ENHANCING TSA OFFICER SAFETY AND SECURITY:

AGENCY ACTIONS AND PATH FORWARD

MARCH 26, 2014
Executive Summary

In response to the tragic shooting of Transportation Security Officer (TSO) Gerardo I. Hernandez and wounding of other TSA employees and a passenger on November 1, 2013, at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), Administrator John S. Pistole called for a comprehensive review of the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) policies, procedures, and training to identify possible improvements to safety and security for TSA employees. The following report provides a summary of TSA actions as a result of this review. Its scope is limited to TSA employees serving to protect the public at our nation’s airports. The agency’s response focuses primarily on those areas with the greatest effect on safety and security for the workforce: mandatory training, improved communication systems and policies, and enhanced law enforcement presence. A total of fourteen recommendations were adopted.

The steps outlined in this report represent a combination of alternatives identified by an internal working group or “Integrated Project Team” (IPT) and ideas generated by TSA employees in response to a request for feedback from Administrator Pistole. The agency’s response further reflects extensive feedback and participation by industry stakeholders including law enforcement, airport operators, the employee union, and various associations. TSA is greatly appreciative of the collaborative engagement of these stakeholders and remains committed to working closely with all involved entities in continued efforts to provide enhanced safety and security measures for TSA employees.

In the immediate aftermath of the incident, the Administrator assembled a senior leadership crisis action team to advise him on actions to heighten security at airports in the short term. The Administrator also invited key stakeholders to TSA headquarters to share their ideas regarding possible improvements. Thereafter, the agency identified several significant actions aimed at improving officer safety and security. These actions are as follows: (1) strengthening active shooter training by mandating such training for all TSA employees and requiring practical training exercises; (2) improving the existing communications infrastructure through TSA’s acquisition of duress alarms where gaps have been identified; (3) adopting recommended standards for law enforcement presence at checkpoints and ticket counters during peak travel times for airports which do not presently employ a fixed post plan; (4) publishing a minimum recommended standard for airport operators of conducting bi-annual active shooter training and exercises; (5) ensuring explicit incorporation of maximum response times in all Airport Security Programs (ASPs) utilizing flexible response options; and (6) extending the temporary redeployment of additional Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams to airports. The measures relating to law enforcement presence at the checkpoints take into account the responsibility of airport operators to provide a law enforcement presence under 49 U.S.C. § 44903(c) and 49 CFR § 1542.215. Details regarding these actions are set forth in this report. The agency continues to engage in further discussions and initial planning in support of future physical checkpoint enhancements and more long term modifications.

Ongoing solicitation of feedback from employees and consultation with airport stakeholders will take place as TSA seeks to ensure the safest working environment possible for its officers who serve every day to protect the traveling public.
I. Background

A. The Shooting of Officer Gerardo I. Hernandez

On November 1, 2013, Gerardo I. Hernandez, a 39 year old Transportation Security Officer (TSO), was shot and killed while stationed at a security checkpoint at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX). The suspect, Paul Anthony Ciancia, allegedly fired several shots inside the terminal, killing Officer Hernandez and wounding three others, including two uniformed TSOs, and one passenger. The injured TSA employees were Tony Grigsby and James Speer. These employees remained at the checkpoint to assist an elderly passenger and were shot and wounded by Ciancia as they later sought to leave the area.

According to police reports and court documents, Ciancia approached the checkpoint armed with an assault rifle. He allegedly fired multiple shots at Officer Hernandez who was on duty and in uniform. The suspect also carried a handwritten letter addressed to TSA employees stating that he wanted to “instill fear in your traitorous minds” and had made a “conscious decision to kill” TSA employees. Several police officers from Los Angeles World Airports (LAWA) responded to the scene and pursued the suspect into the terminal. They engaged the suspect in gunfire and shot, wounded and apprehended him.

Ciancia was subsequently charged with murder of a federal officer and commission of violence at an international airport. The investigation is being led by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, with support from multiple law enforcement agencies, and is being prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Central District of California. The suspect was arraigned on December 4, 2013 and indicted on 11 charges, including first degree murder, on December 17, 2013. He entered a plea of not guilty on December 26, 2013, and is currently awaiting trial.

Officer Hernandez had worked for TSA since 2010 and was a well-liked and well respected employee. He leaves behind a wife, Ana Machuca, and two children. TSA employees Grigsby and Speer are continuing to recover from their injuries.

Officer Hernandez’s death marks the first time a TSA employee has been killed in the line of duty since the agency was formed in 2001.

B. Administrator’s Call for Comprehensive Agency Review

In the days following the incident, the Administrator called for a comprehensive review of agency policies, procedures, and training to identify ways to enhance officer safety and security. Thereafter, on November 14, 2013, Administrator Pistole testified before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Transportation Security, at a previously scheduled hearing regarding Behavior Detection Officers (BDOs). The Administrator briefed the Committee on what had transpired at the agency since the shooting and killing of Officer Hernandez and wounding of two other TSA employees and a passenger. Administrator Pistole provided the Committee with a summary of actions which were immediately undertaken by the agency and the ongoing efforts to closely coordinate with airport law enforcement organizations to identify and implement enhancements to airport safety and security. He also referenced the ongoing review leading to the issuance of this report, encouraged Members of Congress and
other stakeholders to present recommendations to the agency, and committed to sharing the results of the review with Congress.

C. Formation of an Integrated Project Team (IPT)

To identify proposals for improving the safety and security of TSA employees at airports, the agency assembled an IPT with senior level subject matter experts from several TSA offices including the Office of Security Operations, the Office of Law Enforcement and Federal Air Marshal Service, the Office of Security Capabilities, the Office of Inspection, the Office of Training and Workforce Engagement, and the Office of Chief Counsel. The IPT was chaired by William R. Hall, Special Agent in Charge of the New York Field Office for the Federal Air Marshal Service and Vera Adams, Deputy Director of Field Operations for the Office of Security Operations.

The first meeting of the IPT occurred on November 4, 2013. Thereafter, the IPT met on multiple occasions prior to presenting its preliminary options to TSA’s senior leadership. The group’s initial areas of inquiry included outreach to Federal Security Directors (FSDs) and TSOs to determine how well they were coping with the incident and to solicit input regarding suggested safety and security improvements. In conducting this outreach, the IPT learned the following information: (1) a small percentage of TSOs believe that arming them and giving them bullet proof vests is the best solution; (2) a small percentage of TSOs believe that it was “only a matter of time” before an incident like this occurred and that “it’s part of the job”; and (3) the majority of TSOs are concerned for their safety and are looking for management engagement to provide a heightened sense of security.

The IPT identified a series of options which were presented to TSA’s senior leadership. With respect to internal policy, training, and communication, the agency was able to quickly implement several of these recommendations. For others, particularly in the area of law enforcement presence at and response to the checkpoints, the agency sought stakeholder feedback to help guide any additional measures. The stakeholder process is highlighted below.

D. Stakeholder Engagement

As noted, one of the first external actions taken by the Administrator was convening a stakeholder meeting on November 7, 2013, at TSA headquarters. There were 32 attendees at this initial meeting including representatives from labor groups and industry associations, law enforcement agencies and associations, and other federal agencies (see Appendix, Attachment A for a full list of participating organizations and agencies). The Deputy Executive Director for Homeland Security and the Chief of Police for LAWA participated in the meeting by teleconference. Several members of TSA’s Senior Leadership Team were in attendance.

Subsequently, on January 8, 2014, the Administrator held a second meeting with the same group of stakeholders and 34 participants. At this meeting, the Administrator presented an overview of various possible actions and asked participants for initial feedback. The agency afforded stakeholders an additional opportunity to provide feedback through written comments to be provided within 30 days. These comments were considered in the agency’s decision-making
process and development of supplemental proposals. On March 21, 2014, TSA convened a third meeting of these stakeholders, drawing 28 participants, to present a summary of the agency’s adopted recommendations and those not being implemented.

TSA continues to welcome stakeholder feedback, while the IPT remains engaged in advancing further recommendations.

E. Input from the Workforce

In addition to feedback provided to the IPT, the Administrator sought employee input to improve TSA officer safety and security in four key areas: (1) possible short-term and long-term safety and security changes, such as regular training and drills; (2) options for timely law enforcement response and presence at checkpoints; (3) future checkpoint design and configuration changes; and (4) crisis communications between TSA employees, Law Enforcement Officers (LEOs) and key stakeholders.

Employee feedback was solicited through the Idea Factory, which is a web-based tool designed to enable innovation and collaboration within the agency. It serves as a means of generating employee ideas in several areas including enhancing organizational effectiveness. To date, the Idea Factory has received more than 200 suggestions (see Appendix, Attachment B for a summary of employee ideas submitted through the Idea Factory). Input was obtained from all levels of the organization including FSDs, TSOs, staff from Training and Coordination Centers, security inspectors and headquarters employees. The workforce expressed appreciation for being invited to participate in this collective effort and offered several ideas which have been endorsed by senior management, and others that are not being considered at this time. The feedback process is ongoing.

Among several suggestions, employees recommended: (1) increasing active shooter drills and exercises with other airport and local law enforcement agencies as participants; (2) developing training for all frontline employees to help them recognize and react to escalating incidents; (3) requiring more frequent and visible local airport LEO support at the checkpoints and relocation of these LEOs near the Travel Document Checker (TDC) podium; (4) enhancing use of BDOs in plain clothes to blend into the crowd and analyze behaviors in public areas outside of the checkpoints; and (5) creating an armed workforce division.

Many of the employee submissions overlapped with options for consideration identified by the IPT. The ideas generated by employees through the Idea Factory were presented to the SLT, which suggested further consideration of a number of the proposals.

II. Agency Response

A. Immediate Action Steps

In the immediate aftermath of the incident, TSA assembled a senior leadership crisis action team to advise the Administrator. TSA increased the visibility of uniformed officers in and around checkpoints by: (1) ensuring that state and local airport law enforcement agencies provided an enhanced deployment of uniformed officers in and around checkpoints; and (2) redeploying
certain Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams to the aviation sector. The agency also communicated with the workforce regarding the event and, as noted, promptly convened a large number of stakeholders at TSA headquarters to hear preliminary ideas regarding future improvements.

The agency then considered numerous proposals generated by the IPT and workforce, and input from key stakeholders in the areas of training, communications, and employee support; equipment and technology; and law enforcement presence and response to the checkpoints. The agency also considered a number of options, including arming TSOs, which are not being implemented (see Appendix, Attachment C for a general description of the alternatives not adopted by the agency).

**B. Training, Communications and Employee Support**

1. **Enhance Active Shooter Training**

   The shooting incident at LAX raised concerns about the adequacy of training for TSA employees if required to respond to an active shooter scenario. Historically, TSA made available an optional training course “Run, Hide, Fight” through the Online Learning Center (OLC). This course provided training on what to do during an active shooter incident. Similarly, and again through OLC, TSA offered an active shooter course developed by FEMA. While neither of these courses were required training for employees, they were made available through the OLC. Industry stakeholders shared that it was most important for the workforce to know how to respond. Taking that into consideration along with the recommendations from the workforce, on December 19, 2013, the agency mandated completion of these courses and employees were notified that they were required to take an OLC course “Active Shooter Response Training” by March 31, 2014. Additionally, there was widespread agreement throughout all levels of TSA that efforts to continue active shooter training and exercises should be a top priority.

   In addition, the Office of Training and Workforce Engagement (OTWE) is developing active shooter practical exercises and scenarios, which the workforce also strongly supports. These exercises and scenarios will be incorporated into a course for all officers. The course will include a planned practical exercise, allowing officers to react to the incident and then immediately assess their reaction. Officers will later return to the classroom to discuss the exercise and review a CCTV video of the exercise to assess their reaction. In addition, OTWE is creating a video on active shooter incidents at checkpoints which will be shown to all officers. As a further enhancement, OTWE established a working group to develop a facilitator guide to assist field Assistant Federal Security Directors for Law Enforcement in providing best practices and templates for local airport active shooter type exercises.

   Feedback from law enforcement and industry stakeholders emphasized the importance of training and preparation to minimize casualties and help direct LEOs to the active shooter. TSA is therefore recommending that airport operators conduct active shooter training and exercises on a bi-annual basis to minimize casualties and help direct law enforcement to active shooters.
2. **Reinforce Emergency Procedures**

The presence of an active shooter at LAX also led to questions about whether there were active shooter tactical response plans in place at every airport and if such plans were consistent with the national plan format which includes the designation of possible evacuation routes from specific areas (screening checkpoints, baggage screening areas, and office/break/training rooms) and establishment of rendezvous points. In response to these questions, the agency conducted an initial review of a random sample of Active Shooter Mitigation Plans to verify that local airports follow the national template for Active Shooter Tactical Response Plans. The preliminary review confirmed that local airport plans track TSA’s national standard. Subsequently, the agency conducted a broader review to make certain that 100 percent of airports have active shooter plans in place and that such plans are in compliance with the national model. The agency also immediately reviewed the LAX plan to ensure compliance with the national format. LAX had conducted an active shooter exercise three weeks prior to the shooting.

In addition, and in support of further efforts to reinforce emergency procedures, the agency has incorporated a reminder in its weekly shift brief requiring supervisors to conduct briefings for employees regarding the evacuation routes and rendezvous points identified in the local mitigation plan. As such, supervisors brief all personnel at the beginning of each shift regarding the evacuation plan, emergency exits, and alarm protocol for their particular location.

Finally, the agency developed an Operations Directive requiring that all FSDs conduct evacuation drills twice a year, including a walk-through for familiarization of the local evacuation routes and rendezvous points. This Directive supplements the information shared by shift supervisors regarding evacuation procedures and ensures that employees are trained on the active shooter plan in place at their local airport.

3. **Inform Employees of Actions Taken**

The Administrator traveled to Los Angeles the day after the shooting and met with the widow and two children of Officer Hernandez, along with many LAX employees. In addition, TSA Headquarters sent a situational report to all employees the day of the shooting advising them of details known at the time. The Administrator then addressed the workforce by video on November 8, 2013. Two days later, on November 10, 2013, the agency issued a shift brief to the entire TSA workforce with information regarding actions endorsed by senior management and currently underway to emphasizing that every possible effort to ensure officer safety is being considered and implemented, if feasible and appropriate. The brief further advised all employees as to the process established by the agency to respond to the incident including solicitation of feedback from stakeholders, formation of the IPT, and use of the Idea Factory to encourage employees to share ideas regarding safety enhancements. Through over 100 Town Hall meetings with the workforce, the Administrator and TSA’s senior leadership engaged employees at LAX and around the country in discussions about the shooting and how the agency could best respond.

As a follow up to a related suggestion to better inform the workforce, the Administrator delivered a video message highlighting leadership’s engagement and response to the incident. This message was shared with all TSA employees through the agency’s website on November
19, 2013. The video acknowledged the importance and legitimacy of employee concerns and reviewed the steps taken by the agency to mitigate inherent risks faced by TSA employees every day. The video also discussed future potential enhancements in the areas of communication and training, law enforcement presence and response to the checkpoints, and physical security at airports. On January 8, 2014, coinciding with the second stakeholder meeting, the Administrator delivered another video message to employees updating them on the status of the agency’s efforts to enhance officer safety and security. The Administrator and other senior leaders continued to discuss actions taken or underway at Town Hall meetings and through other communication channels. Additional video messages occurred on January 14 and February 5, 2014. As a supplement to the video messages and Town Hall meetings, the agency published numerous broadcast messages in the days and weeks following the shooting to provide updates (See Appendix, Attachment D for a listing of agency broadcasts and video messages). The agency intends to continue with video messaging to employees and other communications going forward.

4. **Provide Grief Counseling to TSA Employees**

The Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) Los Angeles Field Office (LAFO) Critical Incident Response Team (CIRT) was immediately activated and remained involved with providing resources and assistance to those affected by the shooting incident at LAX. FAMS CIRT members arrived on scene at LAX approximately 90 minutes after the shooting and immediately began providing peer support services to TSA employees, the first of whom were witness to or very near the actual gunfire. FAMS CIRT personnel maintained direct contact and communication with The Counseling Team International (TCTI) who later responded to LAX and assisted the CIRT members by providing professional counseling services to TSA personnel. That same afternoon, a FAMS CIRT member was assigned to the family of TSO Hernandez and remained in constant communication with them for several weeks, providing significant support and assistance. In addition, several CIRT team members responded to local hospitals where shooting victims had been taken. A CIRT team was assigned to each injured TSO providing both added security and support to the injured and their families.

Over the course of the next few days, CIRT members and TCTI personnel continued to provide assistance and counseling to the TSA Office of Security Operations population, hosting counseling sessions at the airport and at the FAMS LAFO. In total, CIRT and TCTI personnel provided services to more than 700 personnel over the course of four days. In addition, FAMS LAFO CIRT members assisted the family of TSO Hernandez with funeral and memorial service arrangements. The CIRT FAM assigned to the Hernandez family also accompanied family members to TSA headquarters for additional services and ceremonies. TSA received positive feedback on its grief counseling and peer support efforts from many officers and will continue to offer these services as needed.

5. **Notify Federal Air Marshals about Active Shooter Incidents**

In the aftermath of the incident at LAX, it was discovered that, although the majority of Federal Air Marshals (FAMs) flying into, departing from, or otherwise at the airport, received telephonic notification that there was an ongoing active shooter scenario taking place, they did not receive...
automatic notification. The agency has therefore changed the existing protocol to ensure notification to all FAMs nationwide through the Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC) and local FAMS Field Offices. This change was immediately implemented.

6. Support Changes to First Responder Policies and Training in Responding to Active Shooter Incidents (Airport Best Practice)

When first responders (responsible for providing medical and emergency care) arrived at LAX in response to the shooting, they set up in a “cold zone” awaiting further instruction from tactical law enforcement that the area was cleared to render aid. Following the incident, the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) accelerated proposed changes to policies and procedures governing how they respond to active shooter scenarios. The new LAFD procedures, issued in November 2013, call for paramedics and firefighters to enter potentially dangerous areas or “warm zones” in responding to active shooter scenarios. These first responders will be protected by armed law enforcement officers.

This shift in practice is consistent with FEMA guidelines, *Fire/Emergency Medical Services Department Operational Considerations and Guide for Active Shooter and Mass Casualty Incidents*, published in September 2013. These guidelines call for fire department first responders to work with police to enter “warm zones” which are areas near active shooters where a threat might exist. The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) is reportedly adopting similar changes to existing training methods, with officers being trained to use trauma kits to help victims of gunshot wounds. The kits include standard first aid items.

TSA applauds this decision and supports replication of this best practice at other airports to ensure that first aid is rendered as soon as possible and that it is administered by first responders specially trained to provide such care in active shooter scenarios.

7. Pursue Opportunities to Provide Benefits to the Family of TSO Hernandez

The agency is pursuing opportunities to provide the family of TSO Hernandez with additional benefits such as those provided to public safety officers. TSA encourages efforts to offer support to the screening workforce in extraordinary circumstances such as those that occurred at LAX.

C. Emergency Response Equipment and Technology

1. Regularly Test Existing Alert Notification Capacity (Duress Alarms)

Although not all airports have extensive alert notification capability (i.e. duress alarms) at TSA screening locations, for those airports that do, the IPT suggested mandating a regular test to verify that the alert notification systems are fully functional. The agency initially conducted a survey of all existing duress alarms to determine if they were functional. Duress alarms serve to alert authorities of the presence of an imminent threat of bodily harm. Ninety eight percent of the alarms were deemed fully functional and corrective action was taken on the remaining alarms (see Appendix, Attachment E for a more detailed description of the duress alarm operational status). Following this initial analysis, the agency determined that the most appropriate
mechanism for continuing to ensure fully functional alarms was to mandate weekly testing through an Operations Directive. This Directive has been issued.

2. **Expand Duress Alarm Coverage at Screening Locations**

The IPT determined that technological improvements (capacity building) to alert notification systems are needed in many airports to ensure that duress alarms are present at all screening locations, including terminal lobbies. This was one of the airport technology enhancements also submitted through the Idea Factory. In response to this suggestion, the agency conducted a survey of screening and other locations where TSA employees are stationed, including the following seven areas: X-ray lanes, private screening rooms, TDCs, supervisor podiums, Known Crew Member (KCM) lanes, exit lanes, and Explosive Detection System (EDS) baggage screening areas in non-sterile spaces. The survey results of all Federalized and Screening Partnership Program (SPP) airports showed that several of these locations do not have alert notification capability.

To close the gap identified by the survey, the Administrator approved the acquisition of additional alert notification capacity. The Office of Acquisition (OA) has begun the process of acquiring duress alarms for all airports. OA intends to award a delivery order to a third-party systems integrator for the installation of additional duress alarms at airports as needed. Installation will begin shortly after the contract is awarded and contractor proposed installation dates are determined.

3. **Encourage Linkage of Duress Alarms to CCTV Systems (Airport Best Practice)**

The linkage between duress alarms and CCTV systems is a low cost and feasible option where sophisticated CCTV systems are already in place. TSA will begin working with individual airports and stakeholder groups and will encourage development of a best practice document to implement this change, as feasible. Such linkage will ensure that when a duress alarm is received, a predetermined set of CCTV views is programmed to assist the CCTV operator to focus on the location of the alarm. Implementation of this recommendation requires airport cooperation and engagement.

In more sophisticated airport systems, such CCTV programming can be automatically conducted through a technology link while other airports may need to rely on a manual match between the CCTV camera list and the alarm system. Whether through a technological or manual solution, creating these linkages will greatly enhance the ability of the airport operator to have a “real time” visual of the area where a duress alarm is activated.

4. **Use Local Airport Emergency Phone Numbers**

The agency also adopted guidance for FSDs to ensure that all TSA-owned wireless devices are programmed with local airport emergency numbers and to inform employees of the number to allow them to voluntarily program it into personal cell phones. This guidance is in direct response to learning that calls made to 911 at airports in the event of an emergency may not be routed to the on-site police department.
As to LAX, the agency, working directly with the airport, created a solution whereby on-site airport police can be reached directly from all TSA VoIP phones. This solution was implemented on February 26, 2014. At this time, dialing 888 from any TSA VoIP phone will connect callers directly to LAX Airport Police thus providing a shorter communications path to facilitate more rapid responses to emergencies. This new communication solution will address one of the lessons learned from the LAX shooting incident where dialing 911 failed to provide the quickest possible police response.

D. Law Enforcement Officers at Checkpoints – Presence and Response

1. Summary of Actions

The November 1, 2013 LAX shooting raised several questions regarding LEO presence at and response to airport security checkpoints. On this issue in particular, TSA strongly encouraged feedback from stakeholders at the January 8, 2014 meeting.

A summary of the agency’s key actions to enhance the presence of law enforcement at checkpoints is as follows: (1) issuing recommended standards for law enforcement presence at checkpoints and ticket counters during peak travel times; (2) ensuring explicit incorporation of maximum response times in all ASPs which do not presently employ a fixed post; and (3) extending the temporary redeployment of additional VIPR teams to airports.

These changes are collectively intended to provide enhanced visibility and response capability of law enforcement officers in and around checkpoints.

2. Legal and Programmatic Context

The issue of LEOs at security checkpoints is generally governed by statute, regulation, Security Directive 1542-01-07, individual ASPs, and Reimbursable Agreements (if in effect). Information regarding these provisions is given below to provide context for the agency’s changes (see Appendix, Attachment F setting forth the relevant statutes and regulations).

A law enforcement presence at airports has long been required by statute. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 44903(c), airport operators must provide a law enforcement presence and capability adequate to ensure the safety of passengers. This statutory provision has been implemented by regulation. Specifically, in accordance with 49 CFR § 1542.215, each airport operator is required to provide law enforcement personnel in a number and manner adequate to support the security program they are mandated to adopt under 49 CFR § 1542.103. The security program must include a description of the law enforcement support used to comply with 49 CFR § 1542.215(a). When the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) was enacted, a requirement of deployment of at least one LEO to each security screening location was added to the previously existing mandate of law enforcement presence at airports. See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(h). Thereafter, Congress adopted 49 U.S.C. § 44922(f), which allows “law enforcement personnel to be stationed other than at the airport screening location if that would be preferable for law
enforcement purposes and if such personnel would still be able to provide prompt responsiveness to problems occurring at the screening locations.”

Security Directive 1542-01-07 sets forth the agency’s requirements regarding the posting of LEOs at screening checkpoints and reflects the above legal framework. Similarly, ASPs adopted under the regulatory mandate provide a description of the law enforcement in place to support the security program.

Approximately 323 airports participate in the LEO Reimbursement Program, adopted by Congress in 2003, and which provides additional funds for state and local law enforcement personnel at airports. Reimbursable Agreements entered into under this Program are a contract between the agency and individual airport operators. Most, but not all, of the Agreements set forth a mandatory law enforcement response time to checkpoints. Some of the Agreements impose a fixed post requirement.

3. **Agency Actions to Enhance Law Enforcement Presence**

Among the issues warranting review following the LAX shooting was whether the agency could improve officer safety and security by enhancing law enforcement presence and response to checkpoints. This concern was emphasized by the TSA workforce in Town Hall meetings with the Administrator and through the Idea Factory (see Appendix, Attachment G for a description of current LEO checkpoint support under existing ASPs).

After due consideration was given to workforce input and stakeholder feedback, the agency identified several changes to the status quo as outlined below.

   a. **Issue Recommended Standards for Law Enforcement Presence at Checkpoints and Ticket Counters During Peak Travel Times**

Seeking to be responsive to concerns raised by stakeholders but sensitive to the importance of creating a more visible law enforcement presence, the agency issued recommended standards which call for an increased LEO (or Airport Security Guard) presence at high traffic locations within the airport such as peak travel times at checkpoints and ticket counters. The recommended standards are intended to provide visible deterrence and quicker incident response time and apply to those airports not currently utilizing a fixed post plan. The agency also advised airport operators that it will ensure that TSA employees use duress alarms only when they perceive imminent danger.

All airport operators remain obligated to comply with existing ASP requirements to provide a law enforcement presence adequate to ensure the safety of passengers as mandated under 49 U.S.C § 44903(c) and 49 CFR § 1542.215. In situations where there is an imminent threat, law enforcement must therefore respond accordingly. As a further measure, TSA will ensure that its employees use duress alarms only when they perceive an imminent danger and not in response to more routine requests for law enforcement assistance.
BDOs, highlighted as an important aspect of the agency’s layers of security, will continue to provide needed flexibility in responding to threats and identifying potentially high-risk individuals based on behavioral indicators.

b. Ensure Explicit Incorporation of Maximum Response Times in all ASPs Utilizing Flexible Response Options.

Following the LAX shooting, the agency conducted a review of all ASPs and concluded that while most airports were operating under ASPs which specified a maximum response time to checkpoints, 71 airports (operating under flexible response) did not have any required response time stated in the security plan. The agency also identified differences in maximum response times resulting from discretionary determinations of need made at the local level. Although it considered imposing standardized maximum response times by category, the agency recognizes the importance of allowing discretion in these determinations and is therefore not currently pursuing standardized maximum response times. Nonetheless, ensuring that all airports adopt clearly articulated maximum response times in their ASP is a priority. Accordingly, FSDs overseeing those airports with no specified maximum response time are working expeditiously with airport operators to ensure that each airport’s ASP is quickly brought into compliance with the Security Directive requirements by specifying a maximum response time that addresses the unique circumstances of the individual airport.

c. Enhance VIPR Presence at Airports

TSA VIPR teams are authorized under the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, P.L. 110-53, to augment the security of any mode of transportation at any location within the United States. VIPR teams typically are composed of federal, state, and local law enforcement and security assets and TSA personnel including FAMs, BDOs, TSOs, Transportation Security Specialists-Explosives, Transportation Security Inspectors, and TSA-certified explosives detection canine teams. Pursuant to 6 U.S.C. § 1112 and 49 U.S.C. § 114(d), TSA tailors VIPR operations to meet the specific goals of law enforcement and security operations at the nation’s transportation systems, subject to consultation with entities directly affected by the deployment, including airport operators.

In the immediate aftermath of the incident, the agency deployed additional VIPR teams to the passenger screening checkpoints to provide a visible deterrent in support of the TSOs. To accomplish this surge in VIPR presence at the airports, VIPR teams were redeployed from an approximate split of 70% dedicated to surface and 30% to aviation transportation modes to a more even split between surface and aviation. This VIPR deployment strategy has garnered support among the agency workforce. The continued deployment of VIPRs will leverage BDO resources and allow for an enhanced presence as appropriate.

Presently, the agency has 37 VIPR teams which are supported with funding from three TSA appropriations. TSA plans to continue a 50-50 split of VIPR surface and aviation transportation mode missions in the near term. Actual operations, however, are subject to adjustments based on intelligence and special requirements.
III. Conclusion

The tragic shooting of Officer Hernandez and injuries suffered by two other TSA employees and a passenger on November 1, 2013, were an extraordinary shock to the TSA community and the public on whose behalf the agency is charged with ensuring safe and secure travel through the nation’s transportation systems. The events of that day were understandably upsetting and concerning to employees as well as to the public. It remains difficult to comprehend the sudden loss of a dedicated public servant who was simply doing his job in support of the agency’s transportation security mission.

The agency’s actions are aimed at seeking to prevent, to the greatest extent possible, a recurrence of this tragedy, while recognizing that the next attack may take a different form. In the wake of the LAX incident, the agency was given an opportunity to identify a better way forward in partnership with industry and law enforcement stakeholders and continued engagement with the workforce. The agency remains committed to delivering meaningful improvements to officer safety and security and to working collaboratively with its partners in this effort.
## ATTACHMENT A

### Stakeholder Participation by Association/Entity

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* Affiliated with the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC)
**ATTACHMENT B**

**Idea Factory – Officer Safety & Security**  
Summary as of March 11, 2014

**Background:** The Idea Factory received 213 submissions between 11/18/13 and 03/11/14 in response to Administrator Pistole’s request for employee input to improve TSA Officer Safety and Security. He asked for input in four key areas:

1) Possible short-term and long-term safety and security changes, like regular training and drills
2) Options for timely law enforcement response and presence at checkpoints
3) Future checkpoint design and configuration changes
4) Crisis communications between TSA employees, Law Enforcement Officers and key stakeholders

This response underscores the enthusiasm of the workforce to contribute to solving these challenges and we encourage the Integrated Project Team to continue engaging employees as the work on this effort continues.

**Employee Response:** Discussing the challenges and recommending possible solutions for effectively mitigating the threat and protecting the public as well as frontline officers has energized the workforce. Input was received from all levels within the organization; from FSDs, TSOs, staff from Training Departments and Coordination Centers, security inspectors and HQ employees. In addition to recommendations, the workforce indicated how thankful they are that “Senior Leadership is reaching out for ideas,” and wanted to express appreciation they were invited to participate in this “collective effort” and “for creating an impartial and open forum thread here on our established intranet board at the Idea Factory for use in communicating potential innovations and solutions.”

**Safety and Security Changes:** Ideas in this category ranged from increased training and drills, to strategies to protect the workforce from harm and how to quickly address incidents. More details on each topic are presented below.

**Drills and Training**
- Increase active shooter drills and exercises with other airport and local law enforcement agencies as participants.
- Develop “training for all frontline employees to help them recognize and react to escalating encounters.”
- Allow the entire workforce to “view the CCTV video of the LAX incident to study what behaviors, actions and activities Ciancia took prior to, during, and after the shooting.”

**Security Equipment**
- Use bulletproof vests by either making them available through VF solutions or having a certain number “on loan” at each checkpoint.
- Use police bullet shields, Tasers and pepper spray.

**Employee Response**
- Conduct self-defense training similar to crew members’ self-defense course.
- Create an extraction plan for fallen officers.
• Train all employees on basic CPR via the Online Learning Center.
• Give any certified EMTs on staff a set of emergency medical supplies.
• Equip uniform pants with tourniquet strips.

Public Perception of TSA Employees
• Adopt a public relations campaign to improve the image of TSA employees.
• Add signage that outlines the penalties associated with assault or attempted assault of a TSA officer.
• Alter uniform pants by removing the identifiable blue stripe and allowing officers to arrive and leave their duty location in plain clothes so as not to be identified as a TSA employee.

Timely Law Enforcement Response and Presence at Checkpoints: The majority of submissions recommend increasing visible law enforcement presence and response. Suggestions include a range of perspectives including:
• Require more frequent local airport LEO support at the checkpoints and “relocate them to the front near TDC.”
• Utilize “BDOs in plain clothes to blend in and analyze behaviors.”
• Regularly rotate FAMs into airport assignments.
• More effectively utilize TSA canines
• Create an armed division similar to the FFDO Program or Federal Protective Service. TSA armed employees could be created from retired law enforcement personnel or even employees who have concealed weapons permits.
• Create a new checkpoint position: “Law Enforcement Specialist TSO, similar to the passenger specialist, who would handle active communications with local airport law enforcement, and is trained on how to handle active shooter situations at the checkpoint.”

Checkpoint Design and Configuration Changes: Many comments highlighted future checkpoint design and configuration changes, such as:
• Enclose the “TDC in booths like Customs.”
• Use bulletproof glass or roll down/drop down gates at the entry to the checkpoint.
• Establish safe rooms and/or areas of cover.
• Close hallway access.

Crisis Communications: Crisis communications suggestions consisted of the following ideas:
• Use an app to ensure timely and accurate information sharing among stakeholders.
• Co-locate the coordination center with airport operations.
• Install a “special panic button or shooter warning alarm at every checkpoint that will alert all airport staff at one time, much like an audible tornado warning.”
• Include training with our federal/state and local enforcement agencies to improve response to a threat.
• “Ensure that airports have red phones or hotlines that connect directly to police.”
• Use FAMs to respond to calls to “help with the disconnect of local law enforcement when dealing with checkpoint response.”
ATTACHMENT C

Options Considered But Not Implemented

The agency contemplated numerous additional actions which are currently on hold or are no longer being considered due to feasibility, funding limitations, or the existence of preferred alternatives. A summary of these options is as follows:

1. Changes to the Workforce and Employee Policies

The agency considered but chose not to implement the following options seeking changes to the current workforce or employee policies: (1) creating a new TSA armed law enforcement cadre; (2) deputizing TSOs and Supervisory TSOs; (3) offering (or mandating) First Aid training; (4) issuing bulletproof vests to TSOs; (5) modifying the TSO uniform to make it appear less like law enforcement; and (6) permitting uniformed TSOs to carry personal cell phones on their belts (rather than in their pockets or lockers) while on duty.

The agency’s decision not to pursue these changes was based on the following rationale. As to creating a new law enforcement cadre or deputizing TSOs to carry out law enforcement functions, the Administrator does not believe that adding more guns to the checkpoint by arming TSOs is the solution and that it raises jurisdictional and cost issues. Moreover, all but one stakeholder group, along with TSA’s Integrated Project Team, agreed that arming TSOs was inadvisable.

With respect to First Aid training, as noted previously in the report, the agency believes that such emergency services can and should be rendered through specially trained first responders who are equipped and prepared to enter “warm zones” in active shooter circumstances. On the proposal to change the TSO uniforms to something more casual or less distinctive, the agency does not agree that this modification would produce appreciable gains in officer safety as TSOs would still need to be identified as TSA personnel. Moreover, TSO uniforms are an important aspect of TSA’s professionalism and esprit de corps. Any modifications would therefore have a negative impact on morale. Finally, the agency is confident that the current policy on personal cell phones affords sufficient accessibility, particularly in light of other agency efforts underway to enhance officer safety and security, including the expansion of duress alarms.

2. Enhancements to Law Enforcement Presence

Several options to enhance law enforcement presence at or around checkpoints were contemplated but are not being implemented. These alternatives include: (1) deploying Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement Officers to checkpoints; (2) assigning FAMs to checkpoints at major airports; (3) adopting the previous FAA maximum standard response times as a requirement for all airports; (4) establishing more stringent response times for airports with Reimbursable Agreements; (5) funding Reimbursable Agreements based on airport size and passenger throughput; (6) requiring that LEOs be stationed within a standard distance (e.g. 300 feet) of checkpoints; and (7) mandating standards for LEO response times for unattended vehicles and bags.
In light of the feedback from stakeholders, several of the above alternatives setting forth varying approaches to enhancing LEO presence at the checkpoints were tabled. The agency chose instead to proceed with recommended standards for law enforcement presence at checkpoints and ticket counters during peak travel times; ensuring that maximum response times are explicitly incorporated into 71 Airport Security Programs which don’t currently have a maximum response time specified (all operating under flexible response); and continuing to provide an enhanced VIPR presence at airports.

3. Physical Checkpoint Enhancements

The agency also considered several physical enhancements to the checkpoints which are on hold or otherwise not viable. These enhancements include (1) installing ballistic protection for the TDC podium, man traps or gates, deafening alarms, strobe lights, Kevlar panels, elevated platforms, and shatterproof glass; (2) placing police signs at checkpoints and phone connections to police or coordination centers; (3) stationing ballistic blankets or clear body shields at checkpoints; and (4) obtaining data analytical technology whereby specific data and sounds (i.e. gunshots) can be identified.

A number of the proposed changes would require significant investment without substantial gains in physical security for officers. Some of the suggested modifications such as deafening alarms and strobe lights would also incapacitate supervisors, law enforcement, and other first responders, who are trying to provide evacuation and other emergency instructions. Other ideas, while innovative, would not provide appreciable gains to safety or can easily be circumvented. Finally, certain suggested physical enhancements are more appropriate for consideration in future checkpoint redesign rather than as a retrofit project.
ATTACHMENT D

Broadcasts, Internal Blog Posts, and Video Messages

1. November 1, 2013 (SharePoint Page) – Active Shooter News (This was a one-stop page that was used to keep all related messages together)
2. November 1, 2013 (Broadcast Email) – Los Angeles International Airport Shooting Incident
3. November 1, 2013 (Broadcast Email) – Los Angeles International Airport Shooting
4. November 2, 2013 (SharePoint Page) – Gerardo Hernandez Memorial Page (This is a page at which TSA employees can offer condolences to the Hernandez family)
5. November 2, 2013 (Broadcast Email) – Los Angeles International Airport Visit
6. November 3, 2013 (Broadcast Email) – Injured Employees Update
7. November 5, 2013 (Broadcast Email) – Remembering and Honoring TSO Gerardo Hernandez
8. November 6, 2013 (Broadcast Email) – Blue Ribbons to Remember and Honor Gerardo Hernandez
9. November 6, 2013 (SharePoint Story) – Kudos Across America – Tribute to Gerardo Hernandez and LAX
10. November 7, 2013 (Broadcast Email) – Adopt-A-Family Program for the Hernandez Family
11. November 8, 2013 (Broadcast Email) – Today’s Moment of Silence for Los Angeles TSA Gerardo Hernandez
12. November 8, 2013 (Video) – TSA News – One week after LAX
13. November 12, 2013 (Broadcast Email) – Adopt-A-Family Program for the Hernandez, Grigsby and Speer Families
14. November 12, 2013 (Broadcast Email) – November 18 Memorial Service for TSO Gerardo Hernandez
15. November 15, 2013 (Broadcast Email) – Reminder: Memorial Service for TSO Gerardo Hernandez on November 18
17. November 18, 2013 (Broadcast Email) – Reminder: Memorial Service for TSO Gerardo Hernandez Today at 1 p.m.
18. November 19, 2013 (Video) – TSA News – Celebrating the life of TSO Gerardo Hernandez, Administrator Pistole addresses workplace safety
19. November 25, 2013 (Video) – Gerardo Hernandez – A three-part video of the HQ memorial event that honored the life and memory of Gerardo Hernandez
20. December 13, 2013 (SharePoint Story) – Miami Airport Community Raises Money for the Hernandez Memorial Fund
21. December 19, 2013 (Broadcast Email) – Mandatory Training for Workplace Violence Active Shooter Events
22. December 31, 2013 (Video) – TSA News – Mandatory active shooter training
23. January 8, 2014 (Video) – A Message from Administrator Pistole – TSA actions since LAX shooting to ensure employee safety
24. January 14, 2014 (Video) – TSA News – Administrator Pistole talks about Officer Safety
26. January 31, 2014 (SharePoint Story) – Two $30,000 Scholarships Awarded to Children of Slain TSA Agent Gerardo Hernandez
27. February 5, 2014 (Video) – Conversation with TSA Administrator – Administrator Pistole discusses TSA priorities for 2014 (Workplace Safety)
Duress Alarm Operational Status*

Operational Devices

- 98% Operational (1562)
- 2% Non-operational (32)**

Non-Op Devices by Airport Category

- 53% CAT X (17)
- 31% CAT I (2)
- 6% CAT II (10)
- 3% CAT III (2)
- 7% CAT IV (1)

Testing Frequency by Airport***

- 56% Daily (131)
- 44% Other (101)

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* These numbers include duress alarms not located at the checkpoint in areas such as FSD offices.
** Non-Operational include alarms in currently unused areas that have been switched off during renovation and other activities.
*** Others range from being tested weekly, monthly, quarterly, or were not addressed.
ATTACHMENT F

Relevant Authorities

49 U.S.C. § 44903(c)(1) – AIR TRANSPORTATION SECURITY/SECURITY PROGRAMS

(1) The Under Secretary shall prescribe regulations under subsection (b) of this section that require each operator of an airport regularly serving an air carrier holding a certificate issued by the Secretary of Transportation to establish an air transportation security program that provides a law enforcement presence and capability at each of those airports that is adequate to ensure the safety of passengers. The regulations shall authorize the operator to use the services of qualified State, local, and private law enforcement personnel. When the Under Secretary decides, after being notified by an operator in the form the Under Secretary prescribes, that not enough qualified State, local, and private law enforcement personnel are available to carry out subsection (b), the Under Secretary may authorize the operator to use, on a reimbursable basis, personnel employed by the Under Secretary, or by another department, agency, or instrumentality of the Government with the consent of the head of the department, agency, or instrumentality, to supplement State, local, and private law enforcement personnel. When deciding whether additional personnel are needed, the Under Secretary shall consider the number of passengers boarded at the airport, the extent of anticipated risk of criminal violence or aircraft piracy at the airport or to the air carrier aircraft operations at the airport, and the availability of qualified State or local law enforcement personnel at the airport.

49 U.S.C. § 44901(h) – SCREENING PASSENGERS AND PROPERTY/DEPLOYMENT OF ARMED PERSONNEL

(1) IN GENERAL.—The Under Secretary shall order the deployment of law enforcement personnel authorized to carry firearms at each airport security screening location to ensure passenger safety and national security.

(2) MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS.—Except at airports required to enter into agreements under subsection (c), the Under Secretary shall order the deployment of at least 1 law enforcement officer at each airport security screening location. At the 100 largest airports in the United States, in terms of annual passenger enplanements for the most recent calendar year for which data are available, the Under Secretary shall order the deployment of additional law enforcement personnel at airport security screening locations if the Under Secretary determines that the additional deployment is necessary to ensure passenger safety and national security.

49 U.S.C. § 44922(f) STATIONING OF OFFICERS

(f) STATIONING OF OFFICERS.—The Under Secretary may allow law enforcement personnel to be stationed other than at the airport security screening location if that would be preferable for law enforcement purposes and if such personnel would still be able to provide prompt responsiveness to problems occurring at the screening location.
6 U.S.C. § 1112 – AUTHORIZATION OF VISIBLE INTERMODAL PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary, acting through the Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration, may develop Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (referred to in this section as “VIPR”) teams to augment the security of any mode of transportation at any location within the United States. In forming a VIPR team, the Secretary—

(1) may use any asset of the Department, including Federal air marshals, surface transportation security inspectors, canine detection teams, and advanced screening technology;
(2) may determine when a VIPR team shall be deployed, as well as the duration of the deployment;
(3) shall, prior to and during the deployment, consult with local security and law enforcement officials in the jurisdiction where the VIPR team is or will be deployed, to develop and agree upon the appropriate operational protocols and provide relevant information about the mission of the VIPR team, as appropriate; and
(4) shall, prior to and during the deployment, consult with all transportation entities directly affected by the deployment of a VIPR team, as appropriate, including railroad carriers, air carriers, airport owners, over-the-road bus operators and terminal owners and operators, motor carriers, public transportation agencies, owners or operators of highways, port operators and facility owners, vessel owners and operators and pipeline operators.

(b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary to carry out this section such sums as necessary for fiscal years 2007 through 2011.

49 CFR §1542.103 Content.

(a) Complete program. Except as otherwise approved by TSA, each airport operator regularly serving operations of an aircraft operator or foreign air carrier described in §1544.101(a)(1) or §1546.101(a) of this chapter, must include in its security program the following:

(1) The name, means of contact, duties, and training requirements of the ASC required under §1542.3.
(2) [Reserved]
(3) A description of the secured areas, including—

   (i) A description and map detailing boundaries and pertinent features;
   (ii) Each activity or entity on, or adjacent to, a secured area that affects security;
   (iii) Measures used to perform the access control functions required under §1542.201(b)(1);
   (iv) Procedures to control movement within the secured area, including identification media required under §1542.201(b)(3); and
   (v) A description of the notification signs required under §1542.201(b)(6).

(4) A description of the AOA, including—

   (i) A description and map detailing boundaries, and pertinent features;
   (ii) Each activity or entity on, or adjacent to, an AOA that affects security;
   (iii) Measures used to perform the access control functions required under §1542.203(b)(1);
(iv) Measures to control movement within the AOA, including identification media as appropriate; and
(v) A description of the notification signs required under §1542.203(b)(4).

(5) A description of the SIDA’s, including—
   (i) A description and map detailing boundaries and pertinent features; and
   (ii) Each activity or entity on, or adjacent to, a SIDA.

(6) A description of the sterile areas, including—
   (i) A diagram with dimensions detailing boundaries and pertinent features;
   (ii) Access controls to be used when the passenger-screening checkpoint is non-operational and the entity responsible for that access control; and
   (iii) Measures used to control access as specified in §1542.207.

(7) Procedures used to comply with §1542.209 regarding fingerprint-based criminal history records checks.

(8) A description of the personnel identification systems as described in §1542.211.

(9) Escort procedures in accordance with §1542.211(e).

(10) Challenge procedures in accordance with §1542.211(d).

(11) Training programs required under §§1542.213 and 1542.217(c)(2), if applicable.

(12) A description of law enforcement support used to comply with §1542.215(a).

(13) A system for maintaining the records described in §1542.221.

(14) The procedures and a description of facilities and equipment used to support TSA inspection of individuals and property, and aircraft operator or foreign air carrier screening functions of parts 1544 and 1546 of this chapter.

(15) A contingency plan required under §1542.301.

(16) Procedures for the distribution, storage, and disposal of security programs, Security Directives, Information Circulars, implementing instructions, and, as appropriate, classified information.

(17) Procedures for posting of public advisories as specified in §1542.305.

(18) Incident management procedures used to comply with §1542.307.

(19) Alternate security procedures, if any, that the airport operator intends to use in the event of natural disasters, and other emergency or unusual conditions.

(20) Each exclusive area agreement as specified in §1542.111.

(21) Each airport tenant security program as specified in §1542.113.

(b) Supporting program. Except as otherwise approved by TSA, each airport regularly serving operations of an aircraft operator or foreign air carrier described in §1544.101(a)(2) or (f), or §1546.101(b) or (c) of this chapter, must include in its security program a description of the following:

   (1) Name, means of contact, duties, and training requirements of the ASC, as required under §1542.3.

   (2) A description of the law enforcement support used to comply with §1542.215(a).

   (3) Training program for law enforcement personnel required under §1542.217(c)(2), if applicable.

   (4) A system for maintaining the records described in §1542.221.

   (5) The contingency plan required under §1542.301.

   (6) Procedures for the distribution, storage, and disposal of security programs, Security Directives, Information Circulars, implementing instructions, and, as appropriate, classified information.
(7) Procedures for public advisories as specified in §1542.305.
(8) Incident management procedures used to comply with §1542.307.

(c) **Partial program.** Except as otherwise approved by TSA, each airport regularly serving operations of an aircraft operator or foreign air carrier described in §1544.101(b) or §1546.101(d) of this chapter, must include in its security program a description of the following:

1. Name, means of contact, duties, and training requirements of the ASC as required under §1542.3.
2. A description of the law enforcement support used to comply with §1542.215(b).
3. Training program for law enforcement personnel required under §1542.217(c)(2), if applicable.
4. A system for maintaining the records described in §1542.221.
5. Procedures for the distribution, storage, and disposal of security programs, Security Directives, Information Circulars, implementing instructions, and, as appropriate, classified information.
6. Procedures for public advisories as specified in §1542.305.
7. Incident management procedures used to comply with §1542.307.

(d) **Use of appendices.** The airport operator may comply with paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this section by including in its security program, as an appendix, any document that contains the information required by paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this section. The appendix must be referenced in the corresponding section(s) of the security program.

**49 CFR §1542.215 Law enforcement support.**

(a) In accordance with §1542.217, each airport operator required to have a security program under §1542.103(a) or (b) must provide:

1. Law enforcement personnel in the number and manner adequate to support its security program.
2. Uniformed law enforcement personnel in the number and manner adequate to support each system for screening persons and accessible property required under part 1544 or 1546 of this chapter, except to the extent that TSA provides Federal law enforcement support for the system.

(b) Each airport required to have a security program under §1542.103(c) must ensure that:

1. Law enforcement personnel are available and committed to respond to an incident in support of a civil aviation security program when requested by an aircraft operator or foreign air carrier that has a security program under part 1544 or 1546 of this chapter.
2. The procedures by which to request law enforcement support are provided to each aircraft operator or foreign air carrier that has a security program under part 1544 or 1546 of this chapter.
Law Enforcement Checkpoint Support per Airport Security Programs

LEO Support by Type
- Municipal 192
- County 105
- Airport Authority 116
- Private 18
- State 15
- Military 1

LEO Located at Airport
- Yes 329
- No 118

LEO Checkpoint Response
- Combination Stationed and Flexible 17
- Stationed at Checkpoint 51
- Flexible Response to Checkpoint 379

447 Airports