensure equipment remains in a ready state.

Radios and all equipment are inventoried. Any equipment leaving the room or being returned must be logged in on the inventory sheet located in the ICC. The ICC manager will open the room and verify the item(s) disposition. The manager is tasked with ensuring all equipment is accounted for prior to close of business each day.

6.5.1. FAMS Radios

Organic VIPR Team equipment given to: VIPR Team FAMS Crypto fills will be coordinated with each VIPR Team SFAM and TSA Indianapolis LMR POC to ensure consistent crypto fill and inter-team communications ability.

6.5.2. 800 MHz APD/MECA Public Safety

The IAA AOC has supplied TSA with Ten (10) 800 MHz radios

- Interoperable with all regional first responders
- Provided to SFAMS
- Extra batteries available through ICC
- **The primary law enforcement channel is S1-T2 (IMPD DISPATCH).**
- **Interagency Command is assigned S1-T1**
- **A comprehensive list of radio channels is included in the index and is available in the ICC**

6.6. Scanner

A Uniden Bearcat scanner capable of scanning public safety, weather, and military for purposes of monitoring real time responder activity. If an incident occurs which can impact operations or personnel, the ICC notifies the Team Lead(s) for their awareness and action as appropriate.

7. DATA BASES/PROGRAMS

7.1. Web-EOC

7.1.1. Prior individual account is required for any Web-EOC access and use

7.1.2. Multiple Web EOC systems are active during the Super Bowl period. TSA's primary focus and first responsibility is the **TSOC WEB-EOC** for situational and operational awareness,

7.1.3. VIPR operations log entry and updates, and documenting VIPR related incidents. The ICC can monitor statewide activity via the IN-DHS system, which includes all 92 counties. Any qualified person may make entries to incident and event logs, which must comply with all system policies, procedures, guidelines, and best practices.

7.1.4. The Coordination Center has the lead for any *incident reporting data entry*, assisted by the ICC as requested. The ICC has the lead for all VIPR entries assisted by the C-Center.

7.1.5. MAPTAC

MAPTAC has uploaded VIPR related venue maps and photos as a tool to assist normal operational resource tracking, as well as during any incident requiring shared information between the field and TSOC. *MAPTAC is a shared, web-based system available to anyone with internet and account access, and is real time with TSOC. It is the best system for tracking if real time wide range sharing is required or desired.*

7.2. I-View

Like a combination Web-EOC MAPTAC and Google Earth Streetview, **I-VIEW** is a TSA product on disc providing outside and inside video and/or still pictures of most IND VIPR operational locations. Like MAPTAC, the location can be projected and a wide variety of icons dropped into the scene to depict an ongoing incident, normal staffing by location, etc. "Snapshots" can then be saved to the computer and emailed, used for reports, or for later viewing. The product, however, *can only be used on one computer at a time and that computer controls all processes - it is not a shared or web based system - only "snapshots" can be shared across the system*. Each user must be trained prior to using I-VIEW and have a copy of the disc.

7.3. Airport Airplane Parking Status

Data base providing current airplane parking spaces by airport and their status using the green, yellow and red matrix system. Valuable for situational awareness (b)(3)49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

(b)(3)49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

7.4. Weather

Ice, snow and extreme cold are major concerns for VIPR operations planning and execution throughout the period. The ICC has weather information available via the web, television, scanner, NWS radio, and spotters. Weather contingency plans are covered in Section 11.

TSA INCIDENT COMMAND CENTER SUPERBOWL XLVI



8. WEB-CAM COMMUNICATOR

Outlook based Web-Cam Communicator is connected to the Master Controller for teleconferencing. The camera is located above the monitors with a full room view.

This system may not be active when any classified materials are out or during any classified discussion

9. SECURE COMMUNICATION

The COMSEC Custodian is available on site or on call throughout the operational period (317-695-1463). If there is a problem or any possible concern, the COMSEC Custodian should be contacted prior to taking any action. Any breach should be reported immediately.

- STE phone line and TRACE Ethernet may not be unplugged or disconnected at any time
- All cell phones must be turned off *any time* classified activity takes place
- Non-secure landlines or other communications devices may not be on during use
- Verify the clearance level of all personnel prior to any classified activity - only persons with a verified clearance level and a need to know may remain in the room during classified activity

9.1. TRACE

- Located in an office near the EOC
- Authorized TSA IND staff on the access list are available to check computer on a regular basis and are on call in case of urgent information release
- Clearance level must be verified on each person prior to sharing classified information
- Only those on the TRACE access list regardless of position may be given access to the computer, passwords, or the ability to view the screen
- Evansville Airport is the backup system for IND

9.2. STE

- A STE phone is available in the same room as TRACE
- The same rules apply for access and use
- A person on the access list may permit the one time use of the phone
- Dial the number for the person
- Verify the identity of the person
- Then give the phone to the requesting individual

10. MILITARY AUXILIARY RADIO SYSTEM (MARS)



The Military Auxiliary Radio System (MARS) provides Department of Defense sponsored emergency communications on a local, national, and international basis. MARS also provides auxiliary communications for military, federal, civil, and/or disaster officials during periods of emergency. They assist the military and other

TSA INCIDENT COMMAND CENTER SUPERBOWL XLVI



organizations in effecting normal communications under emergency conditions. They provide a reserve of personnel trained in military radio communications, techniques, and procedures as well as to initiate efforts to improve radio-operating techniques.

10.1. TSA MARS

- 10.1.1. The TSA MARS is located at the TSA Southern Avenue administration office. The radio is set up in a cube directly outside the ICC. There is currently one CC staff member trained and certified to use MARS.
- 10.1.2. Per TSA national policy, MARS may only be used to communicate with TSA Headquarters
- 10.1.3. Capability is limited to voice and small emails without attachments

11. CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS

11.1. ICC Alternate Site

The TSA C-Center is the alternate ICC site. If any incident (ie: power failure, fire, flood), prevents access to the ICC, staff reports to the C-Center and assumes positions at open desks. Critical information, such as those listed, available on iShare, drive folders, or previously retained at the C-Center, allow continuation of critical functions.

- Contacts
- Schedules
- Operational Plans

If ICC staffing is full and operations are normal, ICC and C-Center staff will continue their respective duties divided between normal and VIPR operations.

11.2. Severe Winter Weather

All ICC staff are FSD and FAM-SAC designated emergency employees during the Super Bowl period, especially Super Bowl Weekend. **Team members will be notified and kept updated by AIM NOTIFICATION SYSTEM** until normal operations are resumed.

11.2.1. Should severe winter weather prevent operations but ICC staff is able to report, plans are in place to use the time constructively. VIPR team members may also be involved in activities if they are stranded.

- Development of Alternate Work Schedules
- Exercises - TTX, Workshops
- After Action Preparation
- Plan Revisions Reflecting Current Situation
- Normal telework duties able to be conducted from their location and properly documented



TSA INCIDENT COMMAND CENTER SUPERBOWL XLVI



11.2.2. Declared Administrative Leave

The FSD and/or FAM SAC determine the course of action, if administrative leave is granted, according to Management Directive, policy, and best practice. VIPR notification of decisions will be provided via AIM in the ICC.

11.2.3. IT Failure

If the IT failure is localized, the Coordination Center assumes critical operations until the issue is resolved. If the outage is widespread, a Spoke or other alternate airport may be designated.

11.2.4. Cell Phone Overload

11.2.4.1. **GAME DAY** cell *calling* coverage can overload during peak periods such as pre-kick off, half time or after any exciting play. There are GETS cards available, and carriers have brought in additional mobile equipment for past Super Bowls.


11.2.4.1.1. Landlines, portable radios, and email/text messaging are viable, reliable alternatives during peak periods and should be utilized as much as possible in lieu of calls.

11.2.4.1.2. If local exchanges overload, a viable option is passing information to a long distance number such as TSOC for relay back to the field by other means (email or W-EOC).

TSA INCIDENT COMMAND CENTER SUPERBOWL XLVI



ATTACHMENT A - ICC SET UP





TSA INCIDENT COMMAND CENTER SUPERBOWL XLVI



ATTACHMENT B - OPERATION CENTERS PLACEHOLDER - FINAL PRODUCT IN PROGRESS

Public Safety Compound	JOC	IN-DHS	AOC	ICC	LUCAS	CONVENTION CENTER	DWNTOWN	HIT	VACIS
0700 - 0000	0700 - 0000				0900 - 0000	0900 - 2300	0930 - 0000	0700 - 0000	
0700 - 1600	0700 - 1600				0900 - 1600	0900 - 1600	0930 - 1830	0700 - 1600	
1500 - 0000	1500 - 0000				1600 - 0000	0900 - 1600	1600 - 0000	1500 - 0000	
2300 - 0700	2300 - 0700					1500 - 2300		2300 - 0700	
						1500 - 2300			
	2200 - 0600 BECKIUS								


NFL Experience schedule (hours subject to change):

- Friday, Jan. 27: 3 p.m. - 10 p.m.
- Saturday, Jan. 28: 10 a.m. - 10 p.m.
- Sunday, Jan. 29: 11 a.m. - 8 p.m.
- Monday, Jan. 30: 3 p.m. - 10 p.m.
- Tuesday, Jan. 31: 3 p.m. - 10 p.m.
- Wednesday, Feb. 1: 3 p.m. - 10 p.m.
- Thursday, Feb. 2: 3 p.m. - 10 p.m.
- Friday, Feb. 3: 3 p.m. - 10 p.m.
- Saturday, Feb. 4: 10 a.m. - 10 p.m.

TSA INCIDENT COMMAND CENTER SUPERBOWL XLVI



ATTACHMENT C - FLOW CHART



TSA INCIDENT COMMAND CENTER SUPERBOWL XLVI



ATTACHMENT D - ICC CHECKLIST

Initial Activation

- Upon receipt of a confirmed/valid warning message or by being made aware of an incident, emergency, or impending incident that may necessitate activation, the ICC Manager gathers as much information as possible and determines if circumstances warrant recommending activation.

- If warranted,

- Make or cause to make contact with all appropriate ICC staff and/or all persons that should report to the ICC.

- Prepare an initial briefing to include, but not limited to:

Scope and known specifics

Names and locations of Incident Commanders and Incident Command Posts.

Location of incident(s) (i.e. countywide, area, specific location, etc.).

Number of units or personnel currently assigned or dispatched to the incident(s).

Number of known injured or dead.

Weather conditions.

Initial personnel to staff the ICC.

Expected length of activation.

Security / Safety

Sign in and sign out process.

Messaging

Communications (i.e. telephone number assignments, radio assignments, etc.).

- Establish ICC incident command.

- Ensure personnel are assigned to and understand their assignment to one or more of the five groups.

Command Operations Planning Logistics Finance

- Turn on all electronic displays.

- Turn on and ensure operation of all computer equipment and software.

- Activate all telephones and place telephone books at work areas.

- Ensure sufficient workspace and work equipment is on hand and in good working condition.

TSA INCIDENT COMMAND CENTER SUPERBOWL XLVI



- Start an ICC event/incident log (major events).
- Prepare an Incident Action Plan (IAP).
- Contact the State EOC or State EM Operations and submit initial EM-43 (Situation Report or SitRep) to the State.

Full / Partial continued activation

- Conduct a full briefing when ICC staff arrives.
- The briefing includes but is not limited to:

Incident scope and known specifics

The names and locations of Incident Commanders and Incident Command Posts.

Location of the incident(s) (i.e. countywide, area, specific location, etc.).

Number of units or personnel currently assigned or dispatched to the incident(s).

Number of currently known injured or dead.

Weather conditions.

The expected time period of activation.

Security / Safety.

Sign in and sign out process.

Messaging.

Communications (i.e. telephone number assignments, radio assignments, etc.).

"Housekeeping".

Maps.

Group assignments.

Likelihood of a "second shift" requirement.

- Continue briefings as necessary, but at least every two hours, to update staff on new information and to be updated by them on their activity.
- Establish and maintain contact with State Emergency Management, either the Branch Office, or the State EOC, whichever is appropriate or dictated by NCDDEM.
- Receive and process resource requests.
- Establish and maintain communications with:

On scene incident commanders / command posts.

State / Federal agencies as appropriate.

Communications Center.

Utilities / NCDOT as appropriate.

Media (through the Public Information Officer)

TSA INCIDENT COMMAND CENTER SUPERBOWL XLVI



- Maintain the level of EOC activation as appropriate or until the incident is terminated.
- Prepare IAP for each shift.
- Submit follow up reports (Situation Reports or SitReps) to the State in a timely manner.
- As necessitated by the incident as it progresses, contact additional personnel for activation or possible activation. Such as:

- Damage Assessment (Tax Assessor)
- Debris Management (Solid Waste)
- Animal Control
- Radiation Protection
- Transportation (ICATS)

Closing or deactivating the EOC

- When it is determined EOC closure is imminent, prepare a final debriefing. This debriefing should allow each EOC staff member to make comments, suggestions and offer a "thumbnail" critique of specific actions or inactions. During the debriefing include:
 - Return of equipment.
 - Reports due or to be collected.
 - Final reminders of safety or security.
 - Overall EOC performance.
 - Success stories (or not so successful stories).
 - Lessons learned.
 - Date and time of the incident/emergency/disaster response critique.
- Only close or deactivate the EOC if the incident or incidents have been terminated or all actions successfully concluded.
- Make backups or archives of all computer records.
- Print copies of reports or other documents that will be necessary to present to state/federal agencies.
- Collect all damage assessment reports or reports from other agencies relative to the incident(s)/emergency/disaster.
- Gather and return all rented or borrowed equipment.
- Turn off displays.
- Return telephones and telephone books and other supplies to their storage locations.
- Clean or have the EOC cleaned and ready



TSA INCIDENT COMMAND CENTER SUPERBOWL XLVI



~~SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION~~

TSA Operations Plan

Super Bowl XLVI

Annex 8.10

Indiana DHS Ops Order

~~SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION~~

~~WARNING: THIS RECORD CONTAINS SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION THAT IS CONTROLLED UNDER 49 CFR PARTS 15 AND 1520. NO PART OF THIS RECORD MAY BE DISCLOSED TO PERSONS WITHOUT A "NEED TO KNOW," AS DEFINED IN 49 CFR PARTS 15 AND 1520, EXCEPT WITH THE WRITTEN PERMISSION OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION OR THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION. UNAUTHORIZED RELEASE MAY RESULT IN CIVIL PENALTY OR OTHER ACTION. FOR U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, PUBLIC DISCLOSURE GOVERNED BY 5 U.S.C. 552 AND 49 CFR PARTS 15 AND 1520.~~

~~SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION~~

TSA Operations Plan

Super Bowl XLVI


Annex 8.11

IndyGo Ops Plan


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IndyGo Super Bowl Detours January 27 - February 4



IndyGo Super Bowl Detours February 5



~~SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION~~



**Transportation Security Administration
Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air
Marshal Service (OLE/FAMS)**

Super Bowl XLVI

**Office of Flight Operations
Federal Air Marshal Service**

05 February 2012

~~SENSITIVE SECURITY INFORMATION~~

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Event Information



The Super Bowl is one of the premier sporting events in the country. This year's Super Bowl will be held at Lucas Oil Stadium, with a seating capacity of over 63,000. The game is a high-visibility event that concentrates large numbers of people in a venue that is easily identified from the air. The FAMS seeks to increase overall security for the event through enhanced deployment of Federal Air Marshals in the aviation domain.

Facts

Gametime: 6:00 pm EST
Kickoff: 6:28 pm EST
Anticipated Duration: 4 hours



The event location, Lucas Oil Stadium, is readily identifiable from the air.

Background

The Federal Air Marshal Service engages in a sophisticated risk management/mitigation strategy known as the FAMS Concept of Operations (CONOPS). The CONOPS is based on Consequence, Vulnerability, Intelligence, and Threat. **Consequence** addresses geographic locations that have the potential for decapitation of government, the centers and symbols of the financial infrastructure of the Nation, and other critical infrastructure. **Vulnerability** is an assessment of aircraft size and fuel load that determines destructive capabilities. **Intelligence** is strategic and tactical information concerning criminal/terrorist activity affecting aviation security. **Threat** is specific information of criminal/terrorist targeting of specific flights. Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) are deployed on Targeted Flights. Targeted Flights are all flights of U.S. air carriers in the Aviation Domain as determined by the application of the CONOPS.

Methodology

The Department of Homeland Security has designated the *Super Bowl* as a (b)(7)(E) [redacted]. The FAMS mission coverage goals will be in accordance with the FAMS CONOPS as follows:

CONSEQUENCE

- Critical Times: 1600-2159 hours EDT, 05 February 2012
- Location: Indianapolis, Indiana
 - Impacted Airports:
 - Indianapolis International Airport (IND)


INTELLIGENCE & THREAT

There is no specific threat intelligence involving the commercial aviation sector concerning the event at this time. The FAMS continually monitors the intelligence situation.

VULNERABILITY

In general, larger aircraft offer the greatest vulnerability due to their size, speed, and fuel load. FAMS planning establishes several distinct categories of aircraft based upon size and location of arrivals/ departures.

Summary Information

Event	Date(s)	Critical Times
Super Bowl XLVI	05 February 2012	1600-2259 EDT
Location(s)		NSSE/SEAR Category
Indianapolis, Indiana		(b)(7)(E)

Special Events Domestic Coverage Goals	Special Events International Coverage Levels
(b)(3):49 U.S.C. § 114(r)	
	N/A

Impacted Airports
Indianapolis International Airport (IND)

SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS:

- Normal operational tempo will be maintained outside of the special event.

Mission Coverage Goals

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

Mission Recovery

All field offices will coordinate with the Mission Operations Control (MOC) center to insure coverage is maintained on all special event Targeted Flights during the critical timeframe.

Federal Flight Deck Officer Program

Several aircraft transiting the impacted airports during the critical timeframe may have Federal Flight Deck Officers (FFDO) on board. (b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

(b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

(b)(3) 49
U.S.C. §

Special Events After Action Report

Super Bowl XLVI

Introduction

After a major special event, the host field office should prepare an after-action report (AAR) summarizing the event and its successes, failures, and problem areas. AAR's may provide recommendations or lessons learned in a variety of topical areas. AAR's should adhere to the following format.

- a. Issue(s):
- b. Description:
- c. Recommendations:

Section 1: Event Overview

Note: EPD/FEC to complete

Note: Should be used to briefly describe the following:

- a. **Event:** Super Bowl XLVI
- b. **Event Date:** February 5, 2012
- c. **Location:** Lucas Oil Stadium, Indianapolis, IN
- d. **SEAR Level:** SEAR 1
- e. **FEC:** Rich Adams, AFSD-LE Indianapolis Int'l Airport (IND)
- f. TSA provided support in the following areas:
 - Airspace security
 - Temporary flight restrictions
 - Aviation security
 - FAM mission coverage
 - Primary airport security enhancements
 - IND
 - (b)(3) 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)



Section 2: Office Support

a. Manpower Requirements

(b)(5)

b. Funding Requirements

c. Personnel Deployments

d. Equipment/Supplies Deployment

Section 3: Intelligence

(b)(5)

a. Threat Assessment

b. Intelligence collection & dissemination

Section 4: Operational Response

(b)(5)

Section 5: Logistics & Administration

a. Funding

(b)(5)

b. Medical

c. Legal

d. Lodging

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

e. Media Relations

(b)(5)

f. Manpower Support

(b)(5) (b)(3):49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

(b)(5) (b)(3):49 U.S.C. § 114(r)

(b)(5)
(b)(3)

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

g. Personnel Deployment

h. Equipment/Supplies Deployment

i. Facilities

(b)(5)

(b)(5)

Section 6: Command & Control

- a. Planning Committee Participation
- b. Operation/Coordination Center representation
- c. Liaison Locations (other than operations/coordination centers)
- d. Communications

(b)(5)

- e. Training Exercises
- f. Relationship With Other Agencies During Event
- g. Event Support Plans